Towards AI Accountability Infrastructure: Gaps and Opportunities in AI Audit Tooling
Open accessAbstract
Audits are critical mechanisms for identifying the risks and limitations of deployed artifcial intelligence (AI) systems.However, the efective execution of AI audits remains incredibly difcult, and practitioners often need to make use of various tools to support their eforts.Drawing on interviews with 35 AI audit practitioners and a landscape analysis of 435 tools, we compare the current ecosystem of AI audit tooling to practitioner needs.While many tools are designed to help set standards and evaluate AI systems, they often fall short in supporting accountability.We outline challenges practitioners faced in their eforts to use AI audit tools and highlight areas for future tool development beyond evaluationfrom harms discovery to advocacy.We conclude that the available resources do not currently support the full scope of AI audit practitioners' needs and recommend that the feld move beyond tools for just evaluation and towards more comprehensive infrastructure for AI accountability.
AI snapshot
Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
This paper compares AI audit practitioners’ tooling needs with the existing AI audit tool landscape, finding that available tools are concentrated in evaluation and standards rather than accountability. The authors argue the field needs broader infrastructure for harms discovery, communication, advocacy, and independent auditing.
Key findings
- Across 435 tools, the landscape was dominated by evaluation-oriented resources: Standards Identification & Management (N=206) and Performance Analysis (N=129), while accountability-related stages were far rarer: Harms Discovery (N=48), Advocacy (N=14), Transparency Infrastructure (N=12), and Audit Communication (N=8).
- Most tools in the dataset were freely available or open source (77.9%), but auditors often still built their own tools or adapted existing ones because available tools were ad hoc, context-specific, or inadequate for complex systems.
- Data Collection tools were much more likely to be open source (68.1%) than Transparency Infrastructure tools (25.0%); Performance Analysis tools were disproportionately built by for-profit organizations (48.1%) and were less likely to be open source.
- Practitioners wanted tools for uncompromised data access, consistent and holistic standards, audit integrity, participation, communication, and advocacy, but found current tooling did not support the full audit process or meaningful accountability.
Methods
- Semi-structured interviews with 35 AI audit practitioners across 24 organizations, conducted as 27 interviews; participants worked in tech companies, startups, government, non-profits, consulting, news, law, and academia, primarily in North America (N=22) and Europe (N=5).
- A landscape analysis of 435 AI audit tools, built from an initial list of 143 tools, theoretical sampling that added 181 tools between August and October 2022, 102 more through September 2024, and 9 additional tools in September 2024; tools were grouped into a taxonomy of 30 main categories, 27 subcategories, and 7 audit stages.
- Interview transcripts were inductively coded with descriptive and values coding; tools were manually labeled for license, organization type, audit target, intended user, and format, supplemented with Crunchbase, GitHub, and Google Scholar data.
Limitations
- The paper states the tool sample is not exhaustive or statistically representative; theoretical sampling deliberately over-represents less common tooling such as advocacy tools, and reliance on public materials likely over-represents open tooling over proprietary tooling.
- The authors state the analysis is primarily scoped to the U.S. and E.U., relies mainly on English-language and Western sources, and may not represent the global AI auditing landscape; they also note struggling to avoid a techno-solutionist framing.
- Evident from the text: the interview sample is limited to 35 practitioners across 24 organizations in North America and Europe, so findings may not generalize to other regions, sectors, or audit contexts.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
35 of 84 cited sources checked · 23 supported · 0 flagged · accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation§ 1 Introduction · p. 1
The maturity of the AI audit ecosystem in the technology sector lags far behind other industries such as finance and healthcare.
“Often defined as independent evaluations of the performance, fairness, legality, or safety of deployed AI systems, the maturity of the audit ecosystem in the technology sector lags far behind other industries such as finance and healthcare [38, 88].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim2 of 2 sources checked- cites [38] [38] Inioluwa Deborah Raji, Andrew Smart, Rebecca N. White, Margaret Mitchell, Timnit Gebru, Ben Hutchinson, Jamila Smith-Loud, Daniel Theron, and Parker Barnes. 2020. Closing the AI accountability gap: defining an end-to-end framework for internal algorithmic auditing. In Proceedings of the 2020 Conference on - Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAT* '20). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (Jan. 2020), 33-44. isbn: 978-1-4503-6936-7. doi: 10.1145/3351095.3372873. - source
- cites [88] [88] Inioluwa Deborah Raji, Peggy Xu, Colleen Honigsberg, and Daniel Ho. 2022. Outsider Oversight: Designing a Third Party Audit Ecosystem for AI Governance. In Proceedings of the 2022 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society (AIES '22). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (July 2022), 557-571. isbn: 978-1-4503-9247-1. doi: 10.1145/3514094.3534181. - source
- Premisecitation§ Abeba Birhane · p. 1
The lack of access and visibility to many AI systems leaves auditors without the information needed to make adequate and truly independent assessments.
“leaves auditors without the information needed to make adequate and truly independent assessments [70, 75].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 2 sources checked- cites [70] [70] Kenneth Holstein, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan, Hal Daumé, Miro Dudik, and Hanna Wallach. 2019. Improving Fairness in Machine Learning Systems: What Do Industry Practitioners Need? In Proceedings of the 2019 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems . ACM, Glasgow Scotland Uk, (May 2019), 1-16. isbn: 978-1-4503-5970-2. doi: 10.1145/3290605.3300830. - source
The ‘Needs for More Proactive Auditing Processes’ section (p. 8) reports that practitioners often lack individual-level demographic information needed for fairness auditing. It does not say that limited access or visibility into AI systems prevents auditors from making truly independent assessments; its findings concern teams auditing their own products. (LLM, conf=0.83)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites [75] [75] Petros Terzis, Michael Veale, and Noëlle Gaumann. 2024. Law and the Emerging Political Economy of Algorithmic Audits. In Proceedings of the 2024 ACM - Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT '24). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (June 2024), 1255-1267. doi: 10.1145/3630106.3658970. - source
Section 5.0.2 (Confidentiality; page unavailable) says rigorous algorithmic audits require access to documents that organisations may withhold, and that independence challenges may make auditors less forceful in seeking them. This supports the concern, but the paper presents restricted access as a risk rather than establishing that auditors generally lack the information needed for adequate, independent assessments of many AI systems. (LLM, conf=0.82)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation§ Abeba Birhane · p. 1
A thorough evaluation alone is not sufficient to hold key stakeholders responsible for system-wide behavior.
“A thorough evaluation alone is not sufficient to hold key stakeholders responsible for system-wide behavior [13, 88]-auditors also need tools that support key components of the accountability process, including target identification, standardization of practice, communication, and advocacy [136].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checked- cites [13] [13] Ellen P Goodman and Julia Tréhu. 2022. AI Audit-Washing and Accountability. Policy Paper. German Marshall Fund of the United States, (Nov. 2022). https: //www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/2022-11/Goodman%20%26%20Trehu%2 0-%20Algorithmic%20Auditing%20-%20paper.pdf. - source
- cites [88] [88] Inioluwa Deborah Raji, Peggy Xu, Colleen Honigsberg, and Daniel Ho. 2022. Outsider Oversight: Designing a Third Party Audit Ecosystem for AI Governance. In Proceedings of the 2022 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society (AIES '22). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (July 2022), 557-571. isbn: 978-1-4503-9247-1. doi: 10.1145/3514094.3534181. - source
- Findingcitation§ 4.4 Performance Analysis · p. 11
Tools surveyed in Performance Analysis often overlooked entire other areas of concern, including basic functionality of the model as well as other methods of evaluation.
“The tools we surveyed in this category often overlooked entire other areas of concern, including the basic functionality of the model [117] as well as other methods of evaluation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites [117] [117] Inioluwa Deborah Raji, I. Elizabeth Kumar, Aaron Horowitz, and Andrew Selbst. 2022. The Fallacy of AI Functionality. In 2022 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency . ACM, Seoul Republic of Korea, (June 2022), 959-972. isbn: 978-1-4503-9352-2. doi: 10.1145/3531146.3533158. - source
- Rests on an assumption: The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
- Rests on an assumption: The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
- Premisecitation§ 5.1 Moving beyond evaluation, towards accountability · p. 12
Costanza-Chock et al. found that over 65% of surveyed AI audit practitioners felt that 'accountability' was a top unmet need in their AI auditing work.
“Costanza-Chock et al. [136] found that over 65% of surveyed AI audit practitioners felt that 'accountability' (defined as a 'commitment from auditee to address problems covered by audit within set time') was a top unmet need in their AI auditing work.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Costanza-Chock et al. [136] [136] Sasha Costanza-Chock, Inioluwa Deborah Raji, and Joy Buolamwini. 2022. Who Audits the Auditors? Recommendations from a field scan of the algorithmic auditing ecosystem. In Proceedings of the 2022 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT '22). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (June 2022), 1571-1583. isbn: 978-1-4503-9352-2. doi: 10.1145/3531146.3533213. - source
- Premisecitation§ · Developing participatory methods for audit work. · p. 12
Recent HCI work on user auditing, such as the 'WeAudit' tool, demonstrates the possibility of designing for a more participatory AI audit process.
“Recent HCI work on user auditing [132], such as the 'WeAudit' tool [126], exemplifies this shift and demonstrates the possibility of designing for a more participatory AI audit process [2, 52, 132].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim3 of 4 sources checked- cites [132] [132] Wesley Hanwen Deng, Boyuan Guo, Alicia Devrio, Hong Shen, Motahhare Eslami, and Kenneth Holstein. 2023. Understanding Practices, Challenges, and Opportunities for User-Engaged Algorithm Auditing in Industry Practice. In Proceedings of the 2023 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI '23). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (Apr. 2023), 1-18. isbn: 978-1-4503-9421-5. doi: 10.1145/3544548.3581026. - source
- cites [126] [126] Alicia DeVos, Aditi Dhabalia, Hong Shen, Kenneth Holstein, and Motahhare Eslami. 2022. Toward User-Driven Algorithm Auditing: Investigating users' strategies for uncovering harmful algorithmic behavior. In Proceedings of the 2022 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI '22). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (Apr. 2022), 1-19. isbn: 978-1-4503-9157-3. doi: 10.1145/3491102.3517441. - source
- cites [2] [2] Hong Shen, Ángel Alexander Cabrera, Adam Perer, and Jason Hong. 2022. "Public(s)-in-the-Loop": Facilitating Deliberation of Algorithmic Decisions in Contentious Public Policy Domains. (Apr. 2022). arXiv: 2204.10814 [cs] . doi: 10.48550/arXiv.2204.10814. -
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [52] [52] Hong Shen, Alicia DeVos, Motahhare Eslami, and Kenneth Holstein. 2021. Everyday algorithm auditing: Understanding the power of everyday users in surfacing harmful algorithmic behaviors. Proceedings of the ACM on HumanComputer Interaction , 5, CSCW2, 1-29. - source
- Premisecitation§ · Developing participatory methods for audit work. · p. 12
Power dynamics between auditors and the audited have a critical impact on accountability.
“Power dynamics between auditors and the audited have a critical impact on accountability [14, 88].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 2 sources checked- cites [14] [14] A. Birhane, R. Steed, V. Ojewale, B. Vecchione, and I. Raji. 2024. AI auditing: The broken bus on the road to AI accountability. In 2024 IEEE Conference on Secure and Trustworthy Machine Learning (SaTML) . IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos, CA, USA, (Apr. 2024), 612-643. doi: 10.1109/SaTML59370.2024 .00037. - source
- cites [88] [88] Inioluwa Deborah Raji, Peggy Xu, Colleen Honigsberg, and Daniel Ho. 2022. Outsider Oversight: Designing a Third Party Audit Ecosystem for AI Governance. In Proceedings of the 2022 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society (AIES '22). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (July 2022), 557-571. isbn: 978-1-4503-9247-1. doi: 10.1145/3514094.3534181. - source
- Findingcitation§ 5.2 Moving beyond ad hoc toolkits, towards shared infrastructure · p. 13
The Linux Foundation hosts several of the open source tools found in the study, including IBM's AI Fairness 360.
“the Linux Foundation, which hosts several of the open source tools we found (IBM's AI Fairness 360 [15], for example).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites [15] [15] Rachel K. E. Bellamy et al. 2018. AI Fairness 360: An Extensible Toolkit for Detecting, Understanding, and Mitigating Unwanted Algorithmic Bias. (Oct. 2018). arXiv: 1810.01943 [cs] . doi: 10.48550/arXiv.1810.01943. - source
The Abstract (p. 1) identifies IBM’s AI Fairness 360 as an open-source toolkit, supporting its use as an example of such a tool. Neither that passage nor the Introduction (p. 1) says that the Linux Foundation hosts it or other tools found in the citing study. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation§ · Developing participatory methods for audit work. · p. 12
External auditors face the threat of legal action under existing privacy and anti-hacking laws.
“who face the threat of legal action under existing privacy and anti-hacking laws [88, 122]”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 2 sources checked- cites [88] [88] Inioluwa Deborah Raji, Peggy Xu, Colleen Honigsberg, and Daniel Ho. 2022. Outsider Oversight: Designing a Third Party Audit Ecosystem for AI Governance. In Proceedings of the 2022 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society (AIES '22). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (July 2022), 557-571. isbn: 978-1-4503-9247-1. doi: 10.1145/3514094.3534181. - source
- cites [122] [122] Aleksandra Urman, Ivan Smirnov, and Jana Lasser. 2024. The right to audit and power asymmetries in algorithm auditing. EPJ Data Science , 13, 1, (Dec. 2024), 1-15. doi: 10.1140/epjds/s13688-024-00454-5. - source
Section 4 reports threats of legal action against independent auditors, and the Introduction discusses a challenge to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. The paper does not establish that auditors face legal action under privacy laws; its discussion of privacy concerns does not make that connection. No page numbers were provided in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.85)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Findingown data§ 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 8
In practice, participants reported that key details such as data sampling methods, data provenance, model versioning, metrics, and design justifications were often omitted or only partially disclosed.
“In practice, participants reported that key details, such as data sampling methods, data provenance, model versioning, metrics, and design justifications, were often omitted or only partially disclosed.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
- Findingown data§ 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 9
Tools for Data Collection, most not built specifically for AI auditing, comprised the most popular Github repositories in the dataset.
“Tools for Data Collection-most not built specifically for AI auditing-also comprised the most popular Github repositories in our dataset (Table E.2).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
- Rests on an assumption: The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
- Findingown data§ 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 9
Tools for Data Collection were much more likely to be available under an open source license (68.1%) than Transparency Infrastructure tools (25.0%).
“Unlike the tools we found for Transparency Infrastructure, which were mostly not open source (25.0% open source in our dataset; see Fig. 3), tools for Data Collection were muchmorelikely to be available under an open source license (68.1% open source in our dataset).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
- Rests on an assumption: The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
- Findingown data§ 4 Results · p. 5
Even when open source tools existed, auditors often preferred to build their own tooling solutions.
“Even when open source tools existed, auditors often preferred to build their own tooling solutions: ' if we tried to use the existing stuff, it would just complicate that process ' (P25).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data§ 4 Results · p. 5
Current tooling did not always help practitioners reach their accountability goals.
“In particular, though we found many tools for evaluating the performance of AI systems, current tooling did not always help practitioners reach their accountability goals.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data§ 4 Results · p. 5
Our survey of AI audit tools (N=435) revealed a wide-ranging landscape of resources built by a variety of academic, for-profit, non-profit, and government organizations.
“First, while our survey of AI audit tools ( 𝑁 = 435), revealed a wide-ranging landscape of resources built by a variety of academic, for-profit, non-profit, and government organizations (Table 2), we primarily surfaced tools for evaluation , particularly tools for Standards Identification & Management ( 𝑁 = 206) and Performance Analysis ( 𝑁 = 129).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data§ 4 Results · p. 5
Auditors highlighted the messy, context-specific nature of their actual audit tool use.
“Second, while we found many freely available and open source tools (77.9% of our dataset), auditors highlighted the messy, contextspecific nature of their actual audit tool use: ' Many approaches were not necessarily principled. They were quite ad hoc ' (P20).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data§ Abstract · p. 1
While many tools are designed to help set standards and evaluate AI systems, they often fall short in supporting accountability.
“While many tools are designed to help set standards and evaluate AI systems, they often fall short in supporting accountability.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data§ 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 8
Tools for Data Collection (N=47) helped external auditors gather information outside auditee-controlled interfaces.
“More commonly, though, tools for Data Collection ( 𝑁 = 47), helped external auditors in particular gather information outside auditee-controlled interfaces.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
- Rests on an assumption: The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
- Findingown data§ 4 Results · p. 5
Tools for other stages of the audit process crucial to accountability-Harms Discovery (N=48), Audit Communication (N=8), Advocacy (N=14), and model/data transparency (N=12)-were much less common in our sample.
“Tools for other stages of the audit process crucial to accountability-Harms Discovery ( 𝑁 = 48), Audit Communication ( 𝑁 = 8), Advocacy ( 𝑁 = 14), and model/data transparency ( 𝑁 = 12)-were much less common in our sample.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data§ 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 9
External auditors, particularly journalists, still saw advantages in independent data collection.
“Despite these difficulties, external auditors-particularly the journalists in our sample-still saw advantages in independent data collection.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
- Findingown data§ 4 Results · p. 5
We found many freely available and open source tools (77.9% of our dataset).
“Second, while we found many freely available and open source tools (77.9% of our dataset), auditors highlighted the messy, contextspecific nature of their actual audit tool use: ' Many approaches were not necessarily principled. They were quite ad hoc ' (P20).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data§ 2 Related work · p. 2
External auditors faced significant hurdles to accountability, including lack of access to the systems they aimed to evaluate.
“However, as our findings reveal, external auditors faced significant hurdles to accountability, including lack of access to the systems they aimed to evaluate.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data§ 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 9
Multiple participants wished for tools to help with tasks such as data collection and cleaning.
“Multiple participants wished for tools to help with tasks such as data collection and cleaning:”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
- Findingreasoning§ 4.1 Harms Discovery · p. 5
Participation helped make audits more context-dependent and inclusive by providing thorough understanding of how an AI system interacts with impacted groups.
“Second, participation helped make audits more 'context-dependent' and inclusive by providing thorough understanding of how an AI system interacts with impacted groups.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data§ 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 9
Participants noted that basic challenges involved with managing and analyzing data required more labor than any other task.
“participants noted that basic challenges involved with managing and analyzing data required more labor than any other task.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
- Findingown data§ 4 Results · p. 5
In each stage of the audit process, auditors encountered practical challenges and development gaps between their needs and the landscape of available tools.
“In each stage of the audit process, auditors encountered practical challenges and development gaps between their needs and the landscape of available tools.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data§ Abstract · p. 1
The available resources do not currently support the full scope of AI audit practitioners' needs.
“We conclude that the available resources do not currently support the full scope of AI audit practitioners' needs and recommend that the field move beyond tools for just evaluation and towards more comprehensive infrastructure for AI accountability.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data§ 4.1 Harms Discovery · p. 5
Compared to other stages of our taxonomy, nonprofits contributed significantly to creating and maintaining Harms Discovery tools in our dataset (79.2% not-for-profit).
“Compared to other stages of our taxonomy (Fig. 2), nonprofits contributed significantly to creating and maintaining these types of tools in our dataset (79.2% not-for-profit; see Fig. E.6).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data§ 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 8
Auditors said corporate control over APIs undermined their independence in conducting audits.
“Auditors also said that corporate control over APIs undermined their independence in conducting audits which aligns with our definition of an audit (Def. B.2).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
- Findingown data§ 4.1 Harms Discovery · p. 5
Participation helped auditors anticipate a broader range of possible harms.
“First, participation helped auditors anticipate a broader range of possible harms: ' Different types of biases are going to manifest, and accordingly it requires ... diverse groups from society, to understand their experiences and expectations in these settings and how they can be impacted ' (P20).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data§ (3) RQ3: Do existing tools support practitioners' needs? · p. 2
The practitioners interviewed often adapted existing tools or built their own from scratch to relieve tedious or difficult tasks in their particular audit workflows.
“The practitioners we interviewed often adapted existing tools or built their own from scratch to relieve the tedious or difficult tasks in their particular audit workflows.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data§ 4.1 Harms Discovery · p. 5
We found fewer tools designed specifically for identifying and collaborating with affected users, such as the ACLU of Washington's Algorithmic Equity Toolkit.
“However, we found fewer tools designed specifically for identifying and collaborating with affected users, such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Washington's Algorithmic Equity Toolkit [23].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [23] [23] Bissan Barghouti et al. 2020. Algorithmic Equity Toolkit. (Mar. 2020). Retrieved Dec. 7, 2023 from https://www.aclu-wa.org/AEKit. -
Not checked in the free run.
- Findingown data§ 4.2 Standards Identification & Management · p. 6
Standards Identification tools were particularly general in their applications compared to other categories of tools; principle statements, checklists, and similar resources were usually developed without a specific target system in mind.
“The Standards Identification tools we found were particularly general in their applications, compared to other categories of tools-the principle statements, checklists, and similar resources we found were usually developed without a specific kind of target system in mind (Fig. E.4).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
- Rests on an assumption: The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
- Findingown data§ 4 Results · p. 5
For some, existing tools were inadequate for the complexity and scale of the systems being evaluated.
“For some, existing tools were inadequate for the complexity and scale of the systems being evaluated: ' Most often we try to use open source tools, but that's very different than a data pipeline that... curates data on millions of [users] every day ' (P3).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data§ 4 Results · p. 5
We primarily surfaced tools for evaluation, particularly tools for Standards Identification & Management (N=206) and Performance Analysis (N=129).
“First, while our survey of AI audit tools ( 𝑁 = 435), revealed a wide-ranging landscape of resources built by a variety of academic, for-profit, non-profit, and government organizations (Table 2), we primarily surfaced tools for evaluation , particularly tools for Standards Identification & Management ( 𝑁 = 206) and Performance Analysis ( 𝑁 = 129).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data§ 4.2 Standards Identification & Management · p. 7
Multiple participants commented on the difficulty of harmonizing current or expected regulatory guidance with practical implementation.
“multiple participants commented on the difficulty of harmonizing current or expected regulatory guidance with practical implementation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
- Findingown data§ 4.2 Standards Identification & Management · p. 6
Some participants found standards identification tools too broad to easily apply.
“Some participants found these tools too broad to easily apply:”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
- Findingown data§ 4.1 Harms Discovery · p. 5
Our tool survey surfaced some tools for participatory incident reporting.
“Our tool survey surfaced some tools for participatory incident reporting.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data§ 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 8
Data collection tools aim to address the difficulty of accessing data and other vital information required to conduct meaningfully independent audits.
“Data collection tools aim to address one of the challenges most frequently mentioned by our participants: the difficulty of accessing data and other vital information required to conduct meaningfully independent audits.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
- Findingown data§ 5.2 Moving beyond ad hoc toolkits, towards shared infrastructure · p. 13
9 of the 12 Transparency Infrastructure tools found were built by for-profit organizations.
“for example, 9 of the 12 Transparency Infrastructure tools we found were built by for-profit organizations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data§ 4.5 Audit Communication & Advocacy · p. 11
For the auditors the authors spoke to, tooling in the Audit Communication & Advocacy stage was mostly aspirational.
“For the auditors we spoke to, tooling in this stage of auditing was mostly aspirational.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
- Findingown data§ 5.2 Moving beyond ad hoc toolkits, towards shared infrastructure · p. 13
In the landscape analysis, even the free tools currently dominating the audit tooling landscape were often built by large, for-profit tech companies.
“In our landscape analysis, we found that even the free tools currently dominating the audit tooling landscape were often built by large, for-profit tech companies (Fig. 2)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data§ 4.5 Audit Communication & Advocacy · p. 11
Auditors wanted their evaluation work to inform consequential judgments.
“Still, auditors wanted their evaluation work to inform consequential judgments, in line with our definition of an audit (Def. B.2).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
- Findingnone given§ 5.2 Moving beyond ad hoc toolkits, towards shared infrastructure · p. 12
Developing high quality audit tools, even when adapting existing open source tools, took resources.
“But developing high quality audit tools-even when adapting existing open source tools-took resources”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data§ 5.1 Moving beyond evaluation, towards accountability · p. 12
The authors' tool survey identifies several neglected categories of tools, particularly Incident Reporting, Education/Awareness, Target Identification, and Audit Communication.
“Our tool survey identifies several neglected categories of tools-particularly tools for Incident Reporting, Education/Awareness, Target Identification, and Audit Communication-that are worthy subjects for future HCI research.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
- Rests on an assumption: The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
- Findingown data§ · Developing participatory methods for audit work. · p. 12
Audit target retaliation and censorship was raised as a risk to internal auditors (P5).
“Audit target retaliation and censorship was raised as a risk to both internal auditors (P5)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data§ 4.4 Performance Analysis · p. 10
Internal auditors in particular had concerns about the validity, reproducibility, transparency, and trustworthiness of methods used in popular Performance Analysis tools.
“Internal auditors in particular had concerns about the validity, reproducibility, transparency, and trustworthiness of the methods used in popular Performance Analysis tools.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
- Findingown data§ 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 10
Auditors expressed hesitation about reforms that give platforms more control over what data is released.
“Auditors also expressed hesitation about reforms that give platforms more control over what data is released.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
- Findingown data§ 4.4 Performance Analysis · p. 10
Despite many tools developed for Performance Analysis, practitioners expressed a need for more robust, well-vetted tools and methodologies.
“Despite the many tools developed for Performance Analysis-including the most popular AI-specific Github repositories in our dataset (e.g., OpenAI Evals [67]; see Table E.2)-practitioners expressed a need for more robust, well-vetted tools and methodologies.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [67] [67] OpenAI. 2023. GPT-4 Technical Report. (Mar. 2023). arXiv: 2303.08774 [cs] . doi: 10.48550/arXiv.2303.08774. -
Not checked in the free run.
- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
- Findingown data§ A Reflections · p. 17
Initial tests of translated queries in non-English search engines and regional keywords did not find any additional AI audit tools.
“we were unable to find any additional tools with initial tests of these methods.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data§ 4.5 Audit Communication & Advocacy · p. 11
These types of tools were mentioned less often in interviews compared to preceding stages of the taxonomy.
“These types of tools were also mentioned less often in our interviews, compared to preceding stages of our taxonomy.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
- Findingcitation§ 5.3 Ongoing Impact · p. 13
These findings were cited several times in the U.S. NTIA 'Artificial Intelligence Accountability Policy Report', the E.U. Digital Services Act 'Summary report on the call for evidence on the Delegated Regulation on data access', and the U.K. AI Safety Institute's 'International AI Safety Report'.
“After submitting public comments, these findings were cited several times in the U.S. National Telecommunication and Information Administration (NTIA) 'Artificial Intelligence Accountability Policy Report' [83], the 'Summary report on the call for evidence on the Delegated Regulation on data access' for the E.U. Digital Services Act [47], and the U.K. AI Safety Institute's 'International AI Safety”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [83] [83] Ellen Goodman. 2024. NTIA Artificial Intelligence Accountability Policy Report. Tech. rep. National Telecommunication and Information Administration, (Mar. 2024). Retrieved Oct. 22, 2024 from https://www.ntia.gov/sites/default/f iles/publications/ntia\_ai\_report\_final-3-27-24.pdf. -
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [47] [47] Paddy Leerssen. 2023. Digital Services Act: Summary Report on the Call for Evidence on the Delegated Regulation on Data Access. Tech. rep. European Commission, (Nov. 2023). Retrieved Oct. 22, 2024 from https://digital-strateg y.ec.europa.eu/en/library/digital-services-act-summary-report-call-eviden ce-delegated-regulation-data-access. -
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [71] [71] Yoshua Bengio et al. 2025. International AI Safety Report. Tech. rep. arXiv, AI Action Summit, (Jan. 2025). Retrieved Feb. 4, 2025 from http://arxiv.org/abs/2 501.17805 arXiv: 2501.17805 [cs] . - source
- Findingown data§ 5.2 Moving beyond ad hoc toolkits, towards shared infrastructure · p. 13
Currently, much of the funding for even open source audit tools comes from private, for-profit organizations.
“Currently, much of the funding for even open source audit tools comes from private, for-profit organizations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data§ 5.2 Moving beyond ad hoc toolkits, towards shared infrastructure · p. 13
Tool selection was a major source of uncertainty for practitioners.
“Tool selection was a major source of uncertainty for practitioners”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data§ 4.4 Performance Analysis · p. 11
Some industry participants had reproducibility in mind when designing evaluation procedures.
“Some of our industry participants had reproducibility in mind when designing evaluation procedures:”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
- Findingown data§ · Developing participatory methods for audit work. · p. 12
Tools found for Performance Analysis were less likely to be open source.
“(Tools we found for Performance Analysis were less likely to be open source; Fig. 3).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data§ 4.5 Audit Communication & Advocacy · p. 11
Despite these benefits, tooling to support Audit Communication and Advocacy stages is rare.
“Despite these benefits, tooling to support these stages is rare.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
- Rests on an assumption: The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
- Findingcitation§ · Developing participatory methods for audit work. · p. 12
Audit target retaliation and censorship was raised as a risk to external auditors (P7).
“Audit target retaliation and censorship was raised as a risk to both internal auditors (P5), who face the threat of firings, social dismissal or professional demotion [73, 110], and external auditors (P7), who face the threat of legal action under existing privacy and anti-hacking laws [88, 122].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data§ 5.1 Moving beyond evaluation, towards accountability · p. 12
Despite searching deliberately for non-evaluation tools, the authors found more than five times as many tools in the evaluation stages of the AI audit process as they did tools for harms discovery, audit communication, or advocacy.
“Despite searching deliberately for non-evaluation tools, we found more than fi ve times as many tools in the evaluation stages of the AI audit process as we did tools for harms discovery, audit communication, or advocacy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
- Rests on an assumption: The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
- Findingown data§ 4.5 Audit Communication & Advocacy · p. 11
The authors found few audit reporting tools or tools for facilitating communication between auditors, journalists, and activists.
“While we found some domain-specific spaces where auditors can interact-the Benefits Tech Advocacy Hub [32], for example-we found few audit reporting tools or tools for facilitating communication between auditors, journalists, and activists.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [32] [32] 2023. Benefits Tech Advocacy Hub. (Dec. 2023). Retrieved Dec. 12, 2023 from https://btah.org/. -
Not checked in the free run.
- Rests on an assumption: The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
- Rests on an assumption: The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
- Premisereasoning§ Abeba Birhane · p. 1
The auditing process involves more than just a performance analysis of the AI product or model.
“However, the auditing process involves more than just a performance analysis of the AI product or model.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Study design and conductreasoning§ 3.2 Tool Taxonomy · p. 4
The sample represented in our dataset does not include every tool that could support AI audits.
“The sample represented in our dataset does not include every tool that could support AI audits.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Study design and conductreasoning§ 3.2 Tool Taxonomy · p. 4
Because our search relied on public materials, we likely over-represent open tooling over proprietary tooling.
“And because our search relied on public materials, we likely over-represent open tooling over proprietary tooling (though our dataset includes both).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation§ 1 Introduction · p. 1
AI audits are often inconsistent and unreliable.
“AI audits are often inconsistent and unreliable [138], and the lack of access and visibility to many AI systems”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [138] [138] Tate Ryan-Mosley. 2023. Why everyone is mad about New York's AI hiring law. MIT Technology Review , (July 2023). Retrieved Sept. 15, 2023 from https://ww w.technologyreview.com/2023/07/10/1076013/new-york-ai-hiring-law/. -
Not checked in the free run.
- Study design and conductreasoning§ 3.2 Tool Taxonomy · p. 4
Numeric descriptions of our sample may not reflect the statistical distribution of all AI audit tools used in practice.
“Likewise, though our sample is designed to represent commonly used and commonly built tools in a theoretically representative set of categories, numeric descriptions of our sample may not reflect the statistical distribution of all AI audit tools used in practice.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisereasoning§ 1 Introduction · p. 1
Effective execution of AI audits remains practically difficult.
“Despite increasing policy enthusiasm, 1 the execution of effective AI audits remains practically difficult.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 4.1 Harms Discovery · p. 5
Without a clear understanding of which AI systems require auditing, there is a risk of overlooking critical systems that have significant societal implications.
“Without a clear understanding of which AI systems require auditing, there is a risk of overlooking critical systems that have significant societal implications.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisenone given§ Abeba Birhane · p. 1
Research has yet to properly map, taxonomize, and understand the full scope of tooling needed to meaningfully support AI audit practitioners.
“Despite these developments, research has yet to properly map, taxonomize, and understand the full scope of tooling needed to meaningfully support AI audit practitioners.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 4.1 Harms Discovery · p. 5
Limited access to information about AI systems poses a fundamental barrier to conducting comprehensive audits.
“Limited access to information about AI systems poses a fundamental barrier to conducting comprehensive audits.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisenone given§ 2 Related work · p. 2
No study yet examines the full range of tools and technical infrastructure used to support AI auditing and accountability.
“While these prior studies define the practice of AI auditing and some of the components of accountability, no study yet examines the full range of tools and technical infrastructure used to support AI auditing and accountability.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationcitation§ 4.4 Performance Analysis · p. 11
Tools may claim to provide auditing capabilities using terms such as fairness, safety, or explainability while failing to conduct evaluations that meaningfully contend with power dynamics and institutional barriers to accountability.
“In general, tools may claim to provide auditing capabilitiesusing terms such as fairness, safety, or explainability-while failing to conduct evaluations that meaningfully contend with power dynamics and institutional barriers to accountability [104].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [104] [104] Richmond Y. Wong, Michael A. Madaio, and Nick Merrill. 2023. Seeing Like a Toolkit: How Toolkits Envision the Work of AI Ethics. Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction , 7, CSCW1, (Apr. 2023), 145:1-145:27. doi: 10.1145/3579621. - source
Checked before — its earlier verdict is held back until a new check runs.
- Premisecitation§ · Developing participatory methods for audit work. · p. 12
Internal auditors face the threat of firings, social dismissal or professional demotion.
“who face the threat of firings, social dismissal or professional demotion [73, 110]”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [73] [73] David Gray Widder, Derrick Zhen, Laura Dabbish, and James Herbsleb. 2023. It's about power: What ethical concerns do software engineers have, and what do they (feel they can) do about them? In Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT '23). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (June 2023), 467-479. doi: 10.1145/3593013.3594012. - source
- cites [110] [110] William Boag, Harini Suresh, Bianca Lepe, and Catherine D'Ignazio. 2022. Tech Worker Organizing for Power and Accountability. In Proceedings of the 2022 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT '22). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (June 2022), 452-463. isbn: 978-1-4503-9352-2. doi: 10.1145/3531146.3533111. - source
- Premisecitation§ 5.1 Moving beyond evaluation, towards accountability · p. 12
Audits have limited impact if their results are not reliable or meaningfully connected to real world requirements.
“Audits have limited impact if their results are not reliable or meaningfully connected to real world requirements [10].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [10] [10] Inioluwa Deborah Raji and Joy Buolamwini. 2022. Actionable Auditing Revisited: Investigating the Impact of Publicly Naming Biased Performance Results of Commercial AI Products. Communications of the ACM , 66, 1, (Dec. 2022), 101-108. doi: 10.1145/3571151. - source
Checked before — its earlier verdict is held back until a new check runs.
- Interpretationown data§ A Reflections · p. 17
It is likely that non-English, non-Western AI audit tools exist that the theoretical sampling was unable to identify.
“It thus seems likely that non-English, non-Western tools exist that our theoretical sampling was unable to identify.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation§ 4.4 Performance Analysis · p. 10
Explainability tools such as SHAP are often suggested in official regulatory guidance.
“Yet explainability tools such as SHAP are often suggested in official regulatory guidance [101].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [101] [101] Kate Kaye and Pam Dixon. 2023. Risky Analysis: Assessing and Improving AI Governance Tools. Tech. rep. World Privacy Forum, (Nov. 2023). Retrieved Dec. 18, 2023 from https://www.worldprivacyforum.org/wp-content/uploads /2023/12/WPF\_Risky\_Analysis\_December\_2023\_fs.pdf. -
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ 5.2 Moving beyond ad hoc toolkits, towards shared infrastructure · p. 13
Some initiatives, such as the Mozilla Technology Fund, the U.K. AI Safety Institute's Systemic AI Safety Grants, and the French AI Action Summit Public Interest fund are already positioned to make these investments.
“Some initiatives, such as the Mozilla Technology Fund [81], the U.K. AI Safety Institute's Systemic AI Safety Grants [60], and the French AI Action Summit Public Interest fund [97] are already positioned to make these investments.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [81] [81] 2024. Mozilla Technology Fund (MTF). (Dec. 2024). Retrieved Dec. 10, 2024 from https://foundation.mozilla.org/en/what-we-fund/opportunities/mozill a-technology-fund-mtf/. -
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [60] [60] 2024. Fast Grants. (Dec. 2024). Retrieved Dec. 10, 2024 from https://www.aisi .gov.uk/grants. -
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [97] [97] AI Action Summit. 2024. Public interest AI. (Oct. 2024). Retrieved Feb. 4, 2025 from https://www.elysee.fr/en/sommet-pour-l-action-sur-l-ia/public-inter est-ai. -
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation§ 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 10
In Sandvig v. Barr (2019), the ACLU sued to allow researchers to set up false accounts (sock puppets) to audit computer algorithms.
“In Sandvig v. Barr (2019), for example, the ACLU sued to allow researchers to set up false accounts (sock puppets) to audit computer algorithms [102, 103].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [102] [102] 2020. Sandvig v. Bar. (Mar. 2020). https://casetext.com/case/sandvig-v-barr.
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [103] [103] American Civil Liberties Union. 2019. Sandvig v. Barr - Challenge to CFAA Prohibition on Uncovering Racial Discrimination Online. (May 2019). Retrieved Dec. 7, 2023 from https://www.aclu.org/cases/sandvig-v-barr-challen ge-cfaa-prohibition-uncovering-racial-discrimination-online. -
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning§ 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 10
It is difficult for auditors to determine what methods may be deemed 'unauthorized' and criminal under the CFAA unless the audited organization grants authorization.
“It is difficult for auditors to determine what methods-such as public data scraping or even data donation-may be deemed 'unauthorized' and criminal under the CFAA unless the audited organization grants authorization.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Under the CFAA, an auditor who violates a platform's terms of service may be held criminally liable.
- Interpretationown data§ 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 10
Even auditors hired internally may assume some degree of personal risk.
“Even auditors hired internally may assume some degree of personal risk.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
- Interpretationreasoning§ 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 10
As a result, auditors engaged in external data collection had to take great steps to guard against liability and retaliation.
“As a result, auditors engaged in external data collection had to take great steps to guard against liability and retaliation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Under the CFAA, an auditor who violates a platform's terms of service may be held criminally liable.
- Study design and conductreasoning§ A Reflections · p. 17
The dataset consists primarily of English language tools from Western organizations.
“our dataset consists primarily of English language tools from from Western organizations”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 10
In 2021, Facebook used the term 'unauthorized' several times in its justification for disabling accounts of researchers auditing its advertising algorithms with Ad Observer.
“In 2021, Facebook used exactly this term of art-'unauthorized'-several times in its justification for disabling the accounts of a group of researchers auditing its advertising algorithms with a data donation tool called Ad Observer [100, 133].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [100] [100] Mike Clark. 2021. Research Cannot Be the Justification for Compromising People's Privacy. (Aug. 2021). Retrieved Dec. 7, 2023 from https://about.fb.co m/news/2021/08/research-cannot-be-the-justification-for-compromisingpeoples-privacy/. -
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [133] [133] Laura Edelson and Damon McCoy. 2021. We Research Misinformation on Facebook. It Just Disabled Our Accounts. The New York Times , (Aug. 2021). Retrieved Dec. 7, 2023 from https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/10/opinion/fa cebook-misinformation.html. -
Not checked in the free run.
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 64
- May combine two claims. 49
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ Abeba Birhane · p. 1Past research in HCI and social computing has developed and studied a host of fairness, explainability, and other toolkits that inform AI evaluations.
“Past research in human-computer interaction (HCI) and social computing has developed and studied a host of fairness, explainability, and other toolkits that inform such evaluations [5, 15, 39, 54, 69, 70, 72, 80, 82, 85, 104, 119, 125, 126, 132].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim3 of 3 sources checked- cites [5] [5] Allison Woodruff, Sarah E. Fox, Steven Rousso-Schindler, and Jeffrey Warshaw. 2018. A Qualitative Exploration of Perceptions of Algorithmic Fairness. In Proceedings of the 2018 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI '18). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (Apr. 2018), 1-14. isbn: 978-1-4503-5620-6. doi: 10.1145/3173574.3174230. - source
In “Workshop as Method” (page unavailable), the paper describes using a workshop as a research instrument to study perceptions of algorithmic fairness and inform future technology and policy. That supports the sentence’s broader point about HCI methods informing fairness work, but our copy does not describe this study as developing or studying a fairness or explainability toolkit for AI evaluations. (LLM, conf=0.78)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites [15] [15] Rachel K. E. Bellamy et al. 2018. AI Fairness 360: An Extensible Toolkit for Detecting, Understanding, and Mitigating Unwanted Algorithmic Bias. (Oct. 2018). arXiv: 1810.01943 [cs] . doi: 10.48550/arXiv.1810.01943. - source
- cites [39] [39] Michael A. Madaio, Luke Stark, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan, and Hanna Wallach. 2020. Co-Designing Checklists to Understand Organizational Challenges and Opportunities around Fairness in AI. In Proceedings of the 2020 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI '20). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (Apr. 2020), 1-14. isbn: 978-14503-6708-0. doi: 10.1145/3313831.3376445. - source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Premisecitation§ Abeba Birhane · p. 1Auditors need tools that support key components of the accountability process, including target identification, standardization of practice, communication, and advocacy.
“A thorough evaluation alone is not sufficient to hold key stakeholders responsible for system-wide behavior [13, 88]-auditors also need tools that support key components of the accountability process, including target identification, standardization of practice, communication, and advocacy [136].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites [136] [136] Sasha Costanza-Chock, Inioluwa Deborah Raji, and Joy Buolamwini. 2022. Who Audits the Auditors? Recommendations from a field scan of the algorithmic auditing ecosystem. In Proceedings of the 2022 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT '22). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (June 2022), 1571-1583. isbn: 978-1-4503-9352-2. doi: 10.1145/3531146.3533213. - source
Section 4.1.1 reports that few auditors use standardized frameworks and tools, while section 5.2 recommends standards and disclosure of audit findings—supporting the need for better practice and communication. Section 4.2.1 also links public pressure to action on ethical AI issues. The paper does not clearly recommend tools for target identification and advocacy as components of an accountability process. (LLM, conf=0.83)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
May combine two claims.
Findingcitation§ 4.2 Standards Identification & Management · p. 8Microsoft's AI Fairness checklist was co-designed with practitioners in an effort to be more compatible with practical challenges, but many other standards frameworks did not obviously consult practitioners and fewer involved affected stakeholders.
“Microsoft's AI Fairness checklist, for example, was co-designed with practitioners [39] in an effort to be more compatible with practical challenges, but many of the other standards frameworks we found did not obviously consult practitioners and fewer involved affected stakeholders.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites [39] [39] Michael A. Madaio, Luke Stark, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan, and Hanna Wallach. 2020. Co-Designing Checklists to Understand Organizational Challenges and Opportunities around Fairness in AI. In Proceedings of the 2020 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI '20). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (Apr. 2020), 1-14. isbn: 978-14503-6708-0. doi: 10.1145/3313831.3376445. - source
- Rests on an assumption: The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
- Rests on an assumption: The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationcitation§ · Developing participatory methods for audit work. · p. 12Open tooling practices can have complex interactions with power and oversight.
“but can have complex interactions with power and oversight that are worthy of further study [137].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites [137] [137] David Gray Widder, Meredith Whittaker, and Sarah Myers West. 2024. Why 'open' AI systems are actually closed, and why this matters. Nature , 635, 8040, (Nov. 2024), 827-833. doi: 10.1038/s41586-024-08141-1. - source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisereasoning§ · Developing participatory methods for audit work. · p. 12Participation is an increasing focus for AI audit practitioners and audit tool developers.
“it is no surprise that participation is an increasing focus for AI audit practitioners and audit tool developers as well.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 3 sources checked- cites [90] [90] Kulynych, Bogdan, David Madras, Smitha Milli, Inioluwa Deborah Raji, Angela Zhou, and Richard Zemel. 2020. Participatory approaches to machine learning. International Conference on Machine Learning Workshop. (July 2020). -
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [92] [92] AbebaBirhane, William Isaac, Vinodkumar Prabhakaran, Mark Diaz, Madeleine Clare Elish, Iason Gabriel, and Shakir Mohamed. 2022. Power to the People? Opportunities and Challenges for Participatory AI. In Proceedings of the 2nd - ACM Conference on Equity and Access in Algorithms, Mechanisms, and Optimization (EAAMO '22). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (Oct. 2022), 1-8. isbn: 978-1-4503-9477-2. doi: 10.1145/3551624.3555290. -
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites [121] [121] Fernando Delgado, Stephen Yang, Michael Madaio, and Qian Yang. 2023. The Participatory Turn in AI Design: Theoretical Foundations and the Current State of Practice. In Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Conference on Equity and Access in Algorithms, Mechanisms, and Optimization (EAAMO '23). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (Oct. 2023), 1-23. isbn: 979-84007-0381-2. doi: 10.1145/3617694.3623261. - source
The Introduction describes increasing calls for stakeholder participation in AI design and a growing consensus that stakeholders should participate more. It does not establish that participation is an increasing focus specifically for AI audit practitioners or audit tool developers. (LLM, conf=0.83)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ 4.4 Performance Analysis · p. 11Fewer studies examine how practitioners evaluate criteria such as basic functionality, safety, privacy, or recourse, just as fewer tools exist for this purpose.
“While there are multiple studies on the use of tools for fairness evaluation [54, 70, 119] and explainability [1, 46, 72, 82, 85, 98], fewer studies examine how practitioners evaluate other criteria such as basic functionality [117], safety, privacy, or recourse, just as fewer tools exist for this purpose.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim7 of 10 sources checked- cites [54] [54] Wesley Hanwen Deng, Manish Nagireddy, Michelle Seng Ah Lee, Jatinder Singh, Zhiwei Steven Wu, Kenneth Holstein, and Haiyi Zhu. 2022. Exploring How Machine Learning Practitioners (Try To) Use Fairness Toolkits. In Proceedings of the 2022 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT '22). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (June 2022), 473-484. isbn: 978-1-4503-9352-2. doi: 10.1145/3531146.353 3113. - source
- cites [70] [70] Kenneth Holstein, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan, Hal Daumé, Miro Dudik, and Hanna Wallach. 2019. Improving Fairness in Machine Learning Systems: What Do Industry Practitioners Need? In Proceedings of the 2019 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems . ACM, Glasgow Scotland Uk, (May 2019), 1-16. isbn: 978-1-4503-5970-2. doi: 10.1145/3290605.3300830. - source
The citation [117] is attached to “basic functionality.” In “Needs for More Proactive Auditing Processes” (p. 8), the paper discusses a checklist for accuracy only as a contrast to the lack of one for fairness. The passages examined do not establish that fewer studies examine how practitioners evaluate basic functionality or that fewer tools exist for it. (LLM, conf=0.77)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites [119] [119] Michelle Seng Ah Lee and Jat Singh. 2021. The Landscape and Gaps in Open Source Fairness Toolkits. In Proceedings of the 2021 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI '21). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (May 2021), 1-13. isbn: 978-1-4503-8096-6. doi: 10.1145 /3411764.3445261. - source
- cites [1] [1] Sunnie S. Y. Kim, Elizabeth Anne Watkins, Olga Russakovsky, Ruth Fong, and Andrés Monroy-Hernández. 2023. "Help Me Help the AI": Understanding How Explainability Can Support Human-AI Interaction. In Proceedings of the 2023 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI '23). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (Apr. 2023), 1-17. isbn: 978-1-4503-9421-5. doi: 10.1145/3544548.3581001. - source
- cites [46] [46] Danding Wang, Qian Yang, Ashraf Abdul, and Brian Y. Lim. 2019. Designing Theory-Driven User-Centric Explainable AI. In Proceedings of the 2019 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI '19). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (May 2019), 1-15. isbn: 978-14503-5970-2. doi: 10.1145/3290605.3300831. - source
- cites [72] [72] Harmanpreet Kaur, Harsha Nori, Samuel Jenkins, Rich Caruana, Hanna Wallach, and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan. 2020. Interpreting Interpretability: Understanding Data Scientists' Use of Interpretability Tools for Machine Learning. In Proceedings of the 2020 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI '20). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (Apr. 2020), 1-14. isbn: 978-1-4503-6708-0. doi: 10.1145/3313831.3376219. - source
- cites [82] [82] Alison Smith-Renner, Ron Fan, Melissa Birchfield, Tongshuang Wu, Jordan Boyd-Graber, Daniel S. Weld, and Leah Findlater. 2020. No Explainability without Accountability: An Empirical Study of Explanations and Feedback in Interactive ML. In Proceedings of the 2020 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI '20). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (Apr. 2020), 1-13. isbn: 978-1-4503-6708-0. doi: 10.1145/33138 31.3376624. - source
- cites [85] [85] Astrid Bertrand, Tiphaine Viard, Rafik Belloum, James R. Eagan, and Winston Maxwell. 2023. On Selective, Mutable and Dialogic XAI: a Review of What Users Say about Different Types of Interactive Explanations. In Proceedings of the 2023 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI '23). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (Apr. 2023), 1-21. isbn: 978-1-4503-9421-5. doi: 10.1145/3544548.3581314. - source
- cites [98] [98] Q. Vera Liao, Daniel Gruen, and Sarah Miller. 2020. Questioning the AI: Informing Design Practices for Explainable AI User Experiences. In Proceedings of the 2020 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI '20). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (Apr. 2020), 1-15. isbn: 978-1-4503-6708-0. doi: 10.1145/3313831.3376590. - source
- cites [117] [117] Inioluwa Deborah Raji, I. Elizabeth Kumar, Aaron Horowitz, and Andrew Selbst. 2022. The Fallacy of AI Functionality. In 2022 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency . ACM, Seoul Republic of Korea, (June 2022), 959-972. isbn: 978-1-4503-9352-2. doi: 10.1145/3531146.3533158. - source
The Related Work section says little has been done to systematically discuss functionality problems, which supports the narrower point that basic functionality receives less research attention. It does not establish that fewer studies examine how practitioners evaluate functionality. The paper also says in §5.2.3 that many model-logging and evaluation tools are available, rather than establishing a shortage of such tools. (LLM, conf=0.82)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ 4.4 Performance Analysis · p. 10Shapley values are prone to misuse and may be unsuitable for normative evaluation.
“But as Kumar et al. [95] argue, Shapley values are prone to misuse and may be unsuitable for normative evaluation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Kumar et al. [95] [95] I. Elizabeth Kumar, Suresh Venkatasubramanian, Carlos Scheidegger, and Sorelle A. Friedler. 2020. Problems with Shapley-value-based explanations as feature importance measures. In Proceedings of the 37th International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML'20). Vol. 119. JMLR.org, (July 2020), 54915500. Retrieved Nov. 20, 2023 from. - source
May combine two claims.
Findingcitation§ 5.1 Moving beyond evaluation, towards accountability · p. 12Several tools surfaced in the survey (e.g., from Holistic.ai, Credo.ai) were explicitly marketed for use for NYC Local Law 144 compliance, but studies of audit practice suggest the produced measures may not be reliable or legally compatible.
“For instance, several tools surfaced in our survey (e.g., from Holistic.ai, Credo.ai) were explicitly marketed for use for NYC Local Law 144 compliance, but studies of audit practice suggest the produced measures may not be reliable or legally compatible [30, 84, 86].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim3 of 3 sources checked- cites [30] [30] Lara Groves, Jacob Metcalf, Alayna Kennedy, Briana Vecchione, and Andrew Strait. 2024. Auditing Work: Exploring the New York City algorithmic bias audit regime. In Proceedings of the 2024 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT '24). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (June 2024), 1107-1120. doi: 10.1145/3630106.3658959. - source
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 1 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites [84] [84] Lucas Wright, Roxana Mika Muenster, Briana Vecchione, Tianyao Qu, Pika (Senhuang) Cai, Alan Smith, Comm 2450 Student Investigators, Jacob Metcalf, and J. Nathan Matias. 2024. Null Compliance: NYC Local Law 144 and the challenges of algorithm accountability. In Proceedings of the 2024 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT '24). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (June 2024), 1701-1713. doi: 10.1145/3630106.3658998. - source
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 1 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites [86] [86] Alice Xiang and Inioluwa Deborah Raji. 2019. On the Legal Compatibility of Fairness Definitions. (Nov. 2019). arXiv: 1912 . 00761 [cs, stat] . doi: 10.48550/arXiv.1912.00761. - source
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 1 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ 4.4 Performance Analysis · p. 10Interpretability and explainability methods promoted by popular tools vary widely in their goals and may encourage false confidence in their users.
“Interpretability and explainability methods promoted by popular tools vary widely in their goals [120] and, like many 'snake oil' AI products [18, 59, 91], may encourage false confidence in their users [118].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 5 sources checked- cites [120] [120] Zachary C. Lipton. 2018. The Mythos of Model Interpretability: In machine learning, the concept of interpretability is both important and slippery. Queue , 16, 3, (June 2018), 31-57. doi: 10.1145/3236386.3241340. - source
- cites [18] [18] Arvind Narayanan and Sayash Kapoor. 2024. AI Snake Oil: What Artificial Intelligence Can Do, What It Can't, and How to Tell the Difference . Princeton University Press, Princeton. isbn: 978-0-691-24913-1. -
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [59] [59] Frederike Kaltheuner, (Ed.) 2021. Fake AI . Meatspace Press. isbn: 978-1-91382403-7. -
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [91] [91] Luke Stark and Jevan Hutson. 2021. Physiognomic artificial intelligence. Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. LJ , 32, 922. - source
- cites [118] [118] Marzyeh Ghassemi, Luke Oakden-Rayner, and Andrew L. Beam. 2021. The false hope of current approaches to explainable artificial intelligence in health care. The Lancet Digital Health , 3, 11, (Nov. 2021), e745-e750. doi: 10.1016/S25 89-7500(21)00208-9. - source
May combine two claims.
Findingown data§ 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 9Existing tools for data scraping were helpful but often required extensive adaptation.
“Existing tools for data scraping were helpful but often required extensive adaptation:”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
May combine two claims.
Findingown data§ 4.2 Standards Identification & Management · p. 6In the dataset, goal-articulating principle statements (N=86) and self-assessment checklists (N=49) were most common, while participatory standard-setting methods (N=5) were rare.
“Most commonly found were goal-articulating 'principle statements' ( 𝑁 = 86), selfassessment checklists ( 𝑁 = 49), and similar documents, while methods for participatory standard-setting ( 𝑁 = 5) were comparatively rare in our dataset.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
- Rests on an assumption: The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Findingnone given§ 4.1 Harms Discovery · p. 5Participation also helps instill confidence in the audit process and foster engagement with subsequent accountability efforts.
“Participation also helps instill confidence in the audit process and foster engagement with subsequent accountability efforts.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown data§ 4.2 Standards Identification & Management · p. 7Some participants thought assessment templates and checklists were focused too narrowly on fairness assessment.
“Some participants also thought that assessments templates and checklists were focused too narrowly on fairness assessment.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown data§ 4.2 Standards Identification & Management · p. 6Auditors emphasized the importance of standardized evaluation frameworks that provide clarity and consistency.
“Auditors emphasized the importance of standardized evaluation frameworks that provide clarity and consistency: ' I think standardization is a big [concern]... ' (P23)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingnone given§ 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 8Tools for Transparency Infrastructure (N=12) are interfaces and databases hosted by model operators that allow controlled access to relevant data.
“Tools for Transparency Infrastructure ( 𝑁 = 12) are interfaces and databases hosted by model operators that allow controlled access to relevant data.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
- Rests on an assumption: The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Findingown data§ (3) RQ3: Do existing tools support practitioners' needs? · p. 2Auditors envisioned tools to help them access high-quality, uncompromised data, apply consistent and holistic standards and methods, and ensure audit integrity.
“Auditors envisioned tools to help them access high-quality, uncompromised data, apply consistent and holistic standards and methods, and ensure audit integrity.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Findingown data§ 4.1 Harms Discovery · p. 5Auditors recognized that to comprehensively identify AI-related harms, they must engage with those directly impacted.
“Auditors recognized that to comprehensively identify AI-related harms, they must engage with those directly impacted.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Findingown data§ 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 9With recent datasets scaling up to staggering sizes, the concern about data quality has become more acute, and auditors commented that manual analysis was no longer feasible.
“With recent datasets scaling up to staggering sizes, this concern has become more acute and auditors commented on how manual analysis was no longer feasible:”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown data§ 4.2 Standards Identification & Management · p. 7Multiple participants felt there was a culture or communications gap between legal and compliance people on one side and engineers on the other.
“Multiple participants felt there was a ' culture or communications gap between the legal and compliance people on one side and the engineers on the other ' (P12).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
May combine two claims.
Findingown data§ 4.2 Standards Identification & Management · p. 8Some tools made advances in one or more dimensions of holistic, context-specific, inclusive, and practice-compatible standards, but few accomplished all three.
“Some of the tools we found made advances in one or more of these dimensions, but few accomplished all three.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
- Rests on an assumption: The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
May combine two claims.
Findingcitation§ 4.2 Standards Identification & Management · p. 8NIST's AI RMF includes safety, security, reliability, transparency, explainability, and privacy in addition to fairness, but its guidance for specific evaluation techniques remains fairly broad.
“while NIST's AI RMF includes safety, security, reliability, transparency, explainability, and privacy, in addition to fairness, its guidance for specific evaluation techniques remains fairly broad [17].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [17] [17] Elham Tabassi. 2023. AI Risk Management Framework: AI RMF (1.0). Tech. rep. error: NIST AI 100-1. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, error: NIST AI 100-1. doi: 10.6028/NIST.AI.100-1. - source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingreasoning§ 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 9Data quality concerns intersected with concerns about audit integrity.
“Data quality concerns intersected with concerns about audit integrity.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Findingown data§ 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 10Some external auditors worried that external data collection tools, particularly data scraping or data donation, may violate terms of service set by platforms and result in legal liability or retaliation.
“Some external auditors also worried that external data collection tools-particularly tools for data scraping or data donation-may violate terms of service set by platforms and result in legal liability or retaliation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown data§ 4.2 Standards Identification & Management · p. 6Many auditors wished to streamline the auditing process by offering predefined structures and templates for assessment.
“Many wished to streamline the auditing process by offering predefined structures and templates for assessment, which are essential for conducting audits effectively and facilitating communication.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
May combine two claims.
Findingcitation§ 4.1 Harms Discovery · p. 5While we did find multiple popular databases for recording and collating incidents of harm, these databases record harms after they have already occurred, often rely on second-hand reports, and may not delve deeply into causes of harms or impacts.
“While we did find multiple popular databases for recording and collating incidents of harm (such as the AI Incident Database), these databases record harms after they have already occurred, often rely on second-hand reports, and may not delve deeply into causes of harms or impacts [139].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [139] [139] Violet Turri and Rachel Dzombak. 2023. Why We Need to Know More: Exploring the State of AI Incident Documentation Practices. In Proceedings of the 2023 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society (AIES '23). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (Aug. 2023), 576-583. doi: 10.1145/3600211.3604700. - source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingcitation§ 4.1 Harms Discovery · p. 5Participants recognized the challenge of designing methodologies and tools without exploitation, tokenization, or other forms of 'participation washing'.
“Participants also recognized the challenge of designing methodologies and tools without exploitation, tokenization, or other forms of 'participation washing' [89], highlighting the need for fair compensation and participatory algorithmic development, in addition to participatory auditing.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [89] [89] Mona Sloane, Emanuel Moss, Olaitan Awomolo, and Laura Forlano. 2022. Participation Is not a Design Fix for Machine Learning. In Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Equity and Access in Algorithms, Mechanisms, and Optimization (EAAMO '22). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (Oct. 2022), 1-6. isbn: 978-1-4503-9477-2. doi: 10.1145/3551624.3555 285. - source
May combine two claims.
Findingown data§ (3) RQ3: Do existing tools support practitioners' needs? · p. 2While there currently exist many tools to support audit work, particularly for evaluating AI systems and managing standards, these tools often fell short of helping auditors achieve accountability in practice.
“We find that while there currently exist many tools to support audit work, particularly for evaluating AI systems and managing standards, these tools often fell short of helping auditors achieve accountability in practice.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown data§ 4 Results · p. 5Practitioners struggled to independently access high-quality data about system behavior, apply consistent and holistic standards and methods, ensure audit integrity, involve affected stakeholders, and collaborate across disciplines.
“Practitioners struggled to independently access high-quality data about system behavior, apply consistent and holistic standards and methods, ensure audit integrity, involve affected stakeholders, and collaborate across disciplines.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown data§ 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 10Auditors expressed concerns about legal risks from existing laws and regulations, particularly the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and other privacy laws.
“Auditors expressed concerns about legal risks from existing laws and regulations, particularly the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and other privacy laws.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
May combine two claims.
Findingown data§ (3) RQ3: Do existing tools support practitioners' needs? · p. 2Practitioners found some tools-such as open source tools for data collection-empowering, but tools for tasks beyond evaluation, such as discovering harms, communicating audit results, and advocating for subsequent changes, were much less common.
“Practitioners found some tools-such as open source tools for data collection-empowering, but tools for tasks beyond evaluation, such as discovering harms, communicating audit results, and advocating for subsequent changes, were much less common.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown data§ 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 8Despite court orders and regulations like Article 40 of the Digital Service Act that require construction of transparency tools, key APIs used for auditing are becoming more costly and undependable.
“Despite court orders and regulations like Article 40 of the Digital Service Act [47] that require the construction of transparency tools, one participant noted that key APIs used for auditing are becoming more costly and undependable:”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [47] [47] Paddy Leerssen. 2023. Digital Services Act: Summary Report on the Call for Evidence on the Delegated Regulation on Data Access. Tech. rep. European Commission, (Nov. 2023). Retrieved Oct. 22, 2024 from https://digital-strateg y.ec.europa.eu/en/library/digital-services-act-summary-report-call-eviden ce-delegated-regulation-data-access. -
Not checked in the free run.
- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
May combine two claims.
Findingown data§ 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 8Transparency Infrastructure tools provide external auditors with controlled access to models and data, especially for online platforms in the dataset, but they require investment from model operators.
“Transparency Infrastructure tools provide external auditors with controlled access to models and data-especially for online platforms, in our dataset (Fig. E.4)-but they require investment from model operators.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
- Rests on an assumption: The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
May combine two claims.
Findingown data§ 4 Results · p. 5While there exist many tools for aiding AI auditing, practitioners found existing tools inadequate in multiple ways.
“While there exist many tools for aiding AI auditing, practitioners found existing tools inadequate in multiple ways.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown data§ 4.5 Audit Communication & Advocacy · p. 11Tools to facilitate Audit Communication were the rarest in the dataset (N=8), consisting mostly of tools for Dataset Visualization and Audit Reporting.
“Tools to facilitate Audit Communication were the rarest in our dataset ( 𝑁 = 8), and consist mostly of tools for Dataset Visualization (e.g. Google's FACETS [56]) and Audit Reporting (e.g., the ACLU's repository of NYC Local Law 144 hiring bias audit reports [127]).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [56] [56] 2023. Facets - Know Your Data. (Dec. 2023). Retrieved Dec. 8, 2023 from https://pair-code.github.io/facets/. -
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [127] [127] Melissa Gerchick and Brooke Watson Madubuonwu. 2024. Tracking Automated Employment Decision Tool Bias Audits. aclu-national. (Aug. 2024). Retrieved Sept. 10, 2024 from https://github.com/aclu-national/tracking-ll144 -bias-audits. -
Not checked in the free run.
- Rests on an assumption: The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
- Rests on an assumption: The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown data§ 4.5 Audit Communication & Advocacy · p. 11Auditors hoped greater communication could help unite the profession around policy developments, shared language, standards, and goals that could improve the impact of their work.
“Auditors hoped greater communication could help unite the profession around policy developments, shared language, standards, and goals that could improve the impact of their work.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
May combine two claims.
Findingown data§ 5.1 Moving beyond evaluation, towards accountability · p. 12AI auditors care deeply about accountability but struggled to achieve it.
“This echoes a theme repeated several times throughout our interviews-AI auditors care deeply about accountability but struggled to achieve it.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingcitation§ 4.4 Performance Analysis · p. 10The most popular Performance Analysis tool found on Github is SHAP, a game-theoretic method for measuring feature importance in a model.
“For example, the most popular Performance Analysis tool we found on Github is SHAP (SHapley Additive exPlanations), a gametheoretic method for measuring feature importance in a model [9] (see Table E.2).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [9] [9] Scott M. Lundberg and Su-In Lee. 2017. A unified approach to interpreting model predictions. In Proceedings of the 31st International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS'17). Curran Associates Inc., Red Hook, NY, USA, (Dec. 2017), 4768-4777. isbn: 978-1-5108-6096-4. Retrieved Feb. 12, 2025 from. -
Not checked in the free run.
- Rests on an assumption: The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
- Rests on an assumption: The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Findingown data§ E Additional Landscape Analysis · p. 19Of the 347 organizations in the dataset, Crunchbase records were accessible for 202 (accounting for 270 tools); 173 of these records include estimated employee counts.
“Of the 347 organizations in our dataset, we were able to access Crunchbase records for 202 (accounting for 270 tools); 173 of these records include estimated employee counts.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [44] [44] 2023. Crunchbase. (2023). Retrieved Aug. 24, 2023 from https://www.crunchb ase.com. -
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Findingown data§ 4.4 Performance Analysis · p. 10Performance Analysis tools (N=129) are designed to help auditors evaluate and explain model behavior, usually through calculation of quantitative metrics related to accuracy/safety (N=71), explainability (N=36), or fairness (N=30).
“Tools for Performance Analysis ( 𝑁 = 129) are designed to help auditors evaluate and explain model behavior, usually through the calculation of quantiative metrics related to accuracy/safety ( 𝑁 = 71), explainability ( 𝑁 = 36), or fairness ( 𝑁 = 30).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
- Rests on an assumption: The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Findingcitation§ 5.2 Moving beyond ad hoc toolkits, towards shared infrastructure · p. 13Participants' aspirations for tooling envision a path towards lasting public infrastructure that gives auditors additional levers to hold model operators accountable.
“participants' aspirations for tooling envision another path-a path towards lasting public infrastructure that gives auditors additional levers to hold model operators accountable [96].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [96] [96] Nik Marda, Jasmine Sun, and Mark Surman. 2024. Public AI: Making AI Work for Everyone, by Everyone. Tech. rep. Mozilla Foundation, (Sept. 2024). -
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Findingown data§ 5.1 Moving beyond evaluation, towards accountability · p. 12The stages of harms discovery, audit communication, and advocacy are the stages participants described as most requiring contextual awareness and typically under-studied participatory and community engagement methods.
“Perhaps unsurprisingly, these are also the stages of the audit process that participants described as most requiring contextual awareness and typically under-studied participatory and community engagement methods.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Findingnone given§ 5.2 Moving beyond ad hoc toolkits, towards shared infrastructure · p. 13Currently, the burden of building and maintaining tools to address technical debt falls on the auditors, raising concerns about the sustainability of auditing efforts.
“Currently, the burden of building and maintaining tools to address technical debt falls on the auditors, raising concerns about the sustainability of auditing efforts.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown data§ 5.2 Moving beyond ad hoc toolkits, towards shared infrastructure · p. 13The external auditors interviewed were especially skeptical of the data provided from these tools and aware of their unreliability.
“The external auditors we interviewed were especially skeptical of the data provided from these tools and aware of their unreliability”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingnone given§ 5.3 Ongoing Impact · p. 13OAT team members presented these findings to regulators at the U.K.'s OfCom and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission.
“OAT team members presented these findings to regulators at the U.K.'s OfCom and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown data§ 4.4 Performance Analysis · p. 11Performance Analysis tools found, most popular of which were built and maintained by disproportionately large for-profit firms, often focused on a narrow set of technical fairness definitions and explainability methods popularized in academic literature.
“The Performance Analysis tools we foundthe most popular of which were built and maintained by disproportionately large, for-profit firms (Figures E.6)-often focused on a narrow set of technical fairness definitions and explainability methods popularized in academic literature.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
- Rests on an assumption: The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
May combine two claims.
Findingown data§ 4.4 Performance Analysis · p. 11Performance Analysis tools found (48.1% built by for-profit organizations) were disproportionately not open source compared to other tools in the dataset, especially tools for Explainability.
“However, the Performance Analysis tools we found (48.1% of which were built by for-profit organizations) were disproportionately not open source compared to other tools in our dataset, especially tools for Explainability (Fig. E.3).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
- Rests on an assumption: The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingcitation§ 5.1 Moving beyond evaluation, towards accountability · p. 12Auditors envisioned audit report databases as accountability tools to facilitate amalgamation and communication of audit findings to key stakeholders.
“Likewise, auditors envisioned audit report databases as accountability tools to facilitate the amalgamation and communication of audit findings to key stakeholders, mirroring interventions such as the U.S. Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) EDGAR database for financial accounting audits [88].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [88] [88] Inioluwa Deborah Raji, Peggy Xu, Colleen Honigsberg, and Daniel Ho. 2022. Outsider Oversight: Designing a Third Party Audit Ecosystem for AI Governance. In Proceedings of the 2022 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society (AIES '22). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (July 2022), 557-571. isbn: 978-1-4503-9247-1. doi: 10.1145/3514094.3534181. - source
Not checked in the free run.
- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown data§ 4.5 Audit Communication & Advocacy · p. 11Auditors especially wished for resources that would bring together the diverse, interdisciplinary groups involved in auditing.
“Auditors especially wished for resources that would bring together the diverse, interdisciplinary groups involved in auditing, similar to the few tools for Community Spaces we found in our tool survey.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Findingown data§ 5.2 Moving beyond ad hoc toolkits, towards shared infrastructure · p. 12Participants noted a lack of long-term investment.
“participants noted a lack of long-term investment”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingnone given§ 5.3 Ongoing Impact · p. 13OAT team members participated in advising the selection of two rounds of Mozilla Technology Fund awardees, including 5 teams in an inaugural cohort (2022), and 8 teams in a follow-up cohort (2023) focused on AI audit tooling.
“OAT team members also participated in advising the selection of two rounds of Mozilla Technology Fund (MTF) awardees, including 5 teams in an inaugural cohort (2022), and 8 teams in a follow-up cohort (2023) focused on AI audit tooling.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Findingown data§ 5.2 Moving beyond ad hoc toolkits, towards shared infrastructure · p. 12Participants agreed on the need for shared infrastructure that supports the auditing process.
“Participants agreed on the need for shared infrastructure that supports the auditing process.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Findingown data§ · Developing participatory methods for audit work. · p. 12Some participants were concerned about the efficacy of many AI audit tools, particularly tools whose methods were not made available for public scrutiny.
“Some participants were concerned about the efficacy of many AI audit tools-particularly tools whose methods were not made available for public scrutiny.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown data§ 4.5 Audit Communication & Advocacy · p. 11The authors found more tools for Advocacy (N=14) than for Audit Communication but still fewer than in other stages of the taxonomy.
“We found more tools for Advocacy ( 𝑁 = 14)-including Community Spaces (e.g., the Benefits Tech Advocacy Hub [32], which facilitates collaboration between advocates who oppose algorithmbased cuts to public benefits), tools for Organizing/Resistance (e.g., the Algorithmic Ecology framework [112], a tool for mapping the non-technical dimensions of algorithmic impact), and tools for Legal Search (e.g.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [32] [32] 2023. Benefits Tech Advocacy Hub. (Dec. 2023). Retrieved Dec. 12, 2023 from https://btah.org/. -
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [112] [112] Stop LAPD Spying Coalition and Free Radicals. 2020. The Algorithmic Ecology: An Abolitionist Tool for Organizing Against Algorithms. (Mar. 2020). Retrieved Dec. 8, 2023 from https://freerads.org/2020/03/02/the-algorithmicecology-an-abolitionist-tool-for-organizing-against-algorithms/. -
Not checked in the free run.
- Rests on an assumption: The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
- Rests on an assumption: The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown data§ 4.4 Performance Analysis · p. 11Several participants emphasized the importance of open-sourcing tools for others in the community to inspect.
“To allay methodological concerns, several participants emphasized the importance of open-sourcing tools for others in the community to inspect.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
- Rests on an assumption: Open-sourcing audit tools improves their inspectability and reproducibility.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown data§ E Additional Landscape Analysis · p. 20Total venture funding (adjusted to U.S. dollars) was collected for 48 firms out of the 112 firms that are still private (i.e., have not undertaken an initial public offering).
“We also collected total venture funding (adjusted to U.S. dollars) for 48 firms out of the 112 firms that are still private (i.e., have not undertaken an initial public offering).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [44] [44] 2023. Crunchbase. (2023). Retrieved Aug. 24, 2023 from https://www.crunchb ase.com. -
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown data§ 4.4 Performance Analysis · p. 10Some participants attributed methodological deficiencies to differences in rigor employed by the various disciplines involved with auditing.
“Some participants put methodological deficiencies down to differences in the rigor employed by the various disciplines involved with auditing.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
May combine two claims.
Findingown data§ 4.4 Performance Analysis · p. 11Tools specifically devoted to qualitative, as opposed to quantitative, analysis were much harder to find (N=3) and rarely mentioned by participants.
“For example, tools specifically devoted to qualitative-as opposed to quantitative-analysis were much harder to find ( 𝑁 = 3) and rarely mentioned by our participants.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
- Rests on an assumption: The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Findingown data§ 4.4 Performance Analysis · p. 10Participants had concerns about maintenance, effectiveness of automated monitoring processes, and the efficacy of synthetic data for representing real users.
“Participants had concerns about maintenance, effectiveness of automated monitoring processes, and the efficacy of synthetic data for representing real users instead of functioning as ' an academic exercise ' (P4):”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
May combine two claims.
Findingown data§ · Developing participatory methods for audit work. · p. 12Participants had audit results blocked from publication (P1) or unduly restricted in scope (P13) due to interventions from audit targets.
“Participants had audit results blocked from publication (P1) or unduly restricted in scope (P13) due to interventions from audit targets.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ 2 Related work · p. 2In a survey of 152 audit practitioners, 62% used existing tools like AI Fairness 360, Scikit Fairness, or Parity, though only 7% used a standardized framework for their overall audit protocol.
“And in a survey of 152 audit practitioners, Costanza-Chock et al. [136] found that 62% of practitioners used existing tools like AI Fairness 360, Scikit Fairness, or Parity, though only 7% of respondents used a standardized framework for their overall audit protocol.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [136] [136] Sasha Costanza-Chock, Inioluwa Deborah Raji, and Joy Buolamwini. 2022. Who Audits the Auditors? Recommendations from a field scan of the algorithmic auditing ecosystem. In Proceedings of the 2022 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT '22). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (June 2022), 1571-1583. isbn: 978-1-4503-9352-2. doi: 10.1145/3531146.3533213. - source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 8Gathering empirical evidence is a key step in AI auditing but often poses the most significant challenge in practice.
“Gathering empirical evidence is a key step in AI auditing, but often poses the most significant challenge in practice.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ 2 Related work · p. 2Across various industries, the common accountability practice of auditing has long relied on rituals, organizational processes and tools in order to make consistent, inter-operable and reliable judgments, as well as provide broader access to a larger range of stakeholder participants in the audit process.
“Across various industries, the common accountability practice of auditing has long relied on rituals, organizational processes and tools in order to make consistent, inter-operable and reliable judgments [113], as well as provide broader access to a larger range of stakeholder participants in the audit process [92].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [113] [113] Michael Power. 1999. The Audit Society . Oxford University Press, (Aug. 1999). isbn: 978-0-19-829603-4. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198296034.001.0001. - source
- cites [92] [92] AbebaBirhane, William Isaac, Vinodkumar Prabhakaran, Mark Diaz, Madeleine Clare Elish, Iason Gabriel, and Shakir Mohamed. 2022. Power to the People? Opportunities and Challenges for Participatory AI. In Proceedings of the 2nd - ACM Conference on Equity and Access in Algorithms, Mechanisms, and Optimization (EAAMO '22). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, (Oct. 2022), 1-8. isbn: 978-1-4503-9477-2. doi: 10.1145/3551624.3555290. -
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ Abeba Birhane · p. 1In the E.U., enforcement reports for the Digital Services Act emphasize the importance of AI audit tooling for effective oversight enforcement.
“Similarly, in the E.U., enforcement reports for the Digital Services Act emphasize the importance of AI audit tooling for effective oversight enforcement [45].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [45] [45] Ulrike Klinger and Jakob Ohme. 2023. Delegated Regulation on Data Access Provided for the Digital Services Act: Response to the Call for Evidence DG CNECT-CNECT F2 by the European Commission. Tech. rep. 7. Weizenbaum Institute, (May 2023). https://www.weizenbaum-library.de/handle/id/380. -
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ 4.1 Harms Discovery · p. 5This task can be especially difficult for external auditors who may not know where AI systems are in use or what their impacts might be.
“This task can be especially difficult for external auditors who may not know where AI systems are in use or what their impacts might be.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationreasoning§ 2 Related work · p. 2Accountability requires infrastructure.
“Accountability also requires infrastructure.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ 2 Related work · p. 3Fairness toolkits do not typically support other necessary steps of an audit such as data collection.
“And fairness toolkits do not typically support other necessary steps of an audit such as data collection.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductnone given§ 3.2 Tool Taxonomy · p. 4Our theoretical sampling strategy deliberately over-represents some less common kinds of tooling (such as tools for advocacy).
“In particular, our theoretical sampling strategy deliberately over-represents some less common kinds of tooling (such as tools for advocacy).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductreasoning§ 3.2 Tool Taxonomy · p. 4Our dataset should not be viewed as a comprehensive or perfectly representative sample.
“As a result, while our dataset reflects a structured and iterative search, it should not be viewed as a comprehensive or perfectly representative sample.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 2 Related work · p. 2Audit tooling represents not only a mechanism for maintenance and consistency of audit integrity but also a key capacity-building intervention to lower the barriers for broader participation.
“Audit tooling, then, represents not only a mechanism for maintenance and consistency of audit integrity but also a key capacity-building intervention to lower the barriers for broader participation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ Abeba Birhane · p. 1In the U.S., several recently proposed 'AI innovation' bills are explicitly geared towards investing in tooling and resource development for AI auditing.
“In the U.S. alone, several recently proposed 'AI innovation' bills are explicitly geared towards investing in tooling and resource development for AI auditing.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Interpretationown data§ 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 8The vetting process for API use often requires the auditor to disclose their intent for the evaluation in advance, which may compromise the integrity of the study.
“And currently, the vetting process for API use often requires the auditor to disclose their intent for the evaluation in advance, which may compromise the integrity of the study.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone given§ 4.1 Harms Discovery · p. 5Auditing an AI system first requires identifying the system that should be subject to scrutiny and identifying its potential harms.
“Auditing an AI system first requires identifying the system that should be subject to scrutiny and identifying its potential harms.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ Abeba Birhane · p. 1Governments across the globe are developing their own tools and making use of existing resources as part of their enforcement regimes for AI governance.
“Governments across the globe are developing their own tools and making use of existing resources as part of their enforcement regimes for AI governance [101].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [101] [101] Kate Kaye and Pam Dixon. 2023. Risky Analysis: Assessing and Improving AI Governance Tools. Tech. rep. World Privacy Forum, (Nov. 2023). Retrieved Dec. 18, 2023 from https://www.worldprivacyforum.org/wp-content/uploads /2023/12/WPF\_Risky\_Analysis\_December\_2023\_fs.pdf. -
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoning§ 3.2 Tool Taxonomy · p. 4Our search for tools was systematic but not exhaustive.
“So while our search for tools was systematic, it was not exhaustive.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductnone given§ 3.2 Tool Taxonomy · p. 4One author created the labels and at least one other author reviewed each label for agreement.
“One author created the labels and at least one other author reviewed each label for agreement.”
- Also stated in: § E Additional Landscape Analysis · p. 19 · plain
“One author created the labels and at least one other author reviewed each label for agreement.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Also stated in: § E Additional Landscape Analysis · p. 19 · plain
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ 2 Related work · p. 3A comprehensive survey of auditors' practical needs relative to the landscape of available tools is lacking.
“As yet, however, a comprehensive survey of auditors' practical needs relative to the landscape of available tools is lacking.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductnone given§ 3.1 Interview methodology · p. 3Our protocol was approved by three university IRBs.
“Our protocol was approved by three university IRBs.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisereasoning§ Abeba Birhane · p. 1Practitioners often rely on tools-software, frameworks, and other resources-to support their AI audit work.
“In the face of these challenges, practitioners often rely on toolssoftware, frameworks, and other resources-to support their AI audit work.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 4.5 Audit Communication & Advocacy · p. 11Embracing public evaluation results helps audit practitioners to learn from each other's experiences.
“Embracing public evaluation results also helps audit practitioners to learn from each other's experiences.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 6 Conclusion · p. 13AI audit studies translating into tangible outcomes of accountability is far from certain.
“Ideally, AI audit studies will translate into tangible outcomes of accountability, but this outcome is far from certain.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductown data§ C.1 Initial Sources · p. 18There are substitutes and competitors for many of the tools in the dataset, but they were not included unless observed in the sources or subsequent searches.
“Note that there are substitutes and competitors for many of the tools in our dataset (such as qualitative coding software), but we did not include them unless we observed them in one of the sources above or our subsequent searches (§ C.2).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductreasoning§ A Reflections · p. 17The analysis is primarily scoped to the U.S. and the E.U.
“We thus recognize that our analysis is primarily scoped to the U.S. and the E.U.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 5.2 Moving beyond ad hoc toolkits, towards shared infrastructure · p. 13Open source tools (e.g., for data scraping) can sometimes fill the gap, but do not always cover the scope and complexity of practical audit work.
“Open source tools (e.g., for data scraping) can sometimes fill the gap, but do not always cover the scope and complexity of practical audit work.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 4.5 Audit Communication & Advocacy · p. 11Communicating audit findings, lessons, and insights learned can help build trust and validate audit findings, recommendations, and subsequent interventions.
“Communicating audit findings, lessons, and insights learned can help build trust and validate audit findings, recommendations, and subsequent interventions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ · Developing participatory methods for audit work. · p. 12Making AI audit tools publicly available enables both external collaboration and third-party validation.
“Making AI audit tools publicly available enables both external collaboration and third-party validation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationown data§ 5.2 Moving beyond ad hoc toolkits, towards shared infrastructure · p. 13Audit tools like these can hold great power over the audit process.
“Audit tools like these can hold great power over the audit process:”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductnone given§ C.1 Initial Sources · p. 18The dataset of AI audit tools is not an exhaustive list of all tools that have been or could be used in AI audit practice.
“Our dataset is not an exhaustive list of all tools that have been or could be used in AI audit practice.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 4.5 Audit Communication & Advocacy · p. 11Audit report repositories could expand the forum holding model operators accountable, allowing policymakers, journalists, and other public stakeholders to engage with evaluations more easily.
“Audit report repositories could expand the forum holding model operators accountable, allowing policymakers, journalists, and other public stakeholders to engage with evaluations more easily.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductreasoning§ C.2 Theoretical Sampling · p. 18Categories with a more saturated set of examples were not given an equal amount of additional sourcing.
“Categories with a more saturated set of examples were not given an equal amount of additional sourcing.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductown data§ C.2 Theoretical Sampling · p. 18A point of saturation for each search was determined by examining each Google search page of 30 results at a time until two pages in a row contained no references to specific audit tools.
“In order to determine a point of saturation for each search, we examined each Google search page of 30 results at a time until two pages in a row contained no references to specific audit tools.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationcitation§ 5.1 Moving beyond evaluation, towards accountability · p. 12Unreliable performance or accuracy analysis tools that fail to meaningfully assess the audit target operate as misleading 'rubber stamps' for vendors and lead to 'audit washing,' posing a serious challenge to the legitimacy of audit results.
“Unreliable performance or accuracy analysis tools that fail to meaningfully assess the audit target operate as misleading 'rubber stamps' for vendors and lead to 'audit washing' [13], posing a serious challenge to the legitimacy of audit results.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [13] [13] Ellen P Goodman and Julia Tréhu. 2022. AI Audit-Washing and Accountability. Policy Paper. German Marshall Fund of the United States, (Nov. 2022). https: //www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/2022-11/Goodman%20%26%20Trehu%2 0-%20Algorithmic%20Auditing%20-%20paper.pdf. - source
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ 4.3 Data Collection & Transparency Infrastructure · p. 10Facebook initially insinuated that disabling the researchers' accounts was required by an FTC consent decree, backtracking only after the FTC called the statement inaccurate.
“Facebook initially insinuated that disabling the researchers' accounts was required by an Federal Trade Commission (FTC) consent decree, backtracking only after the FTC called the statement inaccurate [76].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [76] [76] Samuel Levine. 2021. Letter from Acting Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection Samuel Levine to Facebook. (Aug. 2021). Retrieved Dec. 7, 2023 from https://www.ftc.gov/blog-posts/2021/08/letter-acting-director-bureau -consumer-protection-samuel-levine-facebook. -
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoning§ A Reflections · p. 17The analysis may not be representative of the global AI auditing landscape or appropriate for or informed by other contexts.
“and may not be representative of the global AI auditing landscape or appropriate for or informed by other contexts.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ · Developing participatory methods for audit work. · p. 12Open tooling practices may contribute to knowledge-sharing, standards-setting, transparency, accessibility, and trust.
“Open tooling practices may also contribute to knowledge-sharing, standards-setting, transparency, accessibility, and trust”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
The paper relies on this without support.
AI audits are critical mechanisms for identifying the risks and limitations of deployed AI systems.
“Audits are critical mechanisms for identifying the risks and limitations of deployed artificial intelligence (AI) systems.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The effective execution of AI audits is important for AI accountability.
“However, the effective execution of AI audits remains incredibly difficult, and practitioners often need to make use of various tools to support their efforts.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The current ecosystem of AI audit tooling can be meaningfully compared to practitioner needs.
“Drawing on interviews with 35 AI audit practitioners and a landscape analysis of 435 tools, we compare the current ecosystem of AI audit tooling to practitioner needs.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Under the CFAA, an auditor who violates a platform's terms of service may be held criminally liable.
“Under the CFAA, for example, an auditor who violates a platforms' terms of service may be held criminally liable.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The authors' tool dataset is comprehensive enough to support claims about gaps in AI audit tooling.
“Despite searching deliberately for non-evaluation tools, we found more than fi ve times as many tools in the evaluation stages of the AI audit process as we did tools for harms discovery, audit communication, or advocacy.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The interview participants' statements reflect broader AI auditing practice.
“This echoes a theme repeated several times throughout our interviews-AI auditors care deeply about accountability but struggled to achieve it.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The taxonomy's stages and categories are valid for classifying AI audit tools.
“Tools for Performance Analysis ( 𝑁 = 129) are designed to help auditors evaluate and explain model behavior, usually through the calculation of quantiative metrics related to accuracy/safety ( 𝑁 = 71), explainability ( 𝑁 = 36), or fairness ( 𝑁 = 30).”
The paper relies on this without support.
Open-sourcing audit tools improves their inspectability and reproducibility.
“To allay methodological concerns, several participants emphasized the importance of open-sourcing tools for others in the community to inspect.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
AI auditing has the potential to become a meaningful mechanism of accountability.
“until it becomes the meaningful mechanism of accountability it has the potential to be.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
HCI scholarship has a distinctive role in translating abstract principles into concrete, citizen-centred practices by offering insights into participatory design methods for AI systems and policy, tools to facilitate stakeholder engagement, and socio-technical evaluation.
“HCI scholarship has a distinctive role here: by offering established insights into participatory design methods for AI systems and policy [87, 103, 183], tools to facilitate stakeholder engagement [97], and socio-technical evaluation [12, 110, 131], it helps translate abstract principles into concrete, citizen-centred practices.”
From “It’s Just a Wild, Wild West”: Harnessing Public Procurement as an AI Governance Mechanism (2026) · cites this paper as [131]
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Four requirements are described as three
MinorThe paper names four dimensions for evaluation standards-holistic, context-specific, inclusive, and compatible with practice-but then refers to them as "all three."
“few accomplished all three.”
“Standards for evaluating AI systems must be simultaneously holistic, context-specific, inclusive, and compatible with practice.”
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Materializing Morality: Design Ethics and Technological Mediation
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Power to the People? Opportunities and Challenges for Participatory AI
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Self-citationRakova, B., Yang, J., Cramer, H., & Chowdhury, R. (2021) · Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction · doi:10.1145/3449081 · Cited by 329 · see citing works
Sociotechnical Harms of Algorithmic Systems: Scoping a Taxonomy for Harm Reduction
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Human-Centered Explainable AI: Towards a Reflective Sociotechnical Approach
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Participation Is not a Design Fix for Machine Learning
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The Participatory Turn in AI Design: Theoretical Foundations and the Current State of Practice
Delgado, F., Yang, S., Madaio, M., & Yang, Q. (2023) · Equity and Access in Algorithms, Mechanisms, and Optimization · doi:10.1145/3617694.3623261 · Cited by 256 · see citing works
The Fallacy of AI Functionality
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Self-citationProblems with Shapley-value-based explanations as feature importance measures
Kumar, I. E., Venkatasubramanian, S., Scheidegger, C., & Friedler, S. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2002.11097 · Cited by 228 · see citing works
Auditing Algorithms: Understanding Algorithmic Systems from the Outside In
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Help Me Help the AI": Understanding How Explainability Can Support Human-AI Interaction
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Problematic Machine Behavior: A Systematic Literature Review of Algorithm Audits
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Who Audits the Auditors? Recommendations from a field scan of the algorithmic auditing ecosystem
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Self-citationA Qualitative Exploration of Perceptions of Algorithmic Fairness
Woodruff, A., Fox, S. E., Rousso-Schindler, S., & Warshaw, J. (2018) · Proceedings of the 2018 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3173574.3174230 · Cited by 190 · see citing works
Raji, I. D., Smart, A., White, R. N., Mitchell, M., Gebru, T., Hutchinson, B., Smith-Loud, J., Theron, D., & Barnes, P. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2001.00973 · Cited by 179 · see citing works
Self-citationShen, H., DeVos, A., Eslami, M., & Holstein, K. (2021) · Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction · doi:10.1145/3479577 · Cited by 171 · see citing works
The Landscape and Gaps in Open Source Fairness Toolkits
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Outsider Oversight: Designing a Third Party Audit Ecosystem for AI Governance
Raji, I. D., Xu, P., Honigsberg, C., & Ho, D. (2022) · Proceedings of the 2022 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society · doi:10.1145/3514094.3534181 · Cited by 122 · see citing works
Self-citationSmith-Renner, A., Fan, R., Birchfield, M., Wu, T., Boyd-Graber, J., Weld, D. S., & Findlater, L. (2020) · Proceedings of the 2020 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3313831.3376624 · Cited by 112 · see citing works
Seeing Like a Toolkit: How Toolkits Envision the Work of AI Ethics
Wong, R. Y., Madaio, M. A., & Merrill, N. (2023) · Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction · doi:10.1145/3579621 · Cited by 103 · see citing works
Exploring How Machine Learning Practitioners (Try To) Use Fairness Toolkits
Deng, W. H., Nagireddy, M., Lee, M. S. A., Singh, J., Wu, Z. S., Holstein, K., & Zhu, H. (2022) · 2022 ACM Conference on Fairness Accountability and Transparency · doi:10.1145/3531146.3533113 · Cited by 99 · see citing works
DeVos, A., Dhabalia, A., Shen, H., Holstein, K., & Eslami, M. (2022) · CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3491102.3517441 · Cited by 98 · see citing works
AI auditing: The Broken Bus on the Road to AI Accountability
Birhane, A., Steed, R., Ojewale, V., Vecchione, B., & Raji, I. D. (2024) · 2024 IEEE Conference on Secure and Trustworthy Machine Learning (SaTML) · doi:10.1109/satml59370.2024.00037 · Cited by 96 · see citing works
Self-citationWhy ‘open’ AI systems are actually closed, and why this matters
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Deng, W. H., Guo, B., Devrio, A., Shen, H., Eslami, M., & Holstein, K. (2023) · Proceedings of the 2023 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3544548.3581026 · Cited by 78 · see citing works
Widder, D. G., Zhen, D., Dabbish, L., & Herbsleb, J. (2023) · 2023 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency · doi:10.1145/3593013.3594012 · Cited by 76 · see citing works
Privacy Champions in Software Teams: Understanding Their Motivations, Strategies, and Challenges
Tahaei, M., Frik, A., & Vaniea, K. E. (2021) · CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3411764.3445768 · Cited by 75 · see citing works
An overview of national AI strategies and policies
Galindo, L., Perset, K., & Sheeka, F. (2021) · OECD going digital toolkit notes · doi:10.1787/c05140d9-en · Cited by 74 · see citing works
Algorithmic Auditing and Social Justice: Lessons from the History of Audit Studies
Vecchione, B., Levy, K. E. C., & Barocas, S. (2021) · ACM Conference on Equity and Access in Algorithms, Mechanisms, and Optimization (EAAMO) · doi:10.1145/3465416.3483294 · Cited by 73 · see citing works
Self-citationOngoing Face Recognition Vendor Test (FRVT) part 6B :
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A Silicon Valley love triangle: Hiring algorithms, pseudo-science, and the quest for auditability
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Auditing Work: Exploring the New York City algorithmic bias audit regime
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Self-citationBertrand, A., Viard, T., Belloum, R., Eagan, J. R., & Maxwell, W. (2023) · Proceedings of the 2023 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3544548.3581314 · Cited by 59 · see citing works
Berman, G., Goyal, N., & Madaio, M. (2024) · CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3613904.3642398 · Cited by 45 · see citing works
Sociotechnical Audits: Broadening the Algorithm Auditing Lens to Investigate Targeted Advertising
Lam, M. S., Pandit, A., Kalicki, C. H., Gupta, R., Sahoo, P., & Metaxa, D. (2023) · Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction · doi:10.1145/3610209 · Cited by 44 · see citing works
A Safe Harbor for AI Evaluation and Red TeamingPreprint
Longpre, S., Kapoor, S., Klyman, K., Ramaswami, A., Bommasani, R., Blili-Hamelin, B., Huang, Y., Skowron, A., Yong, Z.-X., Kotha, S., et al. (2024) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2403.04893 · Cited by 44 · see citing works
Null Compliance: NYC Local Law 144 and the challenges of algorithm accountability
Wright, L., Muenster, R. M., Vecchione, B., Qu, T., Cai, P. (., Smith, A., Comm 2450 Student Investigators, Metcalf, J., & Matias, J. N. (2024) · The 2024 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency · doi:10.1145/3630106.3658998 · Cited by 43 · see citing works
Self-citationPhysiognomic Artificial Intelligence
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Raji, I. D., & Buolamwini, J. (2023) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/3571151 · Cited by 38 · see citing works
Self-citationOn the Legal Compatibility of Fairness Definitions
Xiang, A., & Raji, I. D. (2019) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1912.00761 · Cited by 34 · see citing works
Self-citationAI Audit Washing and Accountability
Goodman, E. P., & Trehu, J. (2022) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4227350 · Cited by 33 · see citing works
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Tech Worker Organizing for Power and Accountability
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Feffer, M., Martelaro, N., & Heidari, H. (2023) · ACM Conference on Equity and Access in Algorithms, Mechanisms, and Optimization (EAAMO) · doi:10.1145/3617694.3623223 · Cited by 25 · see citing works
Why We Need to Know More: Exploring the State of AI Incident Documentation Practices
Turri, V., & Dzombak, R. (2023) · Proceedings of the 2023 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society · doi:10.1145/3600211.3604700 · Cited by 24 · see citing works
Governing Algorithmic Systems with Impact Assessments: Six Observations
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Lawrence, C., Cui, I., & Ho, D. E. (2023) · Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM Conference on AI Ethics and Society · doi:10.1145/3600211.3604701 · Cited by 24 · see citing works
OECD (2021) · OECD digital economy papers · doi:10.1787/008232ec-en · Cited by 23 · see citing works
Law and the Emerging Political Economy of Algorithmic Audits
Terzis, P., Veale, M., & Gaumann, N. (2024) · The 2024 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency · doi:10.1145/3630106.3658970 · Cited by 21 · see citing works
The Fall of an Algorithm: Characterizing the Dynamics Toward Abandonment
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Against Predictive Optimization
Wang, A., Kapoor, S., Barocas, S., & Narayanan, A. (2023) · ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT) · doi:10.1145/3593013.3594030 · Cited by 19 · see citing works
The ROOTS Search Tool: Data Transparency for LLMs
Piktus, A., Akiki, C., Villegas, P., Laurençon, H., Dupont, G., Luccioni, A. S., Jernite, Y., & Rogers, A. (2023) · Proceedings of the conference - Association for Computational Linguistics. Meeting · doi:10.18653/v1/2023.acl-demo.29 · Cited by 16 · see citing works
International AI Safety Report
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Gaps Between Research and Practice When Measuring Representational Harms Caused by LLM-Based SystemsPreprint
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AI auditing: The Broken Bus on the Road to AI Accountability
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Self-citationBlack-Box Access is Insufficient for Rigorous AI Audits
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WeAudit: Scaffolding User Auditors and AI Practitioners in Auditing Generative AI
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Responsible Reporting for Frontier AI Development
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An FDA for AI? Pitfalls and Plausibility of Approval Regulation for Frontier Artificial Intelligence
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Auditing for Racial Discrimination in the Delivery of Education Ads
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Access Denied: Meaningful Data Access for Quantitative Algorithm Audits
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Ezema, K., Chandler, C., Southwell, R. V., Cholendiran, N., & D’Mello, S. K. (2025) · CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3706598.3714059 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
FairFare : A Tool for Crowdsourcing Rideshare Data to Empower Labor Organizers
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Impact Assessment Card: Communicating Risks and Benefits of AI Uses
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Runtime Policy Enforcement for MCP-Based LLM Agents
Wang, S., Zhu, S., & Li, R. K. (2026) · Electronics · doi:10.3390/electronics15132829 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
Data Hazards: An open-source vocabulary of ethical hazards for data-intensive projects
Zelenka, N., Cara, N. H. D., Bennet, E. D., Clatworthy, P. L., Day, H., Garcia, I. K., García, S. R., Hanschke, V. A., Kuwertz, E. S., & Garcia, I. K. (2025) · Journal of Responsible Technology · doi:10.1016/j.jrt.2025.100110 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Moreira, G., Bogucka, E. P., Constantinides, M., & Quercia, D. (2025) · CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3706598.3714117 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Sound Check: Auditing Recent Audio Dataset Practices
Agnew, W. S., Barnett, J., Chu, A., Hong, R. S., Feffer, M., Netzorg, R., Jiang, H. H., Awumey, E., & Das, S. (2025) · Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM Conference on AI Ethics and Society · doi:10.1609/aies.v8i1.36528 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
The Human Labour of Data Work: Capturing Cultural Diversity through World Wide Dishes
Hall, S. M., Dalal, S., Sefala, R., Yuehgoh, F., Alaagib, A., Hamzaoui, I., Ishida, S., Magomere, J., Crais, L., Salama, A., et al. (2025) · Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction · doi:10.1145/3757673 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
RECONCILING TRADE SECRETS AND AI PUBLIC TRANSPARENCY
Keller, P., & Aplin, T. F. (2026) · The Cambridge Law Journal · doi:10.1017/s0008197325101086 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
“It’s Just a Wild, Wild West”: Harnessing Public Procurement as an AI Governance Mechanism
Hudig, A. I., Kallina, E., & Singh, J. (2026) · Proceedings of the 2026 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3772318.3791968 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
“…recognised as such, the public procurement of AI systems has relevance for several traditional human-centred domains, including community needs [84, 92, 103, 135], transparency [31, 145], AI governance [100, 107, 109, 169, 175], accountability [31, 131, 169, 175], and policy [75, 100, 103].”
InfluentialGoverning Artificial Intelligence Through Auditing
Oluka, A., & Mashau, P. (2026) · Advances in computational intelligence and robotics book series · doi:10.4018/979-8-3373-3922-1.ch005 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Vipera: Towards systematic auditing of generative text-to-image models at scale
Huang, Y., Deng, W. H., Xiao, S., Eslami, M., Hong, J., & Perer, A. (2025) · CHI Conference Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI EA) · doi:10.1145/3706599.3719757 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
WeAudit: Scaffolding User Auditors and AI Practitioners in Auditing Generative AIPreprint
Deng, W. H., Wang, C., Han, H. Z., Hong, J., Holstein, K., & Eslami, M. (2025) · Qeios · doi:10.32388/b1lxnv · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Improving Group Fairness Assessments with Proxies
Harvey, E., Lee, M. S. A., & Singh, J. P. (2024) · ACM Journal on Responsible Computing · doi:10.1145/3677175 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
AI auditing through performance appraisals: A practice-informed approach
Kamphorst, B. A., Muis, I., Straatman, J., & Schäfer, M. T. (2025) · AI & Society · doi:10.1007/s00146-025-02674-3 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Julham, & Widuri, R. (2026) · International Journal of Accounting and Economics Studies · doi:10.14419/ka418q25 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
OntoScope: Using a Divergent-Convergent Interaction Framework to Support LLM-based Ontology Scoping
Zhao, Y., Meroño-Peñuela, A., & Simperl, E. P. B. (2026) · ACM International Conference on Intelligent User Interfaces (IUI) · doi:10.1145/3742413.3789225 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
The Atlas of AI Incidents in Mobile Computing: Visualizing the Risks and Benefits of AI Gone Mobile
Bogucka, E. P., Constantinides, M., Velázquez, J. D. M., Šćepanović, S., Quercia, D., & Gvirtz, A. (2024) · International Conference on Human-Computer Interaction with Mobile Devices and Services (MobileHCI) · doi:10.1145/3640471.3680447 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Vankayala, V. N. M. K. (2025) · Journal of Computer Science and Technology Studies · doi:10.32996/jcsts.2025.7.8.51 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Towards A Global AI Auditing Framework: Assessment and Recommendations
(IPIE), I. P. O. T. I. E., Faveri, B., Johnson-León, M., Sylvester, P., Chun, W. H. K., Hannák, A., Mendoza, M., Broussard, M., Сергеевич, Е. Р., Nelson, A., et al. (2025) · doi:10.61452/zwed1485 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Nainggolan, A. N., & Winoto, A. (2025) · International Conference on Computing and Applied Informatics (ICCAI) · doi:10.1109/iccai65301.2025.11278986 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Afzal, A. (2025) · IEEE Smart World Congress (SWC) · doi:10.1109/swc65939.2025.00146 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Algorithm Auditing for Reliable AI Authenticity Assessment of Digitized Archival Objects
Fonner, D. F. (2025) · IEEE International Conference on Big Data (BigData) · doi:10.1109/bigdata66926.2025.11401572 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Incongruent Priorities in Software Development Teams Using AI
Vigh, E., Kulyk, O., Mayer, P. B., & Barkhuus, L. (2026) · Annual Symposium on Human-Computer Interaction for Work (CHIWORK) · doi:10.1145/3805029.3818283 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Anti-Regulatory AI: How "AI Safety" is Leveraged Against Regulatory Oversight
Yew, R.-J., & Judge, B. (2025) · ACM Conference on Equity and Access in Algorithms, Mechanisms, and Optimization (EAAMO) · doi:10.1145/3757887.3763017 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Perancangan Artefak Audit AI Berbasis NIST AI RMF dan UU PDP
Arifin, F. H., & Sumitra, I. D. (2025) · Jurnal Tata Kelola dan Kerangka Kerja Teknologi Informasi · doi:10.34010/jtk3ti.v11i3.19035 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
AI Governance and the Fundamentals of Data: The Relational, Political, and Material
Posada, J. (2025) · ACM SIGCAS Computers and Society · doi:10.1145/3798139.3798144 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Participatory Data Governance in Practice
Powar, J., Kallina, E., Hudig, A. I., Singh, J. P., Kyi, L., Janssen, H., Smith, G. M., & Zhang, R. (2026) · CHI Conference Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI EA) · doi:10.1145/3772363.3778746 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Jin, A., Asemota, A., Krane, D. E., Adams, N., & Abebe, R. (2026) · CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3772318.3791552 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Whose Knowledge Counts? Co-Designing Community-Centered AI Auditing Tools with Educators in Hawai'i
Zhao, D., Cha, H., Ryan, M. J., Wang, A., Baker-Ramos, R., Helekahi-Kaiwi, E.-B., Diego, R., Hester, J. D., & Yang, D. (2026) · CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3772318.3790958 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Loughrey, D. G., Brosens, C., Moiselle, R., Shterionov, D., Vandeghinste, V., Way, A., & Leeson, L. M. (2026) · AI and Ethics · doi:10.1007/s43681-026-01230-z · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Auditing Algorithmic Medical Systems to Uncover AI Harms and Remedy Racial Injustice
Broussard, M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198945246.003.0020 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Stein, M., Gandhi, M., Kriecherbauer, T., Oueslati, A., & Trager, R. (2024) · Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM Conference on AI Ethics and Society · doi:10.1609/aies.v7i1.31733
Stumpf, S. (2025) · ACM SIGCHI Symposium on Engineering Interactive Computing Systems (EICS) · doi:10.1145/3731406.3742705
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC SECTOR AUDITING: THE GAMBIA AND INDONESIA
Drammeh, L. K., Malik, N., & Leniwati, D. (2025) · Journal of Applied Finance & Accounting · doi:10.21512/jafa.v12i1.13316
Creating an Effective Methodology for End-User Engagement in AI Auditing
O’Hara, E., Fringi, E., & Simpson, K. (2026) · Advances in intelligent systems and computing · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-07938-1_22
Almeida, R., & Latini, L. (2025) · The Paris Journal on AI & Digital Ethics · doi:10.65701/m4qf7v2k1n
A Study on the Role of Audit Methods in Enhancing the Efficiency of Co-operative Banks
Killekar, V. G. (2026) · INTERANTIONAL JOURNAL OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT · doi:10.55041/ijsrem.ibfe028
Human-Centered and Participatory AI Auditing
Deng, W. H., Holstein, K., & Eslami, M. (2026) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-981-97-8440-0_102-1
Biological risk and the AI capability shift
Turner, S. D. (2026) · doi:10.59350/zp9qy-3gg73
Offscript: Agentic Auditing of Instruction Adherence in LLMs
Clark, N., Bai, R., & Mitra, T. (2026) · Conference on Human Information Interaction and Retrieval · doi:10.1145/3786304.3787891
Cultivating a Culture of Innovation With AI
Eragamreddy, N. (2026) · Advances in computational intelligence and robotics book series · doi:10.4018/979-8-3693-3510-9.ch007
Building Secure, Explainable, and Auditable AI Systems for Modern Software Engineering Applications
NAIR, D., KULSHRESHTHA, P., BOSE, I., & Ghosh, A. (2026) · International Journal of Emerging Trends in Engineering and Technology · doi:10.64137/31078699/ijetet-v2i1p101
Upadhyay, S., Pruss, D., DeVrio, A., Gajos, K. Z., & Karusala, N. (2026) · CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3772318.3791923
PASTA: A Scalable Framework for Multi-Policy AI Compliance Evaluation
Yang, Y., Kim, I.-J., & Yoon, D. (2026) · CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3772318.3790966
Human-Centered and Participatory AI Auditing
Deng, W. H., Holstein, K., & Eslami, M. (2026) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-981-95-3658-0_102
Muhuwa, G. A. (2026) · Research Square · doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-9757304/v1
Auditable LLM Autonomy for Operational Decision-Making: Big Data Evidence and Decision Traces
Theodorakopoulos, L., & Theodoropoulou, A. (2026) · Computers, materials & continua/Computers, materials & continua (Print) · doi:10.32604/cmc.2026.082270
Crichton, K., Reddy, A., & Ji, J. (2026) · doi:10.51593/20250002
Using the Blackbox in Embodied AI Art Practice
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Safety Theater in Anthropomorphic AI: Why We Need to Shift from Safety to Accountability Narratives
Maeda, T., & Buening, R. (2026) · ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT) · doi:10.1145/3805689.3812282
SoK: Benchmark Datasets for Evaluating AI Safety — Gaps Between Guidelines and Practice
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Towards Auditing AI Systems in the Wild
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Same System, Opposite Verdicts: Metric Discretion in AI Ethics Audits and the Limits of DisclosurePreprint
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- Authors
- Ojewale, V., Steed, R., Vecchione, B., Birhane, A., & Raji, I. D.
- Affiliations
- Brown University (US)
- Carnegie Mellon University (US)
- Data & Society Research Institute (US)
- Trinity College Dublin (IE)
- University of California, Berkeley (US)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2025 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2025-04-25
- Pages
- 1-29
- OpenAlex
- W4409883896
- Semantic Scholar
- ba59d1f28d2e8abf726cdfe2b080bc27bec424a0
- Cited by
- 81
- References
- 78
- Citations by year
- 2026: 39 · 2025: 27 · 2024: 15
- FWCI
- 48.55
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (cc-by)
- Funders
- Science Foundation Ireland (13/RC/2106_P2)
- Mozilla Foundation
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality › Safety Systems Engineering in Autonomy
- Keywords
- AI audit, AI accountability, practitioner needs
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-11-06.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-11-06.
Cited sources are checked by gpt-6-sol.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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