Machine Learning-based Intrusion Detection for Smart Grid Computing: A Survey
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Machine learning (ML)-based intrusion detection system (IDS) approaches have been significantly applied and advanced the state-of-the-art system security and defense mechanisms. In smart grid computing environments, security threats have been significantly increased as shared networks are commonly used, along with the associated vulnerabilities. However, compared to other network environments, ML-based IDS research in a smart grid is relatively unexplored, although the smart grid environment is facing serious security threats due to its unique environmental vulnerabilities. In this article, we conducted an extensive survey on ML-based IDS in smart grids based on the following key aspects: (1) The applications of the ML-based IDS in transmission and distribution side power components of a smart power grid by addressing its security vulnerabilities; (2) dataset generation process and its usage in applying ML-based IDSs in the smart grid; (3) a wide range of ML-based IDSs used by the surveyed papers in the smart grid environment; (4) metrics, complexity analysis, and evaluation testbeds of the IDSs applied in the smart grid; and (5) lessons learned, insights, and future research directions.
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Cites
Chandola, V., Banerjee, A., & Kumar, V. (2009) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/1541880.1541882 · Cited by 11,687 · cited 1×
“, placed in the network at multiple points as hardware sensors or installed system software connected to network analyzing data packet flow) [21].”
BackgroundA Survey of Data Mining and Machine Learning Methods for Cyber Security Intrusion Detection
Buczak, A. L., & Guven, E. (2016) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2015.2494502 · Cited by 3,332 · cited 4×
“The packet header attributes and the traffic features are described in detail in Reference [18].”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialA survey of intrusion detection techniques for cyber-physical systems
Mitchell, R., & Chen, I.-R. (2014) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/2542049 · Cited by 768
Cyber-security on smart grid: Threats and potential solutions
Gunduz, M. Z., & Das, R. (2020) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2019.107094 · Cited by 717 · cited 1×
“Cybersecurity [44] in the distribution sys-tem has a significant impact on the reliability of the power grid.”
BackgroundCyber-security in smart grid: survey and challenges
Mrabet, Z. E., Kaabouch, N., Ghazi, H. E., & Ghazi, H. E. (2018) · Computers & Electrical Engineering · doi:10.1016/j.compeleceng.2018.01.015 · Cited by 482
Developing a Hybrid Intrusion Detection System Using Data Mining for Power Systems
Pan, S., Morris, T., & Adhikari, U. (2015) · IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid · doi:10.1109/tsg.2015.2409775 · Cited by 457 · cited 5×
“In an SAS, attackers can perform FDI attacks [8, 10, 27, 30, 31, 36, 41, 47, 48, 59, 64, 93, 99, 116, 120, 126] and False Command Injection (FCI) [1, 27, 48, 59, 72, 86, 106].”
MethodInfluentialTypes of machine learning algorithms
Oladipupo, T. (2010) · New Advances in Machine Learning · doi:10.5772/9385 · Cited by 443
Battle of the Attack Detection Algorithms: Disclosing Cyber Attacks on Water Distribution Networks
Taormina, R., Galelli, S., Tippenhauer, N. O., Salomons, E., Ostfeld, A., Eliades, D. G., Aghashahi, M., Sundararajan, R., Pourahmadi, M., Banks, M. K., et al. (2018) · Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management · doi:10.1061/(asce)wr.1943-5452.0000969 · Cited by 277 · cited 3×
“The public dataset, such as BATADAL [112], SWaT [43], and WADI [4], focus on a SCADA system in the power grid and cannot provide the specific features related to power system measurements and protocols or new smart devices (e.g., smart inverters, IEDs, and communication infrastructure).”
MethodPan, S., Morris, T., & Adhikari, U. (2015) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2015.2420951 · Cited by 180 · cited 2×
“In References [85, 86], Common Path Mining is used to efficiently self-learn patterns for cyber intrusion detection from a pool of data containing a combination of synchrophasor measurement data and the audit logs of power system configuration.”
MethodSecuring DNP3 broadcast communications in SCADA systems
Amoah, R., Camtepe, S., & Foo, E. (2016) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2016.2587883 · Cited by 72 · cited 1×
“Even though some authentication mechanisms are proposed in IEC 62351 or DNP3-SA, their weaknesses are well known as discussed in [7, 108].”
BackgroundAnomaly Detection via One Class SVM for Protection of SCADA Systems
Jiang, J., & Yasakethu, L. (2013) · 2013 International Conference on Cyber-Enabled Distributed Computing and Knowledge Discovery · doi:10.1109/cyberc.2013.22 · Cited by 47 · cited 1×
“Other similar studies [56, 72, 89, 119] also proved a one-class SVM to be efficient with high accuracy rates.”
Result
Cited by
A review of state-of-the-art malware attack trends and defense mechanisms
Ferdous, J., Islam, R., Mahboubi, A., & Islam, M. Z. (2023) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2023.3328351 · Cited by 98
CyberSentry: Enhancing SCADA security through advanced deep learning and optimization strategies
Khadidos, A. O., Khadidos, A. O., Selvarajan, S., Al-Shehari, T., Alsadhan, N. A., & Singh, S. (2025) · International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection · doi:10.1016/j.ijcip.2025.100782 · Cited by 9
Metadata
- Authors
- Sahani, N., Zhu, R., Cho, J.-H., & Liu, C.-C.
- Venue
- ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems
- Published
- 2023-04-19
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 1-31
- ISSN
- 2378-962X (ISSN-L)
- 2378-9638
- OpenAlex
- W4315647204
- Cited by
- 164
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 17.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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