The DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Phishing with Malicious QR Codes
Abstract
The use of QR codes for malicious purposes was rather limited in the pre-COVID-19 world. That changed overnight, as the QR codes became a convenient go-between for sharing URLs, including malicious ones. This opens an attractive new way of phishing as QR codes are now widespread. To explore phishing with QR codes (i.e. quishing), we conducted a 173-participant study where we used a COVID-19 digital passport sign-up trial with a malicious QR code as a pretext. We found that 67 % of the participants were keen to sign-up with their Google or Facebook credentials, 18.5% to create a new account, and only 14.5% to skip on the sign-up. Convenience was the single most cited factor for the willingness to yield participants’ credentials. Reluctance of using new services was the reason for creating a new account or skipping the registration. We also developed a Quishing Awareness Scale (QAS) and found a significant relationship between participants’ QR code behavior and their sign-up choices: The ones choosing to sign-up with Facebook scored the lowest while the one choosing to skip the highest on average. We used our results to propose awareness training guidelines as well as develop and test usable security indicators for warning users about the threat of phishing with malicious QR codes.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“The rise of QR code-based phishing ('Quishing') poses a growing cybersecurity threat, as attackers increasingly exploit QR codes to bypass traditional phishing defenses.”
From Detecting Quishing Attacks with Machine Learning Techniques Through QR Code Analysis (2027) · cites this paper as [9]
Citations
Cites
Simple Heuristics That Make Us SmartPreprint
Gigerenzer, G., & Todd, P. M. (1999) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 6,398
Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion
Cialdini, R. B. (1993) · Cited by 2,563
(2011) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4614-0064-6 · Cited by 619
So long, and no thanks for the externalities: the rational rejection of security advice by users
Herley, C. (2009) · Proceedings of the 2009 workshop on New security paradigms workshop · doi:10.1145/1719030.1719050 · Cited by 524 · cited 1×
“First, a minute spent examining an URLs results in an estimated cost (in terms of user time) of two orders of magnitude greater than all phishing losses [36].”
BackgroundAnti-Phishing Phil: the design and evaluation of a game that teaches people not to fall for phish
Sheng, S., Magnien, B., Kumaraguru, P., Acquisti, A., Cranor, L. F., Hong, J., & Nunge, E. (2007) · Proceedings of the 3rd symposium on Usable privacy and security · doi:10.1145/1280680.1280692 · Cited by 509
Why phishing still works: User strategies for combating phishing attacks
Alsharnouby, M., Alaca, F., & Chiasson, S. (2015) · International Journal of Human-Computer Studies · doi:10.1016/j.ijhcs.2015.05.005 · Cited by 260 · cited 1×
“But that’s not always the case and these discrepancies remain unnoticed by most of the phishing victims [3].”
BackgroundScaling the Security Wall: Developing a Security Behavior Intentions Scale (SeBIS)
Egelman, S., & Peer, E. (2015) · Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/2702123.2702249 · Cited by 252 · cited 5×
“Age-wise, 45.7% were in the [35-44] bracket, 24.3% in [25-34], 13.9% in [45-54], 9.8% in [55-64], and 6.4% in [18-24].”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialHow age and gender affect smartphone usage
Andone, I., Błaszkiewicz, K., Eibes, M., Trendafilov, B., Montag, C., & Markowetz, A. (2016) · Proceedings of the 2016 ACM International Joint Conference on Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing: Adjunct · doi:10.1145/2968219.2971451 · Cited by 220 · cited 1×
“However, smartphones are prevalent among teenagers [4] and they also”
BackgroundDesign Frictions for Mindful Interactions: The Case for Microboundaries
Cox, A. L., Gould, S. J. J., Cecchinato, M. E., Iacovides, I., & Renfree, I. (2016) · Proceedings of the 2016 CHI Conference Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/2851581.2892410 · Cited by 218 · cited 1×
“To rectify this problem, security indicators deliberately include “de-sign frictions” designed to disrupt automatic interactions, and grab the attention of the users [21].”
BackgroundWorkman, M. (2008) · Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology · doi:10.1002/asi.20779 · Cited by 213 · cited 1×
“This probably results more from neuroticism or the anxious resistance to sharing information rather than from conscientiousness or attention to detail, the two personality traits associated with resistance to phishing [75].”
BackgroundVaccine hesitancy and anti-vaccination in the time of COVID-19: A Google Trends analysis
Pullan, S., & Dey, M. (2021) · Vaccine · doi:10.1016/j.vaccine.2021.03.019 · Cited by 182
Quantifying Phishing Susceptibility for Detection and Behavior Decisions
Canfield, C., Fischhoff, B., & Davis, A. L. (2016) · Human Factors The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society · doi:10.1177/0018720816665025 · Cited by 176 · cited 1×
“People’s vigilance, or the ability to detect anomalies for a sustained period, has been poor when it comes to phishing, so it is hardly probable for a positive change to happen when dealing with malicious QR codes [11, 72].”
BackgroundYour attention please: designing security-decision UIs to make genuine risks harder to ignore
Bravo-Lillo, C., Komanduri, S., Cranor, L. F., Reeder, R. W., Sleeper, M., Downs, J. S., & Schechter, S. (2013) · Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security · doi:10.1145/2501604.2501610 · Cited by 165 · cited 1×
“Even more, almost 60% of the participants in the follow-up study chose security indicator (C) which visually stands out the most, reasoning that a stronger friction is needed to turn their attention towards a potential anomaly with the embedded URL [9].”
BackgroundSusceptibility to Spear-Phishing Emails: Effects of Internet User Demographics and Email Content
Lin, T., Capecci, D. E., Ellis, D. M., Rocha, H. A., Dommaraju, S., Oliveira, D. S., & Ebner, N. C. (2019) · ACM Transactions on Computer-Human Interaction · doi:10.1145/3336141 · Cited by 164
An Experience Sampling Study of User Reactions to Browser Warnings in the Field
Reeder, R. W., Felt, A. P., Consolvo, S., Malkin, N., Thompson, C., & Egelman, S. (2018) · CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3173574.3174086 · Cited by 158 · cited 4×
“Spotting a malicious URL remains a hard problem for humans [64], but modern email clients and browsers are better in detecting the malicious URLs, so they employ preemptive indicators of potential phishing to warn the users [63].”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialPut Your Warning Where Your Link Is: Improving and Evaluating Email Phishing Warnings
Petelka, J., Zou, Y., & Schaub, F. (2019) · CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3290605.3300748 · Cited by 143 · cited 1×
“We also utilized various usable security recommendations to develop and test practical anti-quishing security indicators in a follow-up study [26, 57, 74].”
MethodInfluentialPredicting susceptibility to social influence in phishing emails
Parsons, K., Butavicius, M., Delfabbro, P., & Lillie, M. (2019) · International Journal of Human-Computer Studies · doi:10.1016/j.ijhcs.2019.02.007 · Cited by 134 · cited 1×
“Quishing, similarly as its older sibling phishing, appears to thrive in conditions of scarcity as the requirements for proof-of-vaccination proved influential in increasing the credibility of the quishing pretext [55].”
BackgroundQR Code Security: A Survey of Attacks and Challenges for Usable Security
Krombholz, K., Frühwirt, P., Kieseberg, P., Kapsalis, I., Huber, M., & Weippl, E. R. (2014) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-07620-1_8 · Cited by 130 · cited 2×
“logos [40], but it is increasingly trivial for attackers to duplicate and impersonate such codes.”
BackgroundWho Provides Phishing Training? Facts, Stories, and People Like Me
Wash, R., & Cooper, M. (2018) · CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3173574.3174066 · Cited by 129 · cited 5×
“As is the case with anti-phishing, the two logical approaches would be to: (1) train users how to spot a quishing campaign; and (2) develop security indicators within the QR code interaction elements to help users avoid falling for quish [73].”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialHow Experts Detect Phishing Scam Emails
Wash, R. (2020) · Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction · doi:10.1145/3415231 · Cited by 124 · cited 1×
“People’s vigilance, or the ability to detect anomalies for a sustained period, has been poor when it comes to phishing, so it is hardly probable for a positive change to happen when dealing with malicious QR codes [11, 72].”
BackgroundF for fake: four studies on how we fall for phish
Blythe, M., Petrie, H., & Clark, J. A. (2011) · CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/1978942.1979459 · Cited by 113 · cited 1×
“Sometimes, the asking comes with a small reward (“sign-up with your Gmail account, get an Amazon gift card”) making the user feel obliged to reciprocate [8].”
BackgroundBehavior Ever Follows Intention?: A Validation of the Security Behavior Intentions Scale (SeBIS)
Egelman, S., Harbach, M., & Pe'er, E. (2016) · International Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/2858036.2858265 · Cited by 104 · cited 3×
“Similarly, the QAS score decreased with the age, with the [18-24] bracket the highest ( QAS = 2 .”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialQRishing: The Susceptibility of Smartphone Users to QR Code Phishing Attacks
Vidas, T., Owusu, E., Wang, S., Zeng, C., Cranor, L. F., & Christin, N. (2013) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-41320-9_4 · Cited by 103 · cited 1×
“Assigning urgency (scarcity in general) for the purpose of scanning a QR code could work given that users that fell for quish so far did it so mostly out of curiosity [71].”
BackgroundTracing Cryptocurrency Scams: Clustering Replicated Advance-Fee and Phishing Websites
Phillips, R. C., & Wilder, H. (2020) · IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency (ICBC) · doi:10.1109/icbc48266.2020.9169433 · Cited by 75 · cited 1×
“could equally materialize in a pretext where a victim is sent a legitimate link to a video resembling the commercial above where the QR code leads to an attacker-controlled cryptocurrency website with a more lucrative deal (usually clustered with cryptocurrency scams [58]).”
BackgroundRiccardo Focardi, A., Luccio, F. L., & Wahsheh, H. A. (2019) · Journal of Information Security and Applications · doi:10.1016/j.jisa.2019.102369 · Cited by 73
Human aspects of information security
Komatsu, A., Takagi, D., & Takemura, T. (2013) · Information Management & Computer Security · doi:10.1108/09685221311314383 · Cited by 68
NoPhish: An Anti-Phishing Education App
Canova, G., Volkamer, M., Bergmann, C., & Borza, R. (2014) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-11851-2_14 · Cited by 67 · cited 2×
“Phishing training is usually delivered through facts-and-advice materials [73], gamification or simulation for malicious URL detection [12, 66, 77] or embedded phishing exercises [67].”
BackgroundExperimental Investigation of Technical and Human Factors Related to Phishing Susceptibility
Greitzer, F. L., Li, W., Laskey, K. B., Lee, J., & Purl, J. D. (2021) · ACM Transactions on Social Computing · doi:10.1145/3461672 · Cited by 67 · cited 4×
“Age-wise, 44.4% were in the [35-44] bracket, 24.2% in [25-34], 12.9% in [45-54], 15.3% in [55-64], and 3.2% in [18-24].”
BackgroundInfluentialUse of Phishing Training to Improve Security Warning Compliance: Evidence from a Field Experiment
Yang, W., Xiong, A., Chen, J., Proctor, R. W., & Li, N. (2017) · doi:10.1145/3055305.3055310 · Cited by 62 · cited 1×
“Phishing training is usually delivered through facts-and-advice materials [73], gamification or simulation for malicious URL detection [12, 66, 77] or embedded phishing exercises [67].”
BackgroundThe Importance of Being Earnest [In Security Warnings]
Egelman, S., & Schechter, S. (2013) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-39884-1_5 · Cited by 62 · cited 1×
“We also utilized various usable security recommendations to develop and test practical anti-quishing security indicators in a follow-up study [26, 57, 74].”
MethodInfluentialOptical Delusions: A Study of Malicious QR Codes in the Wild
Kharraz, A., Kirda, E., Robertson, W., Balzarotti, D., & Francillon, A. (2014) · International Conference on Dependable Systems & Networks/Proceedings · doi:10.1109/dsn.2014.103 · Cited by 62 · cited 1×
“However, the more applications adopted QR codes, the more creative attacks exploiting a wide range of victims surfaced [38].”
BackgroundMoreno-Fernández, M. M., Blanco, F., Garaizar, P., & Matute, H. (2016) · Computers in Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.chb.2016.12.044 · Cited by 62 · cited 1×
“The resulting websites sometimes present typographical errors and visual discrepancies related to the typeface, design layout, or logos [50].”
Background"Should I Worry?" A Cross-Cultural Examination of Account Security Incident Response
Redmiles, E. M. (2019) · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) · doi:10.1109/sp.2019.00059 · Cited by 62 · cited 1×
“The user has no way of knowing, unless carefully inspecting the URL and the website’s layout [52], that the entered credentials end up in the attackers hands instead [61].”
BackgroundART-UP: A Novel Method for Generating Scanning-Robust Aesthetic QR Codes
Xu, M., Li, Q., Niu, J., Su, H., Liu, X., Xu, W., Lv, P., Zhou, B., & Yang, Y. (2021) · ACM Transactions on Multimedia Computing Communications and Applications · doi:10.1145/3418214 · Cited by 48
QR Inception: Barcode-in-Barcode Attacks
Dabrowski, A., Krombholz, K., Ullrich, J., & Weippl, E. R. (2014) · Security and Privacy in Smartphones and Mobile Devices · doi:10.1145/2666620.2666624 · Cited by 44 · cited 2×
“Here the malicious URL has been either embedded in the QR code itself [22, 47] or the QR code layout manipulated to redirect the user to override the URL of the trusted organization [39, 78].”
MethodAdversary Models for Mobile Device Authentication
Mayrhofer, R., & Sigg, S. (2021) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3477601 · Cited by 37 · cited 1×
“restaurant menus) without the need to type the link themselves [48].”
BackgroundQR Code Security -- How Secure and Usable Apps Can Protect Users Against Malicious QR Codes
Krombholz, K., Frühwirt, P., Rieder, T., Kapsalis, I., Ullrich, J., & Weippl, E. R. (2015) · International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES) · doi:10.1109/ares.2015.84 · Cited by 34 · cited 2×
“” The time spent on scanning a QR code, on the other hand, is an acceptable cost and perhaps the security indicators should factor the temporal trade-off when warning about quishing [41].”
BackgroundMalicious Pixels Using QR Codes as Attack Vector
Kieseberg, P., Schrittwieser, S., Leithner, M., Mulazzani, M., Weippl, E. R., Munroe, L., & Sinha, M. (2012) · Atlantis ambient and pervasive intelligence · doi:10.2991/978-94-91216-71-8_2 · Cited by 33 · cited 2×
“Here the malicious URL has been either embedded in the QR code itself [22, 47] or the QR code layout manipulated to redirect the user to override the URL of the trusted organization [39, 78].”
MethodInvestigating Teenagers’ Ability to Detect Phishing Messages
Nicholson, J., Javed, Y., Dixon, M., Coventry, L., Dele-Ajayi, O., & Anderson, P. (2020) · IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW) · doi:10.1109/eurospw51379.2020.00027 · Cited by 32 · cited 1×
“Our results might not entirely generalize for age groups below 18 years given their specific smartphone usage patterns [2], despite the fact that teenagers show poor performance in detecting phishing [53].”
BackgroundBauer, L., Bravo-Lillo, C., Fragkaki, E., & Melicher, W. (2013) · doi:10.1145/2517881.2517886 · Cited by 29 · cited 1×
“We ran an experimental pilot study to determine the most popular ways of signing up that confirmed Facebook and Google as the preferred Single Sign On (SSO) providers [7].”
MethodQuick Response Code Secure: A Cryptographically Secure Anti-Phishing Tool for QR Code Attacks
Mavroeidis, V., & Nicho, M. (2017) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-65127-9_25 · Cited by 28 · cited 4×
“users start aborting the scanning) [30, 47].”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialTeenagers' Reaction on the Long-Lasting Separation from Smartphones, Anxiety and Fear of Missing Out
Adelhardt, Z., Markus, S., & Eberle, T. (2018) · International Conference on Social Media and Society (SMSociety) · doi:10.1145/3217804.3217914 · Cited by 28
Be the Phisher -- Understanding Users' Perception of Malicious Domains
Quinkert, F., Degeling, M., Blythe, J., & Holz, T. (2020) · ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS) · doi:10.1145/3320269.3384765 · Cited by 28 · cited 1×
“The SeBIS proactive awareness sub-scale showed good performance and was used for measuring in numerous phishing experiments [45, 60, 65].”
MethodInvisible QR Code Hijacking Using Smart LED
Zhou, A., Su, G., Zhu, S., & Ma, H. (2019) · Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive Mobile Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies · doi:10.1145/3351284 · Cited by 10 · cited 2×
“Here the malicious URL has been either embedded in the QR code itself [22, 47] or the QR code layout manipulated to redirect the user to override the URL of the trusted organization [39, 78].”
BackgroundMethodSharevski, F., & Jachim, P. (2021) · IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW) · doi:10.1109/spw53761.2021.00034 · Cited by 9 · cited 2×
“The SeBIS proactive awareness sub-scale showed good performance and was used for measuring in numerous phishing experiments [45, 60, 65].”
BackgroundMethodSelf-citationCarroll, F. (2021) · European Symposium on Usable Security (EuroUSEC) · doi:10.1145/3481357.3481376 · Cited by 9 · cited 1×
“The smartphone’s QR scanning function and browsers could incorporate usable security indicators, but nothing says users would not ignore these too [13].”
BackgroundWorkmanMichael (2008) · Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology · doi:10.5555/1345501.1345514 · Cited by 7
Toward a secure QR code system by fingerprinting screens
Li, Y., Chen, Y., Ji, X., Pan, H., Yang, L., Xue, G., & Yu, J. (2020) · ACM Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking (MobiCom) · doi:10.1145/3372224.3418165 · Cited by 3 · cited 1×
“But beside impersonation or duplication, malicious actors were yet to entertain the full potential of manipulating the QR codes to their advantage [43].”
Background
Research works printed but not linked: 19
- Bhupendra Acharya and Phani Vadrevu. 2021. PhishPrint: Evading Phishing Detection Crawlers by Prior Profiling. In 30th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 21). USENIX Association, 3775–3792. https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/acharya
- Casey Canfield, Alex Davis, Baruch Fischhoff, Alain Forget, Sarah Pearman, and Jeremy Thomas. 2017. Replication: Challenges in Using Data Logs to Validate Phishing Detection Ability Metrics. In Thirteenth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2017). USENIX Association, Santa Clara, CA, 271–284. https://www.usenix.org/conference/soups2017/technical-sessions/presentation/canfield
- Christopher Dye and Melinda C Mills. 2021. COVID-19 vaccination passports. Science 371, 6535 (2021), 1184–1184.
- Adrienne Porter Felt, Robert W. Reeder, Alex Ainslie, Helen Harris, Max Walker, Christopher Thompson, Mustafa Embre Acer, Elisabeth Morant, and Sunny Consolvo. 2016. Rethinking Connection Security Indicators. In Twelfth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2016). USENIX Association, Denver, CO, 1–14. https://www.usenix.org/conference/soups2016/technical-sessions/presentation/porter-felt
- Tanya Flushman, Mark Gondree, and Zachary N. J. Peterson. 2015. This is Not a Game: Early Observations on Using Alternate Reality Games for Teaching Security Concepts to First-Year Undergraduates. In 8th Workshop on Cyber Security Experimentation and Test (CSET 15). USENIX Association, Washington, D.C.https://www.usenix.org/conference/cset15/workshop-program/presentation/flushman
- Anjuli Franz, Verena Zimmermann, Gregor Albrecht, Katrin Hartwig, Christian Reuter, Alexander Benlian, and Joachim Vogt. 2021. SoK: Still Plenty of Phish in the Sea — A Taxonomy of User-Oriented Phishing Interventions and Avenues for Future Research. In Seventeenth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2021). USENIX Association, 339–358. https://www.usenix.org/conference/soups2021/presentation/franz
- Shakthidhar Gopavaram, Jayati Dev, Marthie Grobler, DongInn Kim, Sanchari Das, and L Jean Camp. 2021. Cross-National Study on Phishing Resilience. In Proceedings of the Workshop on Usable Security and Privacy (USEC).
- Julia Gressick, Bruce Alan Spitzer, and Kyle Sagarsee. 2014. Designing interactive scavenger hunt using QR codes. Journal of Teaching and Learning with Technology (2014), 90–93.
- Zane Ma, Joshua Reynolds, Joseph Dickinson, Kaishen Wang, Taylor Judd, Joseph D. Barnes, Joshua Mason, and Michael Bailey. 2019. The Impact of Secure Transport Protocols on Phishing Efficacy. In 12th USENIX Workshop on Cyber Security Experimentation and Test (CSET 19). USENIX Association, Santa Clara, CA. https://www.usenix.org/conference/cset19/presentation/ma
- John R. Morelock and Zachary Peterson. 2018. Authenticity, Ethicality, and Motivation: A Formal Evaluation of a 10-week Computer Security Alternate Reality Game for CS Undergraduates. In 2018 USENIX Workshop on Advances in Security Education (ASE 18). USENIX Association, Baltimore, MD. https://www.usenix.org/conference/ase18/presentation/morelock
- James Nicholson, Lynne Coventry, and Pam Briggs. 2017. Can we fight social engineering attacks by social means? Assessing social salience as a means to improve phish detection. In Thirteenth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2017). USENIX Association, Santa Clara, CA, 285–298. https://www.usenix.org/conference/soups2017/technical-sessions/presentation/nicholson
- Sarah Pearman, Shikun Aerin Zhang, Lujo Bauer, Nicolas Christin, and Lorrie Faith Cranor. 2019. Why people (don’t) use password managers effectively. In Fifteenth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2019). USENIX Association, Santa Clara, CA, 319–338. https://www.usenix.org/conference/soups2019/presentation/pearman
- Elissa M. Redmiles, Noel Warford, Amritha Jayanti, Aravind Koneru, Sean Kross, Miraida Morales, Rock Stevens, and Michelle L. Mazurek. 2020. A Comprehensive Quality Evaluation of Security and Privacy Advice on the Web. In 29th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 20). USENIX Association, 89–108. https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/redmiles
- Benjamin Reinheimer, Lukas Aldag, Peter Mayer, Mattia Mossano, Reyhan Duezguen, Bettina Lofthouse, Tatiana von Landesberger, and Melanie Volkamer. 2020. An investigation of phishing awareness and education over time: When and how to best remind users. In Sixteenth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2020). USENIX Association, 259–284. https://www.usenix.org/conference/soups2020/presentation/reinheimer
- Hossein Siadati, Sean Palka, Avi Siegel, and Damon McCoy. 2017. Measuring the Effectiveness of Embedded Phishing Exercises. In 10th USENIX Workshop on Cyber Security Experimentation and Test (CSET 17). USENIX Association, Vancouver, BC. https://www.usenix.org/conference/cset17/workshop-program/presentation/siadatii
- Joshua Sunshine, Serge Egelman, Hazim Almuhimedi, Neha Atri, and Lorrie Faith Cranor. 2009. Crying wolf: An empirical study of ssl warning effectiveness.. In 18th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 09). USENIX Association, 399–342. https://www.usenix.org/event/sec09/tech/full_papers/sec09_browser.pdf
- Christopher Thompson, Martin Shelton, Emily Stark, Maximilian Walker, Emily Schechter, and Adrienne Porter Felt. 2019. The Web’s Identity Crisis: Understanding the Effectiveness of Website Identity Indicators. In 28th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 19). USENIX Association, Santa Clara, CA, 1715–1732. https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity19/presentation/thompson
- Anthony Vance, David Eargle, Jeffrey L. Jenkins, C. Brock Kirwan, and Bonnie Brinton Anderson. 2019. The Fog of Warnings: How Non-essential Notifications Blur with Security Warnings. In Fifteenth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2019). USENIX Association, Santa Clara, CA. https://www.usenix.org/conference/soups2019/presentation/vance
- Michael S Wogalter, Vincent C Conzola, and Tonya L Smith-Jackson. 2002. based guidelines for warning design and evaluation. Applied ergonomics 33, 3 (2002), 219–230.
Cited by
Wan, P. K., & Jiang, S. (2025) · Sustainable Production and Consumption · doi:10.1016/j.spc.2025.01.014 · Cited by 117
Hoheisel, R., van Capelleveen, G., Sarmah, D. K., & Junger, M. (2022) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2023.103158 · Cited by 47
Weinz, M., Zannone, N., Allodi, L., & Apruzzese, G. (2025) · ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS) · doi:10.1145/3708821.3736195 · Cited by 44
Exploring Phishing Threats through QR Codes in Naturalistic Settings
Sharevski, F., Mossano, M., Veit, M. F., Schiefer, G., & Volkamer, M. (2024) · Workshop on Usable Security (USEC) · doi:10.14722/usec.2024.23050 · Cited by 19
“Past studies redirected individuals from the login pages to a survey page [45], but we did not want to interrupt the flow of interaction of our participants.”
BackgroundResultInfluentialSelf-citationSharevski, F., Loop, J. V., & Das, S. (2025) · Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction · doi:10.1145/3710913 · Cited by 19
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Sharevski, F., Devine, A., Pieroni, E., & Jachim, P.
- Affiliations
- DePaul University (US)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2022 European Symposium on Usable Security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2022-09-29
- Pages
- 160-171
- OpenAlex
- W4297659151
- Cited by
- 39
- References
- 47
- Citations by year
- 2026: 16 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 3
- FWCI
- 5.14
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- European Symposium on Usable Security (EuroUSEC) (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Spam and Phishing Detection
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › User Authentication and Security Systems
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Keywords
- phishing, QR code security, credential sharing, security awareness, awareness training, security indicators, user behavior
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.