Phishing with Malicious QR Codes
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The use of QR codes for malicious purposes was rather limited in the pre-COVID-19 world. That changed overnight, as the QR codes became a convenient go-between for sharing URLs, including malicious ones. This opens an attractive new way of phishing as QR codes are now widespread. To explore phishing with QR codes (i.e. quishing), we conducted a 173-participant study where we used a COVID-19 digital passport sign-up trial with a malicious QR code as a pretext. We found that 67 % of the participants were keen to sign-up with their Google or Facebook credentials, 18.5% to create a new account, and only 14.5% to skip on the sign-up. Convenience was the single most cited factor for the willingness to yield participants’ credentials. Reluctance of using new services was the reason for creating a new account or skipping the registration. We also developed a Quishing Awareness Scale (QAS) and found a significant relationship between participants’ QR code behavior and their sign-up choices: The ones choosing to sign-up with Facebook scored the lowest while the one choosing to skip the highest on average. We used our results to propose awareness training guidelines as well as develop and test usable security indicators for warning users about the threat of phishing with malicious QR codes.
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“The rise of QR code-based phishing ('Quishing') poses a growing cybersecurity threat, as attackers increasingly exploit QR codes to bypass traditional phishing defenses.”
From Detecting Quishing Attacks with Machine Learning Techniques Through QR Code Analysis (2027) · cites this paper as [9]
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“…Sharevski et al. found that 67% were willing to sign in with social-media credentials after scanning a malicious QR Code and only 14.5% declined [1], and Wahsheh and Al-Zahrani noted that QR Code generation has no standard authentication phase, leaving scanners exposed to phishing and malware…”
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Londhe, R., Mahamuni, K., Shinde, A., & Mulmule, A. (2026) · INTERANTIONAL JOURNAL OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT · doi:10.55041/ijsrem68518
SAMARA, M. A. (2026) · Research Square · doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-11394102/v1
A Quishing Detection Model via Global Attention-Based Adaptive Fusion of QR Code and URL Text
Zhu, E., Ye, C., Guan, Y., & Zhong, H. (2026) · ACM Transactions on Internet Technology · doi:10.1145/3861079
Simulation of Phishing Attacks by QR Code: Integrating Game Theory and Anomalous Emotional Impacts
Tomaz, M. S. D. L. E. S., Sciutti, A., de Andrade, J. V. R., Lima, R. D., de Lima, S. M. L., da Silva, C. M. R., & Fernandes, B. (2026) · Lecture notes in networks and systems · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-33874-7_2
Hooked: A Real-World Study on QR Code Phishing
Geisler, M., & Pöhn, D. (2024) · arXiv
Metadata
- Authors
- Sharevski, F., Devine, A., Pieroni, E., & Jachim, P.
- Affiliations
- DePaul University (US)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2022 European Symposium on Usable Security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2022-09-29
- Pages
- 160-171
- OpenAlex
- W4297659151
- Cited by
- 39
- References
- 47
- Citations by year
- 2026: 16 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 3
- FWCI
- 5.14
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- European Symposium on Usable Security (EuroUSEC) (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Spam and Phishing Detection
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › User Authentication and Security Systems
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Keywords
- phishing, QR code security, credential sharing, security awareness, awareness training, security indicators, user behavior
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.