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Towards AI Accountability Infrastructure: Gaps and Opportunities in AI Audit Tooling

Open access
Ojewale, Victor, Steed, Ryan, Vecchione, Briana, Birhane, Abeba, Raji, Inioluwa Deborah·2025·Proceedings of the 2025 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems

Abstract

Audits are critical mechanisms for identifying the risks and limitations of deployed artifcial intelligence (AI) systems.However, the efective execution of AI audits remains incredibly difcult, and practitioners often need to make use of various tools to support their eforts.Drawing on interviews with 35 AI audit practitioners and a landscape analysis of 435 tools, we compare the current ecosystem of AI audit tooling to practitioner needs.While many tools are designed to help set standards and evaluate AI systems, they often fall short in supporting accountability.We outline challenges practitioners faced in their eforts to use AI audit tools and highlight areas for future tool development beyond evaluationfrom harms discovery to advocacy.We conclude that the available resources do not currently support the full scope of AI audit practitioners' needs and recommend that the feld move beyond tools for just evaluation and towards more comprehensive infrastructure for AI accountability.

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

This paper compares AI audit practitioners’ tooling needs with the existing AI audit tool landscape, finding that available tools are concentrated in evaluation and standards rather than accountability. The authors argue the field needs broader infrastructure for harms discovery, communication, advocacy, and independent auditing.

Key findings

  • Across 435 tools, the landscape was dominated by evaluation-oriented resources: Standards Identification & Management (N=206) and Performance Analysis (N=129), while accountability-related stages were far rarer: Harms Discovery (N=48), Advocacy (N=14), Transparency Infrastructure (N=12), and Audit Communication (N=8).
  • Most tools in the dataset were freely available or open source (77.9%), but auditors often still built their own tools or adapted existing ones because available tools were ad hoc, context-specific, or inadequate for complex systems.
  • Data Collection tools were much more likely to be open source (68.1%) than Transparency Infrastructure tools (25.0%); Performance Analysis tools were disproportionately built by for-profit organizations (48.1%) and were less likely to be open source.
  • Practitioners wanted tools for uncompromised data access, consistent and holistic standards, audit integrity, participation, communication, and advocacy, but found current tooling did not support the full audit process or meaningful accountability.

Methods

  • Semi-structured interviews with 35 AI audit practitioners across 24 organizations, conducted as 27 interviews; participants worked in tech companies, startups, government, non-profits, consulting, news, law, and academia, primarily in North America (N=22) and Europe (N=5).
  • A landscape analysis of 435 AI audit tools, built from an initial list of 143 tools, theoretical sampling that added 181 tools between August and October 2022, 102 more through September 2024, and 9 additional tools in September 2024; tools were grouped into a taxonomy of 30 main categories, 27 subcategories, and 7 audit stages.
  • Interview transcripts were inductively coded with descriptive and values coding; tools were manually labeled for license, organization type, audit target, intended user, and format, supplemented with Crunchbase, GitHub, and Google Scholar data.

Limitations

  • The paper states the tool sample is not exhaustive or statistically representative; theoretical sampling deliberately over-represents less common tooling such as advocacy tools, and reliance on public materials likely over-represents open tooling over proprietary tooling.
  • The authors state the analysis is primarily scoped to the U.S. and E.U., relies mainly on English-language and Western sources, and may not represent the global AI auditing landscape; they also note struggling to avoid a techno-solutionist framing.
  • Evident from the text: the interview sample is limited to 35 practitioners across 24 organizations in North America and Europe, so findings may not generalize to other regions, sectors, or audit contexts.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1145/3706598.3713301

Cites

83 of 83 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Claims the paper makes

35 of 84 cited sources checked · 23 supported · 0 flagged · accuracy not yet measured

  • Premisecitation
    § 1 Introduction · p. 1

    The maturity of the AI audit ecosystem in the technology sector lags far behind other industries such as finance and healthcare.

    “Often defined as independent evaluations of the performance, fairness, legality, or safety of deployed AI systems, the maturity of the audit ecosystem in the technology sector lags far behind other industries such as finance and healthcare [38, 88].”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim2 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [38] [38] Inioluwa Deborah Raji, Andrew Smart, Rebecca N. White, Margaret Mitchell, Timnit Gebru, Ben Hutchinson, Jamila Smith-Loud, Daniel Theron, and Parker Barnes. 2020. Closing the AI accountability gap: defining an end-to-end framework for internal algorithmic auditing. In Proceedings of the 2020 Conference on - Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAT* '20). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (Jan. 2020), 33-44. isbn: 978-1-4503-6936-7. doi: 10.1145/3351095.3372873. - source
    • cites [88] [88] Inioluwa Deborah Raji, Peggy Xu, Colleen Honigsberg, and Daniel Ho. 2022. Outsider Oversight: Designing a Third Party Audit Ecosystem for AI Governance. In Proceedings of the 2022 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society (AIES '22). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (July 2022), 557-571. isbn: 978-1-4503-9247-1. doi: 10.1145/3514094.3534181. - source
  • Premisecitation
    § Abeba Birhane · p. 1

    The lack of access and visibility to many AI systems leaves auditors without the information needed to make adequate and truly independent assessments.

    “leaves auditors without the information needed to make adequate and truly independent assessments [70, 75].”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [70] [70] Kenneth Holstein, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan, Hal Daumé, Miro Dudik, and Hanna Wallach. 2019. Improving Fairness in Machine Learning Systems: What Do Industry Practitioners Need? In Proceedings of the 2019 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems . ACM, Glasgow Scotland Uk, (May 2019), 1-16. isbn: 978-1-4503-5970-2. doi: 10.1145/3290605.3300830. - source

      The ‘Needs for More Proactive Auditing Processes’ section (p. 8) reports that practitioners often lack individual-level demographic information needed for fairness auditing. It does not say that limited access or visibility into AI systems prevents auditors from making truly independent assessments; its findings concern teams auditing their own products. (LLM, conf=0.83)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [75] [75] Petros Terzis, Michael Veale, and Noëlle Gaumann. 2024. Law and the Emerging Political Economy of Algorithmic Audits. In Proceedings of the 2024 ACM - Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT '24). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (June 2024), 1255-1267. doi: 10.1145/3630106.3658970. - source

      Section 5.0.2 (Confidentiality; page unavailable) says rigorous algorithmic audits require access to documents that organisations may withhold, and that independence challenges may make auditors less forceful in seeking them. This supports the concern, but the paper presents restricted access as a risk rather than establishing that auditors generally lack the information needed for adequate, independent assessments of many AI systems. (LLM, conf=0.82)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Premisecitation
    § Abeba Birhane · p. 1

    A thorough evaluation alone is not sufficient to hold key stakeholders responsible for system-wide behavior.

    “A thorough evaluation alone is not sufficient to hold key stakeholders responsible for system-wide behavior [13, 88]-auditors also need tools that support key components of the accountability process, including target identification, standardization of practice, communication, and advocacy [136].”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [13] [13] Ellen P Goodman and Julia Tréhu. 2022. AI Audit-Washing and Accountability. Policy Paper. German Marshall Fund of the United States, (Nov. 2022). https: //www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/2022-11/Goodman%20%26%20Trehu%2 0-%20Algorithmic%20Auditing%20-%20paper.pdf. - source
    • cites [88] [88] Inioluwa Deborah Raji, Peggy Xu, Colleen Honigsberg, and Daniel Ho. 2022. Outsider Oversight: Designing a Third Party Audit Ecosystem for AI Governance. In Proceedings of the 2022 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society (AIES '22). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (July 2022), 557-571. isbn: 978-1-4503-9247-1. doi: 10.1145/3514094.3534181. - source
  • Findingcitation
    § 4.4 Performance Analysis · p. 11

    Tools surveyed in Performance Analysis often overlooked entire other areas of concern, including basic functionality of the model as well as other methods of evaluation.

    “The tools we surveyed in this category often overlooked entire other areas of concern, including the basic functionality of the model [117] as well as other methods of evaluation.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [117] [117] Inioluwa Deborah Raji, I. Elizabeth Kumar, Aaron Horowitz, and Andrew Selbst. 2022. The Fallacy of AI Functionality. In 2022 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency . ACM, Seoul Republic of Korea, (June 2022), 959-972. isbn: 978-1-4503-9352-2. doi: 10.1145/3531146.3533158. - source
    • Rests on an assumption: The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
    • Rests on an assumption: The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
  • Premisecitation
    § 5.1 Moving beyond evaluation, towards accountability · p. 12

    Costanza-Chock et al. found that over 65% of surveyed AI audit practitioners felt that 'accountability' was a top unmet need in their AI auditing work.

    “Costanza-Chock et al. [136] found that over 65% of surveyed AI audit practitioners felt that 'accountability' (defined as a 'commitment from auditee to address problems covered by audit within set time') was a top unmet need in their AI auditing work.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Costanza-Chock et al. [136] [136] Sasha Costanza-Chock, Inioluwa Deborah Raji, and Joy Buolamwini. 2022. Who Audits the Auditors? Recommendations from a field scan of the algorithmic auditing ecosystem. In Proceedings of the 2022 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT '22). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (June 2022), 1571-1583. isbn: 978-1-4503-9352-2. doi: 10.1145/3531146.3533213. - source
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 64
  • May combine two claims. 49
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § Abeba Birhane · p. 1

    Past research in HCI and social computing has developed and studied a host of fairness, explainability, and other toolkits that inform AI evaluations.

    “Past research in human-computer interaction (HCI) and social computing has developed and studied a host of fairness, explainability, and other toolkits that inform such evaluations [5, 15, 39, 54, 69, 70, 72, 80, 82, 85, 104, 119, 125, 126, 132].”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim3 of 3 sources checked
    • cites [5] [5] Allison Woodruff, Sarah E. Fox, Steven Rousso-Schindler, and Jeffrey Warshaw. 2018. A Qualitative Exploration of Perceptions of Algorithmic Fairness. In Proceedings of the 2018 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI '18). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (Apr. 2018), 1-14. isbn: 978-1-4503-5620-6. doi: 10.1145/3173574.3174230. - source

      In “Workshop as Method” (page unavailable), the paper describes using a workshop as a research instrument to study perceptions of algorithmic fairness and inform future technology and policy. That supports the sentence’s broader point about HCI methods informing fairness work, but our copy does not describe this study as developing or studying a fairness or explainability toolkit for AI evaluations. (LLM, conf=0.78)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [15] [15] Rachel K. E. Bellamy et al. 2018. AI Fairness 360: An Extensible Toolkit for Detecting, Understanding, and Mitigating Unwanted Algorithmic Bias. (Oct. 2018). arXiv: 1810.01943 [cs] . doi: 10.48550/arXiv.1810.01943. - source
    • cites [39] [39] Michael A. Madaio, Luke Stark, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan, and Hanna Wallach. 2020. Co-Designing Checklists to Understand Organizational Challenges and Opportunities around Fairness in AI. In Proceedings of the 2020 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI '20). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (Apr. 2020), 1-14. isbn: 978-14503-6708-0. doi: 10.1145/3313831.3376445. - source
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Premisecitation
    § Abeba Birhane · p. 1

    Auditors need tools that support key components of the accountability process, including target identification, standardization of practice, communication, and advocacy.

    “A thorough evaluation alone is not sufficient to hold key stakeholders responsible for system-wide behavior [13, 88]-auditors also need tools that support key components of the accountability process, including target identification, standardization of practice, communication, and advocacy [136].”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [136] [136] Sasha Costanza-Chock, Inioluwa Deborah Raji, and Joy Buolamwini. 2022. Who Audits the Auditors? Recommendations from a field scan of the algorithmic auditing ecosystem. In Proceedings of the 2022 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT '22). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (June 2022), 1571-1583. isbn: 978-1-4503-9352-2. doi: 10.1145/3531146.3533213. - source

      Section 4.1.1 reports that few auditors use standardized frameworks and tools, while section 5.2 recommends standards and disclosure of audit findings—supporting the need for better practice and communication. Section 4.2.1 also links public pressure to action on ethical AI issues. The paper does not clearly recommend tools for target identification and advocacy as components of an accountability process. (LLM, conf=0.83)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation
    § 4.2 Standards Identification & Management · p. 8

    Microsoft's AI Fairness checklist was co-designed with practitioners in an effort to be more compatible with practical challenges, but many other standards frameworks did not obviously consult practitioners and fewer involved affected stakeholders.

    “Microsoft's AI Fairness checklist, for example, was co-designed with practitioners [39] in an effort to be more compatible with practical challenges, but many of the other standards frameworks we found did not obviously consult practitioners and fewer involved affected stakeholders.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [39] [39] Michael A. Madaio, Luke Stark, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan, and Hanna Wallach. 2020. Co-Designing Checklists to Understand Organizational Challenges and Opportunities around Fairness in AI. In Proceedings of the 2020 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI '20). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (Apr. 2020), 1-14. isbn: 978-14503-6708-0. doi: 10.1145/3313831.3376445. - source
    • Rests on an assumption: The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
    • Rests on an assumption: The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationcitation
    § · Developing participatory methods for audit work. · p. 12

    Open tooling practices can have complex interactions with power and oversight.

    “but can have complex interactions with power and oversight that are worthy of further study [137].”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [137] [137] David Gray Widder, Meredith Whittaker, and Sarah Myers West. 2024. Why 'open' AI systems are actually closed, and why this matters. Nature , 635, 8040, (Nov. 2024), 827-833. doi: 10.1038/s41586-024-08141-1. - source
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisereasoning
    § · Developing participatory methods for audit work. · p. 12

    Participation is an increasing focus for AI audit practitioners and audit tool developers.

    “it is no surprise that participation is an increasing focus for AI audit practitioners and audit tool developers as well.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 3 sources checked
    • cites [90] [90] Kulynych, Bogdan, David Madras, Smitha Milli, Inioluwa Deborah Raji, Angela Zhou, and Richard Zemel. 2020. Participatory approaches to machine learning. International Conference on Machine Learning Workshop. (July 2020). -

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites [92] [92] AbebaBirhane, William Isaac, Vinodkumar Prabhakaran, Mark Diaz, Madeleine Clare Elish, Iason Gabriel, and Shakir Mohamed. 2022. Power to the People? Opportunities and Challenges for Participatory AI. In Proceedings of the 2nd - ACM Conference on Equity and Access in Algorithms, Mechanisms, and Optimization (EAAMO '22). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (Oct. 2022), 1-8. isbn: 978-1-4503-9477-2. doi: 10.1145/3551624.3555290. -

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites [121] [121] Fernando Delgado, Stephen Yang, Michael Madaio, and Qian Yang. 2023. The Participatory Turn in AI Design: Theoretical Foundations and the Current State of Practice. In Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Conference on Equity and Access in Algorithms, Mechanisms, and Optimization (EAAMO '23). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (Oct. 2023), 1-23. isbn: 979-84007-0381-2. doi: 10.1145/3617694.3623261. - source

      The Introduction describes increasing calls for stakeholder participation in AI design and a growing consensus that stakeholders should participate more. It does not establish that participation is an increasing focus specifically for AI audit practitioners or audit tool developers. (LLM, conf=0.83)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § 4.4 Performance Analysis · p. 11

    Fewer studies examine how practitioners evaluate criteria such as basic functionality, safety, privacy, or recourse, just as fewer tools exist for this purpose.

    “While there are multiple studies on the use of tools for fairness evaluation [54, 70, 119] and explainability [1, 46, 72, 82, 85, 98], fewer studies examine how practitioners evaluate other criteria such as basic functionality [117], safety, privacy, or recourse, just as fewer tools exist for this purpose.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim7 of 10 sources checked
    • cites [54] [54] Wesley Hanwen Deng, Manish Nagireddy, Michelle Seng Ah Lee, Jatinder Singh, Zhiwei Steven Wu, Kenneth Holstein, and Haiyi Zhu. 2022. Exploring How Machine Learning Practitioners (Try To) Use Fairness Toolkits. In Proceedings of the 2022 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT '22). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (June 2022), 473-484. isbn: 978-1-4503-9352-2. doi: 10.1145/3531146.353 3113. - source
    • cites [70] [70] Kenneth Holstein, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan, Hal Daumé, Miro Dudik, and Hanna Wallach. 2019. Improving Fairness in Machine Learning Systems: What Do Industry Practitioners Need? In Proceedings of the 2019 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems . ACM, Glasgow Scotland Uk, (May 2019), 1-16. isbn: 978-1-4503-5970-2. doi: 10.1145/3290605.3300830. - source

      The citation [117] is attached to “basic functionality.” In “Needs for More Proactive Auditing Processes” (p. 8), the paper discusses a checklist for accuracy only as a contrast to the lack of one for fairness. The passages examined do not establish that fewer studies examine how practitioners evaluate basic functionality or that fewer tools exist for it. (LLM, conf=0.77)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [119] [119] Michelle Seng Ah Lee and Jat Singh. 2021. The Landscape and Gaps in Open Source Fairness Toolkits. In Proceedings of the 2021 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI '21). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (May 2021), 1-13. isbn: 978-1-4503-8096-6. doi: 10.1145 /3411764.3445261. - source
    • cites [1] [1] Sunnie S. Y. Kim, Elizabeth Anne Watkins, Olga Russakovsky, Ruth Fong, and Andrés Monroy-Hernández. 2023. "Help Me Help the AI": Understanding How Explainability Can Support Human-AI Interaction. In Proceedings of the 2023 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI '23). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (Apr. 2023), 1-17. isbn: 978-1-4503-9421-5. doi: 10.1145/3544548.3581001. - source
    • cites [46] [46] Danding Wang, Qian Yang, Ashraf Abdul, and Brian Y. Lim. 2019. Designing Theory-Driven User-Centric Explainable AI. In Proceedings of the 2019 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI '19). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (May 2019), 1-15. isbn: 978-14503-5970-2. doi: 10.1145/3290605.3300831. - source
    • cites [72] [72] Harmanpreet Kaur, Harsha Nori, Samuel Jenkins, Rich Caruana, Hanna Wallach, and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan. 2020. Interpreting Interpretability: Understanding Data Scientists' Use of Interpretability Tools for Machine Learning. In Proceedings of the 2020 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI '20). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (Apr. 2020), 1-14. isbn: 978-1-4503-6708-0. doi: 10.1145/3313831.3376219. - source
    • cites [82] [82] Alison Smith-Renner, Ron Fan, Melissa Birchfield, Tongshuang Wu, Jordan Boyd-Graber, Daniel S. Weld, and Leah Findlater. 2020. No Explainability without Accountability: An Empirical Study of Explanations and Feedback in Interactive ML. In Proceedings of the 2020 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI '20). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (Apr. 2020), 1-13. isbn: 978-1-4503-6708-0. doi: 10.1145/33138 31.3376624. - source
    • cites [85] [85] Astrid Bertrand, Tiphaine Viard, Rafik Belloum, James R. Eagan, and Winston Maxwell. 2023. On Selective, Mutable and Dialogic XAI: a Review of What Users Say about Different Types of Interactive Explanations. In Proceedings of the 2023 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI '23). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (Apr. 2023), 1-21. isbn: 978-1-4503-9421-5. doi: 10.1145/3544548.3581314. - source
    • cites [98] [98] Q. Vera Liao, Daniel Gruen, and Sarah Miller. 2020. Questioning the AI: Informing Design Practices for Explainable AI User Experiences. In Proceedings of the 2020 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI '20). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (Apr. 2020), 1-15. isbn: 978-1-4503-6708-0. doi: 10.1145/3313831.3376590. - source
    • cites [117] [117] Inioluwa Deborah Raji, I. Elizabeth Kumar, Aaron Horowitz, and Andrew Selbst. 2022. The Fallacy of AI Functionality. In 2022 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency . ACM, Seoul Republic of Korea, (June 2022), 959-972. isbn: 978-1-4503-9352-2. doi: 10.1145/3531146.3533158. - source

      The Related Work section says little has been done to systematically discuss functionality problems, which supports the narrower point that basic functionality receives less research attention. It does not establish that fewer studies examine how practitioners evaluate functionality. The paper also says in §5.2.3 that many model-logging and evaluation tools are available, rather than establishing a shortage of such tools. (LLM, conf=0.82)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § 4.4 Performance Analysis · p. 10

    Shapley values are prone to misuse and may be unsuitable for normative evaluation.

    “But as Kumar et al. [95] argue, Shapley values are prone to misuse and may be unsuitable for normative evaluation.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Kumar et al. [95] [95] I. Elizabeth Kumar, Suresh Venkatasubramanian, Carlos Scheidegger, and Sorelle A. Friedler. 2020. Problems with Shapley-value-based explanations as feature importance measures. In Proceedings of the 37th International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML'20). Vol. 119. JMLR.org, (July 2020), 54915500. Retrieved Nov. 20, 2023 from. - source
  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation
    § 5.1 Moving beyond evaluation, towards accountability · p. 12

    Several tools surfaced in the survey (e.g., from Holistic.ai, Credo.ai) were explicitly marketed for use for NYC Local Law 144 compliance, but studies of audit practice suggest the produced measures may not be reliable or legally compatible.

    “For instance, several tools surfaced in our survey (e.g., from Holistic.ai, Credo.ai) were explicitly marketed for use for NYC Local Law 144 compliance, but studies of audit practice suggest the produced measures may not be reliable or legally compatible [30, 84, 86].”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim3 of 3 sources checked
    • cites [30] [30] Lara Groves, Jacob Metcalf, Alayna Kennedy, Briana Vecchione, and Andrew Strait. 2024. Auditing Work: Exploring the New York City algorithmic bias audit regime. In Proceedings of the 2024 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT '24). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (June 2024), 1107-1120. doi: 10.1145/3630106.3658959. - source

      Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 1 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [84] [84] Lucas Wright, Roxana Mika Muenster, Briana Vecchione, Tianyao Qu, Pika (Senhuang) Cai, Alan Smith, Comm 2450 Student Investigators, Jacob Metcalf, and J. Nathan Matias. 2024. Null Compliance: NYC Local Law 144 and the challenges of algorithm accountability. In Proceedings of the 2024 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT '24). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (June 2024), 1701-1713. doi: 10.1145/3630106.3658998. - source

      Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 1 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [86] [86] Alice Xiang and Inioluwa Deborah Raji. 2019. On the Legal Compatibility of Fairness Definitions. (Nov. 2019). arXiv: 1912 . 00761 [cs, stat] . doi: 10.48550/arXiv.1912.00761. - source

      Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 1 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § 4.4 Performance Analysis · p. 10

    Interpretability and explainability methods promoted by popular tools vary widely in their goals and may encourage false confidence in their users.

    “Interpretability and explainability methods promoted by popular tools vary widely in their goals [120] and, like many 'snake oil' AI products [18, 59, 91], may encourage false confidence in their users [118].”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 5 sources checked
    • cites [120] [120] Zachary C. Lipton. 2018. The Mythos of Model Interpretability: In machine learning, the concept of interpretability is both important and slippery. Queue , 16, 3, (June 2018), 31-57. doi: 10.1145/3236386.3241340. - source
    • cites [18] [18] Arvind Narayanan and Sayash Kapoor. 2024. AI Snake Oil: What Artificial Intelligence Can Do, What It Can't, and How to Tell the Difference . Princeton University Press, Princeton. isbn: 978-0-691-24913-1. -

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites [59] [59] Frederike Kaltheuner, (Ed.) 2021. Fake AI . Meatspace Press. isbn: 978-1-91382403-7. -

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites [91] [91] Luke Stark and Jevan Hutson. 2021. Physiognomic artificial intelligence. Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. LJ , 32, 922. - source
    • cites [118] [118] Marzyeh Ghassemi, Luke Oakden-Rayner, and Andrew L. Beam. 2021. The false hope of current approaches to explainable artificial intelligence in health care. The Lancet Digital Health , 3, 11, (Nov. 2021), e745-e750. doi: 10.1016/S25 89-7500(21)00208-9. - source
  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 9

    Existing tools for data scraping were helpful but often required extensive adaptation.

    “Existing tools for data scraping were helpful but often required extensive adaptation:”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § 4.2 Standards Identification & Management · p. 6

    In the dataset, goal-articulating principle statements (N=86) and self-assessment checklists (N=49) were most common, while participatory standard-setting methods (N=5) were rare.

    “Most commonly found were goal-articulating 'principle statements' ( 𝑁 = 86), selfassessment checklists ( 𝑁 = 49), and similar documents, while methods for participatory standard-setting ( 𝑁 = 5) were comparatively rare in our dataset.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
    • Rests on an assumption: The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Findingnone given
    § 4.1 Harms Discovery · p. 5

    Participation also helps instill confidence in the audit process and foster engagement with subsequent accountability efforts.

    “Participation also helps instill confidence in the audit process and foster engagement with subsequent accountability efforts.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingown data
    § 4.2 Standards Identification & Management · p. 7

    Some participants thought assessment templates and checklists were focused too narrowly on fairness assessment.

    “Some participants also thought that assessments templates and checklists were focused too narrowly on fairness assessment.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingown data
    § 4.2 Standards Identification & Management · p. 6

    Auditors emphasized the importance of standardized evaluation frameworks that provide clarity and consistency.

    “Auditors emphasized the importance of standardized evaluation frameworks that provide clarity and consistency: ' I think standardization is a big [concern]... ' (P23)”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingnone given
    § 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 8

    Tools for Transparency Infrastructure (N=12) are interfaces and databases hosted by model operators that allow controlled access to relevant data.

    “Tools for Transparency Infrastructure ( 𝑁 = 12) are interfaces and databases hosted by model operators that allow controlled access to relevant data.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
    • Rests on an assumption: The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § (3) RQ3: Do existing tools support practitioners' needs? · p. 2

    Auditors envisioned tools to help them access high-quality, uncompromised data, apply consistent and holistic standards and methods, and ensure audit integrity.

    “Auditors envisioned tools to help them access high-quality, uncompromised data, apply consistent and holistic standards and methods, and ensure audit integrity.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Findingown data
    § 4.1 Harms Discovery · p. 5

    Auditors recognized that to comprehensively identify AI-related harms, they must engage with those directly impacted.

    “Auditors recognized that to comprehensively identify AI-related harms, they must engage with those directly impacted.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 9

    With recent datasets scaling up to staggering sizes, the concern about data quality has become more acute, and auditors commented that manual analysis was no longer feasible.

    “With recent datasets scaling up to staggering sizes, this concern has become more acute and auditors commented on how manual analysis was no longer feasible:”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingown data
    § 4.2 Standards Identification & Management · p. 7

    Multiple participants felt there was a culture or communications gap between legal and compliance people on one side and engineers on the other.

    “Multiple participants felt there was a ' culture or communications gap between the legal and compliance people on one side and the engineers on the other ' (P12).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § 4.2 Standards Identification & Management · p. 8

    Some tools made advances in one or more dimensions of holistic, context-specific, inclusive, and practice-compatible standards, but few accomplished all three.

    “Some of the tools we found made advances in one or more of these dimensions, but few accomplished all three.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
    • Rests on an assumption: The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation
    § 4.2 Standards Identification & Management · p. 8

    NIST's AI RMF includes safety, security, reliability, transparency, explainability, and privacy in addition to fairness, but its guidance for specific evaluation techniques remains fairly broad.

    “while NIST's AI RMF includes safety, security, reliability, transparency, explainability, and privacy, in addition to fairness, its guidance for specific evaluation techniques remains fairly broad [17].”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [17] [17] Elham Tabassi. 2023. AI Risk Management Framework: AI RMF (1.0). Tech. rep. error: NIST AI 100-1. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, error: NIST AI 100-1. doi: 10.6028/NIST.AI.100-1. - source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingreasoning
    § 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 9

    Data quality concerns intersected with concerns about audit integrity.

    “Data quality concerns intersected with concerns about audit integrity.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 10

    Some external auditors worried that external data collection tools, particularly data scraping or data donation, may violate terms of service set by platforms and result in legal liability or retaliation.

    “Some external auditors also worried that external data collection tools-particularly tools for data scraping or data donation-may violate terms of service set by platforms and result in legal liability or retaliation.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingown data
    § 4.2 Standards Identification & Management · p. 6

    Many auditors wished to streamline the auditing process by offering predefined structures and templates for assessment.

    “Many wished to streamline the auditing process by offering predefined structures and templates for assessment, which are essential for conducting audits effectively and facilitating communication.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation
    § 4.1 Harms Discovery · p. 5

    While we did find multiple popular databases for recording and collating incidents of harm, these databases record harms after they have already occurred, often rely on second-hand reports, and may not delve deeply into causes of harms or impacts.

    “While we did find multiple popular databases for recording and collating incidents of harm (such as the AI Incident Database), these databases record harms after they have already occurred, often rely on second-hand reports, and may not delve deeply into causes of harms or impacts [139].”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [139] [139] Violet Turri and Rachel Dzombak. 2023. Why We Need to Know More: Exploring the State of AI Incident Documentation Practices. In Proceedings of the 2023 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society (AIES '23). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (Aug. 2023), 576-583. doi: 10.1145/3600211.3604700. - source
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingcitation
    § 4.1 Harms Discovery · p. 5

    Participants recognized the challenge of designing methodologies and tools without exploitation, tokenization, or other forms of 'participation washing'.

    “Participants also recognized the challenge of designing methodologies and tools without exploitation, tokenization, or other forms of 'participation washing' [89], highlighting the need for fair compensation and participatory algorithmic development, in addition to participatory auditing.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [89] [89] Mona Sloane, Emanuel Moss, Olaitan Awomolo, and Laura Forlano. 2022. Participation Is not a Design Fix for Machine Learning. In Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Equity and Access in Algorithms, Mechanisms, and Optimization (EAAMO '22). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (Oct. 2022), 1-6. isbn: 978-1-4503-9477-2. doi: 10.1145/3551624.3555 285. - source
  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § (3) RQ3: Do existing tools support practitioners' needs? · p. 2

    While there currently exist many tools to support audit work, particularly for evaluating AI systems and managing standards, these tools often fell short of helping auditors achieve accountability in practice.

    “We find that while there currently exist many tools to support audit work, particularly for evaluating AI systems and managing standards, these tools often fell short of helping auditors achieve accountability in practice.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § 4 Results · p. 5

    Practitioners struggled to independently access high-quality data about system behavior, apply consistent and holistic standards and methods, ensure audit integrity, involve affected stakeholders, and collaborate across disciplines.

    “Practitioners struggled to independently access high-quality data about system behavior, apply consistent and holistic standards and methods, ensure audit integrity, involve affected stakeholders, and collaborate across disciplines.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingown data
    § 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 10

    Auditors expressed concerns about legal risks from existing laws and regulations, particularly the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and other privacy laws.

    “Auditors expressed concerns about legal risks from existing laws and regulations, particularly the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and other privacy laws.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § (3) RQ3: Do existing tools support practitioners' needs? · p. 2

    Practitioners found some tools-such as open source tools for data collection-empowering, but tools for tasks beyond evaluation, such as discovering harms, communicating audit results, and advocating for subsequent changes, were much less common.

    “Practitioners found some tools-such as open source tools for data collection-empowering, but tools for tasks beyond evaluation, such as discovering harms, communicating audit results, and advocating for subsequent changes, were much less common.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 8

    Despite court orders and regulations like Article 40 of the Digital Service Act that require construction of transparency tools, key APIs used for auditing are becoming more costly and undependable.

    “Despite court orders and regulations like Article 40 of the Digital Service Act [47] that require the construction of transparency tools, one participant noted that key APIs used for auditing are becoming more costly and undependable:”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [47] [47] Paddy Leerssen. 2023. Digital Services Act: Summary Report on the Call for Evidence on the Delegated Regulation on Data Access. Tech. rep. European Commission, (Nov. 2023). Retrieved Oct. 22, 2024 from https://digital-strateg y.ec.europa.eu/en/library/digital-services-act-summary-report-call-eviden ce-delegated-regulation-data-access. -

      Not checked in the free run.

    • Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 8

    Transparency Infrastructure tools provide external auditors with controlled access to models and data, especially for online platforms in the dataset, but they require investment from model operators.

    “Transparency Infrastructure tools provide external auditors with controlled access to models and data-especially for online platforms, in our dataset (Fig. E.4)-but they require investment from model operators.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
    • Rests on an assumption: The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § 4 Results · p. 5

    While there exist many tools for aiding AI auditing, practitioners found existing tools inadequate in multiple ways.

    “While there exist many tools for aiding AI auditing, practitioners found existing tools inadequate in multiple ways.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § 4.5 Audit Communication & Advocacy · p. 11

    Tools to facilitate Audit Communication were the rarest in the dataset (N=8), consisting mostly of tools for Dataset Visualization and Audit Reporting.

    “Tools to facilitate Audit Communication were the rarest in our dataset ( 𝑁 = 8), and consist mostly of tools for Dataset Visualization (e.g. Google's FACETS [56]) and Audit Reporting (e.g., the ACLU's repository of NYC Local Law 144 hiring bias audit reports [127]).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [56] [56] 2023. Facets - Know Your Data. (Dec. 2023). Retrieved Dec. 8, 2023 from https://pair-code.github.io/facets/. -

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites [127] [127] Melissa Gerchick and Brooke Watson Madubuonwu. 2024. Tracking Automated Employment Decision Tool Bias Audits. aclu-national. (Aug. 2024). Retrieved Sept. 10, 2024 from https://github.com/aclu-national/tracking-ll144 -bias-audits. -

      Not checked in the free run.

    • Rests on an assumption: The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
    • Rests on an assumption: The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingown data
    § 4.5 Audit Communication & Advocacy · p. 11

    Auditors hoped greater communication could help unite the profession around policy developments, shared language, standards, and goals that could improve the impact of their work.

    “Auditors hoped greater communication could help unite the profession around policy developments, shared language, standards, and goals that could improve the impact of their work.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § 5.1 Moving beyond evaluation, towards accountability · p. 12

    AI auditors care deeply about accountability but struggled to achieve it.

    “This echoes a theme repeated several times throughout our interviews-AI auditors care deeply about accountability but struggled to achieve it.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingcitation
    § 4.4 Performance Analysis · p. 10

    The most popular Performance Analysis tool found on Github is SHAP, a game-theoretic method for measuring feature importance in a model.

    “For example, the most popular Performance Analysis tool we found on Github is SHAP (SHapley Additive exPlanations), a gametheoretic method for measuring feature importance in a model [9] (see Table E.2).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [9] [9] Scott M. Lundberg and Su-In Lee. 2017. A unified approach to interpreting model predictions. In Proceedings of the 31st International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS'17). Curran Associates Inc., Red Hook, NY, USA, (Dec. 2017), 4768-4777. isbn: 978-1-5108-6096-4. Retrieved Feb. 12, 2025 from. -

      Not checked in the free run.

    • Rests on an assumption: The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
    • Rests on an assumption: The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § E Additional Landscape Analysis · p. 19

    Of the 347 organizations in the dataset, Crunchbase records were accessible for 202 (accounting for 270 tools); 173 of these records include estimated employee counts.

    “Of the 347 organizations in our dataset, we were able to access Crunchbase records for 202 (accounting for 270 tools); 173 of these records include estimated employee counts.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [44] [44] 2023. Crunchbase. (2023). Retrieved Aug. 24, 2023 from https://www.crunchb ase.com. -

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § 4.4 Performance Analysis · p. 10

    Performance Analysis tools (N=129) are designed to help auditors evaluate and explain model behavior, usually through calculation of quantitative metrics related to accuracy/safety (N=71), explainability (N=36), or fairness (N=30).

    “Tools for Performance Analysis ( 𝑁 = 129) are designed to help auditors evaluate and explain model behavior, usually through the calculation of quantiative metrics related to accuracy/safety ( 𝑁 = 71), explainability ( 𝑁 = 36), or fairness ( 𝑁 = 30).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
    • Rests on an assumption: The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Findingcitation
    § 5.2 Moving beyond ad hoc toolkits, towards shared infrastructure · p. 13

    Participants' aspirations for tooling envision a path towards lasting public infrastructure that gives auditors additional levers to hold model operators accountable.

    “participants' aspirations for tooling envision another path-a path towards lasting public infrastructure that gives auditors additional levers to hold model operators accountable [96].”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [96] [96] Nik Marda, Jasmine Sun, and Mark Surman. 2024. Public AI: Making AI Work for Everyone, by Everyone. Tech. rep. Mozilla Foundation, (Sept. 2024). -

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § 5.1 Moving beyond evaluation, towards accountability · p. 12

    The stages of harms discovery, audit communication, and advocacy are the stages participants described as most requiring contextual awareness and typically under-studied participatory and community engagement methods.

    “Perhaps unsurprisingly, these are also the stages of the audit process that participants described as most requiring contextual awareness and typically under-studied participatory and community engagement methods.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Findingnone given
    § 5.2 Moving beyond ad hoc toolkits, towards shared infrastructure · p. 13

    Currently, the burden of building and maintaining tools to address technical debt falls on the auditors, raising concerns about the sustainability of auditing efforts.

    “Currently, the burden of building and maintaining tools to address technical debt falls on the auditors, raising concerns about the sustainability of auditing efforts.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § 5.2 Moving beyond ad hoc toolkits, towards shared infrastructure · p. 13

    The external auditors interviewed were especially skeptical of the data provided from these tools and aware of their unreliability.

    “The external auditors we interviewed were especially skeptical of the data provided from these tools and aware of their unreliability”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingnone given
    § 5.3 Ongoing Impact · p. 13

    OAT team members presented these findings to regulators at the U.K.'s OfCom and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission.

    “OAT team members presented these findings to regulators at the U.K.'s OfCom and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § 4.4 Performance Analysis · p. 11

    Performance Analysis tools found, most popular of which were built and maintained by disproportionately large for-profit firms, often focused on a narrow set of technical fairness definitions and explainability methods popularized in academic literature.

    “The Performance Analysis tools we foundthe most popular of which were built and maintained by disproportionately large, for-profit firms (Figures E.6)-often focused on a narrow set of technical fairness definitions and explainability methods popularized in academic literature.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
    • Rests on an assumption: The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § 4.4 Performance Analysis · p. 11

    Performance Analysis tools found (48.1% built by for-profit organizations) were disproportionately not open source compared to other tools in the dataset, especially tools for Explainability.

    “However, the Performance Analysis tools we found (48.1% of which were built by for-profit organizations) were disproportionately not open source compared to other tools in our dataset, especially tools for Explainability (Fig. E.3).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
    • Rests on an assumption: The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingcitation
    § 5.1 Moving beyond evaluation, towards accountability · p. 12

    Auditors envisioned audit report databases as accountability tools to facilitate amalgamation and communication of audit findings to key stakeholders.

    “Likewise, auditors envisioned audit report databases as accountability tools to facilitate the amalgamation and communication of audit findings to key stakeholders, mirroring interventions such as the U.S. Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) EDGAR database for financial accounting audits [88].”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [88] [88] Inioluwa Deborah Raji, Peggy Xu, Colleen Honigsberg, and Daniel Ho. 2022. Outsider Oversight: Designing a Third Party Audit Ecosystem for AI Governance. In Proceedings of the 2022 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society (AIES '22). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (July 2022), 557-571. isbn: 978-1-4503-9247-1. doi: 10.1145/3514094.3534181. - source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingown data
    § 4.5 Audit Communication & Advocacy · p. 11

    Auditors especially wished for resources that would bring together the diverse, interdisciplinary groups involved in auditing.

    “Auditors especially wished for resources that would bring together the diverse, interdisciplinary groups involved in auditing, similar to the few tools for Community Spaces we found in our tool survey.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Findingown data
    § 5.2 Moving beyond ad hoc toolkits, towards shared infrastructure · p. 12

    Participants noted a lack of long-term investment.

    “participants noted a lack of long-term investment”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingnone given
    § 5.3 Ongoing Impact · p. 13

    OAT team members participated in advising the selection of two rounds of Mozilla Technology Fund awardees, including 5 teams in an inaugural cohort (2022), and 8 teams in a follow-up cohort (2023) focused on AI audit tooling.

    “OAT team members also participated in advising the selection of two rounds of Mozilla Technology Fund (MTF) awardees, including 5 teams in an inaugural cohort (2022), and 8 teams in a follow-up cohort (2023) focused on AI audit tooling.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Findingown data
    § 5.2 Moving beyond ad hoc toolkits, towards shared infrastructure · p. 12

    Participants agreed on the need for shared infrastructure that supports the auditing process.

    “Participants agreed on the need for shared infrastructure that supports the auditing process.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Findingown data
    § · Developing participatory methods for audit work. · p. 12

    Some participants were concerned about the efficacy of many AI audit tools, particularly tools whose methods were not made available for public scrutiny.

    “Some participants were concerned about the efficacy of many AI audit tools-particularly tools whose methods were not made available for public scrutiny.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § 4.5 Audit Communication & Advocacy · p. 11

    The authors found more tools for Advocacy (N=14) than for Audit Communication but still fewer than in other stages of the taxonomy.

    “We found more tools for Advocacy ( 𝑁 = 14)-including Community Spaces (e.g., the Benefits Tech Advocacy Hub [32], which facilitates collaboration between advocates who oppose algorithmbased cuts to public benefits), tools for Organizing/Resistance (e.g., the Algorithmic Ecology framework [112], a tool for mapping the non-technical dimensions of algorithmic impact), and tools for Legal Search (e.g.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [32] [32] 2023. Benefits Tech Advocacy Hub. (Dec. 2023). Retrieved Dec. 12, 2023 from https://btah.org/. -

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites [112] [112] Stop LAPD Spying Coalition and Free Radicals. 2020. The Algorithmic Ecology: An Abolitionist Tool for Organizing Against Algorithms. (Mar. 2020). Retrieved Dec. 8, 2023 from https://freerads.org/2020/03/02/the-algorithmicecology-an-abolitionist-tool-for-organizing-against-algorithms/. -

      Not checked in the free run.

    • Rests on an assumption: The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
    • Rests on an assumption: The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingown data
    § 4.4 Performance Analysis · p. 11

    Several participants emphasized the importance of open-sourcing tools for others in the community to inspect.

    “To allay methodological concerns, several participants emphasized the importance of open-sourcing tools for others in the community to inspect.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
    • Rests on an assumption: Open-sourcing audit tools improves their inspectability and reproducibility.
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingown data
    § E Additional Landscape Analysis · p. 20

    Total venture funding (adjusted to U.S. dollars) was collected for 48 firms out of the 112 firms that are still private (i.e., have not undertaken an initial public offering).

    “We also collected total venture funding (adjusted to U.S. dollars) for 48 firms out of the 112 firms that are still private (i.e., have not undertaken an initial public offering).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [44] [44] 2023. Crunchbase. (2023). Retrieved Aug. 24, 2023 from https://www.crunchb ase.com. -

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingown data
    § 4.4 Performance Analysis · p. 10

    Some participants attributed methodological deficiencies to differences in rigor employed by the various disciplines involved with auditing.

    “Some participants put methodological deficiencies down to differences in the rigor employed by the various disciplines involved with auditing.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § 4.4 Performance Analysis · p. 11

    Tools specifically devoted to qualitative, as opposed to quantitative, analysis were much harder to find (N=3) and rarely mentioned by participants.

    “For example, tools specifically devoted to qualitative-as opposed to quantitative-analysis were much harder to find ( 𝑁 = 3) and rarely mentioned by our participants.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
    • Rests on an assumption: The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § 4.4 Performance Analysis · p. 10

    Participants had concerns about maintenance, effectiveness of automated monitoring processes, and the efficacy of synthetic data for representing real users.

    “Participants had concerns about maintenance, effectiveness of automated monitoring processes, and the efficacy of synthetic data for representing real users instead of functioning as ' an academic exercise ' (P4):”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § · Developing participatory methods for audit work. · p. 12

    Participants had audit results blocked from publication (P1) or unduly restricted in scope (P13) due to interventions from audit targets.

    “Participants had audit results blocked from publication (P1) or unduly restricted in scope (P13) due to interventions from audit targets.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § 2 Related work · p. 2

    In a survey of 152 audit practitioners, 62% used existing tools like AI Fairness 360, Scikit Fairness, or Parity, though only 7% used a standardized framework for their overall audit protocol.

    “And in a survey of 152 audit practitioners, Costanza-Chock et al. [136] found that 62% of practitioners used existing tools like AI Fairness 360, Scikit Fairness, or Parity, though only 7% of respondents used a standardized framework for their overall audit protocol.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [136] [136] Sasha Costanza-Chock, Inioluwa Deborah Raji, and Joy Buolamwini. 2022. Who Audits the Auditors? Recommendations from a field scan of the algorithmic auditing ecosystem. In Proceedings of the 2022 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT '22). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (June 2022), 1571-1583. isbn: 978-1-4503-9352-2. doi: 10.1145/3531146.3533213. - source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 8

    Gathering empirical evidence is a key step in AI auditing but often poses the most significant challenge in practice.

    “Gathering empirical evidence is a key step in AI auditing, but often poses the most significant challenge in practice.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § 2 Related work · p. 2

    Across various industries, the common accountability practice of auditing has long relied on rituals, organizational processes and tools in order to make consistent, inter-operable and reliable judgments, as well as provide broader access to a larger range of stakeholder participants in the audit process.

    “Across various industries, the common accountability practice of auditing has long relied on rituals, organizational processes and tools in order to make consistent, inter-operable and reliable judgments [113], as well as provide broader access to a larger range of stakeholder participants in the audit process [92].”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [113] [113] Michael Power. 1999. The Audit Society . Oxford University Press, (Aug. 1999). isbn: 978-0-19-829603-4. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198296034.001.0001. - source
    • cites [92] [92] AbebaBirhane, William Isaac, Vinodkumar Prabhakaran, Mark Diaz, Madeleine Clare Elish, Iason Gabriel, and Shakir Mohamed. 2022. Power to the People? Opportunities and Challenges for Participatory AI. In Proceedings of the 2nd - ACM Conference on Equity and Access in Algorithms, Mechanisms, and Optimization (EAAMO '22). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (Oct. 2022), 1-8. isbn: 978-1-4503-9477-2. doi: 10.1145/3551624.3555290. -

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § Abeba Birhane · p. 1

    In the E.U., enforcement reports for the Digital Services Act emphasize the importance of AI audit tooling for effective oversight enforcement.

    “Similarly, in the E.U., enforcement reports for the Digital Services Act emphasize the importance of AI audit tooling for effective oversight enforcement [45].”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [45] [45] Ulrike Klinger and Jakob Ohme. 2023. Delegated Regulation on Data Access Provided for the Digital Services Act: Response to the Call for Evidence DG CNECT-CNECT F2 by the European Commission. Tech. rep. 7. Weizenbaum Institute, (May 2023). https://www.weizenbaum-library.de/handle/id/380. -

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § 4.1 Harms Discovery · p. 5

    This task can be especially difficult for external auditors who may not know where AI systems are in use or what their impacts might be.

    “This task can be especially difficult for external auditors who may not know where AI systems are in use or what their impacts might be.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 2 Related work · p. 2

    Accountability requires infrastructure.

    “Accountability also requires infrastructure.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § 2 Related work · p. 3

    Fairness toolkits do not typically support other necessary steps of an audit such as data collection.

    “And fairness toolkits do not typically support other necessary steps of an audit such as data collection.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Study design and conductnone given
    § 3.2 Tool Taxonomy · p. 4

    Our theoretical sampling strategy deliberately over-represents some less common kinds of tooling (such as tools for advocacy).

    “In particular, our theoretical sampling strategy deliberately over-represents some less common kinds of tooling (such as tools for advocacy).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Study design and conductreasoning
    § 3.2 Tool Taxonomy · p. 4

    Our dataset should not be viewed as a comprehensive or perfectly representative sample.

    “As a result, while our dataset reflects a structured and iterative search, it should not be viewed as a comprehensive or perfectly representative sample.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 2 Related work · p. 2

    Audit tooling represents not only a mechanism for maintenance and consistency of audit integrity but also a key capacity-building intervention to lower the barriers for broader participation.

    “Audit tooling, then, represents not only a mechanism for maintenance and consistency of audit integrity but also a key capacity-building intervention to lower the barriers for broader participation.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § Abeba Birhane · p. 1

    In the U.S., several recently proposed 'AI innovation' bills are explicitly geared towards investing in tooling and resource development for AI auditing.

    “In the U.S. alone, several recently proposed 'AI innovation' bills are explicitly geared towards investing in tooling and resource development for AI auditing.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationown data
    § 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 8

    The vetting process for API use often requires the auditor to disclose their intent for the evaluation in advance, which may compromise the integrity of the study.

    “And currently, the vetting process for API use often requires the auditor to disclose their intent for the evaluation in advance, which may compromise the integrity of the study.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given
    § 4.1 Harms Discovery · p. 5

    Auditing an AI system first requires identifying the system that should be subject to scrutiny and identifying its potential harms.

    “Auditing an AI system first requires identifying the system that should be subject to scrutiny and identifying its potential harms.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § Abeba Birhane · p. 1

    Governments across the globe are developing their own tools and making use of existing resources as part of their enforcement regimes for AI governance.

    “Governments across the globe are developing their own tools and making use of existing resources as part of their enforcement regimes for AI governance [101].”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [101] [101] Kate Kaye and Pam Dixon. 2023. Risky Analysis: Assessing and Improving AI Governance Tools. Tech. rep. World Privacy Forum, (Nov. 2023). Retrieved Dec. 18, 2023 from https://www.worldprivacyforum.org/wp-content/uploads /2023/12/WPF\_Risky\_Analysis\_December\_2023\_fs.pdf. -

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Study design and conductreasoning
    § 3.2 Tool Taxonomy · p. 4

    Our search for tools was systematic but not exhaustive.

    “So while our search for tools was systematic, it was not exhaustive.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Study design and conductnone given
    § 3.2 Tool Taxonomy · p. 4

    One author created the labels and at least one other author reviewed each label for agreement.

    “One author created the labels and at least one other author reviewed each label for agreement.”
    • Also stated in: § E Additional Landscape Analysis · p. 19 · plain
      “One author created the labels and at least one other author reviewed each label for agreement.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § 2 Related work · p. 3

    A comprehensive survey of auditors' practical needs relative to the landscape of available tools is lacking.

    “As yet, however, a comprehensive survey of auditors' practical needs relative to the landscape of available tools is lacking.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Study design and conductnone given
    § 3.1 Interview methodology · p. 3

    Our protocol was approved by three university IRBs.

    “Our protocol was approved by three university IRBs.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisereasoning
    § Abeba Birhane · p. 1

    Practitioners often rely on tools-software, frameworks, and other resources-to support their AI audit work.

    “In the face of these challenges, practitioners often rely on toolssoftware, frameworks, and other resources-to support their AI audit work.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § 4.5 Audit Communication & Advocacy · p. 11

    Embracing public evaluation results helps audit practitioners to learn from each other's experiences.

    “Embracing public evaluation results also helps audit practitioners to learn from each other's experiences.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § 6 Conclusion · p. 13

    AI audit studies translating into tangible outcomes of accountability is far from certain.

    “Ideally, AI audit studies will translate into tangible outcomes of accountability, but this outcome is far from certain.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Study design and conductown data
    § C.1 Initial Sources · p. 18

    There are substitutes and competitors for many of the tools in the dataset, but they were not included unless observed in the sources or subsequent searches.

    “Note that there are substitutes and competitors for many of the tools in our dataset (such as qualitative coding software), but we did not include them unless we observed them in one of the sources above or our subsequent searches (§ C.2).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Study design and conductreasoning
    § A Reflections · p. 17

    The analysis is primarily scoped to the U.S. and the E.U.

    “We thus recognize that our analysis is primarily scoped to the U.S. and the E.U.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 5.2 Moving beyond ad hoc toolkits, towards shared infrastructure · p. 13

    Open source tools (e.g., for data scraping) can sometimes fill the gap, but do not always cover the scope and complexity of practical audit work.

    “Open source tools (e.g., for data scraping) can sometimes fill the gap, but do not always cover the scope and complexity of practical audit work.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § 4.5 Audit Communication & Advocacy · p. 11

    Communicating audit findings, lessons, and insights learned can help build trust and validate audit findings, recommendations, and subsequent interventions.

    “Communicating audit findings, lessons, and insights learned can help build trust and validate audit findings, recommendations, and subsequent interventions.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § · Developing participatory methods for audit work. · p. 12

    Making AI audit tools publicly available enables both external collaboration and third-party validation.

    “Making AI audit tools publicly available enables both external collaboration and third-party validation.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationown data
    § 5.2 Moving beyond ad hoc toolkits, towards shared infrastructure · p. 13

    Audit tools like these can hold great power over the audit process.

    “Audit tools like these can hold great power over the audit process:”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Study design and conductnone given
    § C.1 Initial Sources · p. 18

    The dataset of AI audit tools is not an exhaustive list of all tools that have been or could be used in AI audit practice.

    “Our dataset is not an exhaustive list of all tools that have been or could be used in AI audit practice.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 4.5 Audit Communication & Advocacy · p. 11

    Audit report repositories could expand the forum holding model operators accountable, allowing policymakers, journalists, and other public stakeholders to engage with evaluations more easily.

    “Audit report repositories could expand the forum holding model operators accountable, allowing policymakers, journalists, and other public stakeholders to engage with evaluations more easily.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Study design and conductreasoning
    § C.2 Theoretical Sampling · p. 18

    Categories with a more saturated set of examples were not given an equal amount of additional sourcing.

    “Categories with a more saturated set of examples were not given an equal amount of additional sourcing.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Study design and conductown data
    § C.2 Theoretical Sampling · p. 18

    A point of saturation for each search was determined by examining each Google search page of 30 results at a time until two pages in a row contained no references to specific audit tools.

    “In order to determine a point of saturation for each search, we examined each Google search page of 30 results at a time until two pages in a row contained no references to specific audit tools.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation
    § 5.1 Moving beyond evaluation, towards accountability · p. 12

    Unreliable performance or accuracy analysis tools that fail to meaningfully assess the audit target operate as misleading 'rubber stamps' for vendors and lead to 'audit washing,' posing a serious challenge to the legitimacy of audit results.

    “Unreliable performance or accuracy analysis tools that fail to meaningfully assess the audit target operate as misleading 'rubber stamps' for vendors and lead to 'audit washing' [13], posing a serious challenge to the legitimacy of audit results.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [13] [13] Ellen P Goodman and Julia Tréhu. 2022. AI Audit-Washing and Accountability. Policy Paper. German Marshall Fund of the United States, (Nov. 2022). https: //www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/2022-11/Goodman%20%26%20Trehu%2 0-%20Algorithmic%20Auditing%20-%20paper.pdf. - source
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 10

    Facebook initially insinuated that disabling the researchers' accounts was required by an FTC consent decree, backtracking only after the FTC called the statement inaccurate.

    “Facebook initially insinuated that disabling the researchers' accounts was required by an Federal Trade Commission (FTC) consent decree, backtracking only after the FTC called the statement inaccurate [76].”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [76] [76] Samuel Levine. 2021. Letter from Acting Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection Samuel Levine to Facebook. (Aug. 2021). Retrieved Dec. 7, 2023 from https://www.ftc.gov/blog-posts/2021/08/letter-acting-director-bureau -consumer-protection-samuel-levine-facebook. -

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Study design and conductreasoning
    § A Reflections · p. 17

    The analysis may not be representative of the global AI auditing landscape or appropriate for or informed by other contexts.

    “and may not be representative of the global AI auditing landscape or appropriate for or informed by other contexts.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § · Developing participatory methods for audit work. · p. 12

    Open tooling practices may contribute to knowledge-sharing, standards-setting, transparency, accessibility, and trust.

    “Open tooling practices may also contribute to knowledge-sharing, standards-setting, transparency, accessibility, and trust”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
94 of 94
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    AI audits are critical mechanisms for identifying the risks and limitations of deployed AI systems.

    “Audits are critical mechanisms for identifying the risks and limitations of deployed artificial intelligence (AI) systems.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The effective execution of AI audits is important for AI accountability.

    “However, the effective execution of AI audits remains incredibly difficult, and practitioners often need to make use of various tools to support their efforts.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The current ecosystem of AI audit tooling can be meaningfully compared to practitioner needs.

    “Drawing on interviews with 35 AI audit practitioners and a landscape analysis of 435 tools, we compare the current ecosystem of AI audit tooling to practitioner needs.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Under the CFAA, an auditor who violates a platform's terms of service may be held criminally liable.

    “Under the CFAA, for example, an auditor who violates a platforms' terms of service may be held criminally liable.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.

    “Despite searching deliberately for non-evaluation tools, we found more than fi ve times as many tools in the evaluation stages of the AI audit process as we did tools for harms discovery, audit communication, or advocacy.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.

    “This echoes a theme repeated several times throughout our interviews-AI auditors care deeply about accountability but struggled to achieve it.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.

    “Tools for Performance Analysis ( 𝑁 = 129) are designed to help auditors evaluate and explain model behavior, usually through the calculation of quantiative metrics related to accuracy/safety ( 𝑁 = 71), explainability ( 𝑁 = 36), or fairness ( 𝑁 = 30).”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Open-sourcing audit tools improves their inspectability and reproducibility.

    “To allay methodological concerns, several participants emphasized the importance of open-sourcing tools for others in the community to inspect.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    AI auditing has the potential to become a meaningful mechanism of accountability.

    “until it becomes the meaningful mechanism of accountability it has the potential to be.”
9 of 9

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • HCI scholarship has a distinctive role in translating abstract principles into concrete, citizen-centred practices by offering insights into participatory design methods for AI systems and policy, tools to facilitate stakeholder engagement, and socio-technical evaluation.

    “HCI scholarship has a distinctive role here: by offering established insights into participatory design methods for AI systems and policy [87, 103, 183], tools to facilitate stakeholder engagement [97], and socio-technical evaluation [12, 110, 131], it helps translate abstract principles into concrete, citizen-centred practices.”

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

  • Four requirements are described as three

    Minor

    The paper names four dimensions for evaluation standards-holistic, context-specific, inclusive, and compatible with practice-but then refers to them as "all three."

1 of 1

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 18

  1. Joy Buolamwini and Timnit Gebru. 2018. Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification. In Proceedings of the 1st Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency(Proceedings of Machine Learning Research, Vol. 81), Sorelle A Friedler and Christo Wilson (Eds.). PMLR, New York, NY, USA, 77–91. http://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/buolamwini18a.html
  2. Kathy Charmaz. 2014. Constructing Grounded Theory (2nd edition ed.). Sage, London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif.
  3. Deven R. Desai and Joshua A. Kroll. 2017. Trust but Verify: A Guide to Algorithms and the Law. Harvard Journal of Law & Technology (Harvard JOLT) 31 1 (2017) 1–64. https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/hjlt31&i=7
  4. Neel Guha Christie M Lawrence Lindsey A Gailmard Kit T Rodolfa Faiz Surani Rishi Bommasani Inioluwa Deborah Raji Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar Colleen Honigsberg Percy Liang and Daniel E Ho. 2023. AI Regulation Has Its Own Alignment Problem: The Technical and Institutional Feasibility of Disclosure Registration Licensing and Auditing. George Washington Law Review 92 6 (2023) 1473–1557.
  5. Infocomm Media Development Authority and AI Verify Foundation. 2023. Cataloguing LLM Evaluations. Technical Report. Infocomm Media Development Authority of Singapore. https://aiverifyfoundation.sg/downloads/Cataloguing_LLM_Evaluations.pdf
  6. Information Commissioner’s Office. 2023. Annex A: Fairness in the AI Lifecycle. Guidance on the AI Auditing Framework Draft Guidance for Consultation. Information Commissioner’s Office. https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/uk-gdpr-guidance-and-resources/artificial-intelligence/guidance-on-ai-and-data-protection/
  7. Kate Kaye and Pam Dixon. 2023. Risky Analysis: Assessing and Improving AI Governance Tools. Technical Report. World Privacy Forum. https://www.worldprivacyforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/WPF_Risky_Analysis_December_2023_fs.pdf
  8. Ulrike Klinger and Jakob Ohme. 2023. Delegated Regulation on Data Access Provided for the Digital Services Act: Response to the Call for Evidence DG CNECT-CNECT F2 by the European Commission. Technical Report 7. Weizenbaum Institute. https://www.weizenbaum-library.de/handle/id/380
  9. Kulynych Bogdan David Madras Smitha Milli Inioluwa Deborah Raji Angela Zhou and Richard Zemel. 2020. Participatory Approaches to Machine Learning. International Conference on Machine Learning Workshop.
  10. 10.5555/3295222.3295230 · DOI
  11. Nik Marda, Jasmine Sun, and Mark Surman. 2024. Public AI: Making AI Work for Everyone, by Everyone. Technical Report. Mozilla Foundation.
  12. Mozilla Foundation. 2021. YouTube Regrets. Technical Report. Mozilla Foundation. https://assets.mofoprod.net/network/documents/Mozilla_YouTube_Regrets_Report.pdf
  13. Arvind Narayanan and Sayash Kapoor. 2024. AI Snake Oil: What Artificial Intelligence Can Do, What It Can’t, and How to Tell the Difference. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
  14. Queensland Government. 2017. Community Engagement Toolkit for Planning. Technical Report. https://dilgpprd.blob.core.windows.net/general/community-engagement-toolkit.pdf
  15. Christian Sandvig, Kevin Hamilton, Karrie Karahalios, and Cedric Langbort. 2014. Auditing Algorithms: Research Methods for Detecting Discrimination on Internet Platforms. In Data and Discrimination: Converting Critical Concerns into Productive: A Preconference at the 64th Annual Meeting of the International Communication Association. Seattle, WA, 23.
  16. Nathan Sheard. 2021. Banning Government Use of Face Recognition Technology: 2020 Year in Review. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/12/banning-government-use-face-recognition-technology-2020-year-review
  17. Chandler Nicholle Spinks. 2020. Contemporary Housing Discrimination: Facebook Targeted Advertising and the Fair Housing Act. Houston Law Review 57 4 (May 2020) 925–952. https://houstonlawreview.org/article/12762-contemporary-housing-discrimination-facebook-targeted-advertising-and-the-fair-housing-act
  18. Langdon Winner. 1980. Do Artifacts Have Politics? Daedalus 109 1 (1980) 121–136. jstor:20024652https://www.jstor.org/stable/20024652

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Ojewale, V., Steed, R., Vecchione, B., Birhane, A., & Raji, I. D.
Affiliations
  • Brown University (US)
  • Carnegie Mellon University (US)
  • Data & Society Research Institute (US)
  • Trinity College Dublin (IE)
  • University of California, Berkeley (US)
Venue
Proceedings of the 2025 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
Publisher
ACM
Published
2025-04-25
Pages
1-29
OpenAlex
W4409883896
Cited by
81
References
78
Citations by year
2026: 39 · 2025: 27 · 2024: 15
FWCI
48.55
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (cc-by)
Funders
  • Science Foundation Ireland (13/RC/2106_P2)
  • Mozilla Foundation
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality › Safety Systems Engineering in Autonomy
Keywords
AI audit, AI accountability, practitioner needs

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-11-06.

Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-11-06.

Cited sources are checked by gpt-6-sol.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

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