Cited by 5Adversarial Robustness in Machine LearningNetwork Security and Intrusion DetectionArtificial Immune Systems Applications

SRI: A Simple Rule Induction Method for improving resiliency of DNN based IDS against adversarial and zero-day attacks

Kumar, Anjanee, Das, Tanmoy Kanti, Pandey, Rajneesh Kumar·2024·Proceedings of the 10th ACM Cyber-Physical System Security Workshop

Abstract

Adversarial machine learning (ML) has demonstrated vulnerabilities of neural network methods against well-crafted perturbations when added to perfectly acceptable samples. These vulnerabilities get exacerbated when neural network methods are deployed as anomaly or intrusion detectors in cyber-physical systems (CPS). Due to this, mounting of zero-day attacks became much easier against neural network-based intrusion detection systems (IDS) as adversarial samples are similar to zero-day attack vectors. To alleviate some of these problems of neural network (NN) based IDSs, we propose a new rule induction method, known as simple rule induction (SRI), for classification. SRI is capable of extracting control logic in the form of threshold-based rules from CPS's historical operational data. Later, control logic was utilized to generate adversarial samples that could evade detection by a baseline neural network-based IDS. To improve the NN-based detector's resiliency against such adversarial attacks, we retrain the detectors with previously generated adversarial samples. In a specific case, retraining has improved accuracy against adversarial samples from 9% to 99%, as demonstrated by our experiments. Moreover, it was found in our experiments that adversarial training is able to improve the F1_Score of zero day attack detection method from 0.06 to 0.53.

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Crossref · 10.1145/3626205.3659146

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  • Because operational-consistency-based detectors focus on physical and logical feasibility rather than specific attack signatures, they can flag previously unseen attacks that violate process interlocks, causal relationships, or power-balance constraints.

    “Because they focus on physical and logical feasibility rather than on specific attack signatures, they can flag previously unseen attacks that nevertheless violate process interlocks, causal relationships, or power-balance constraints [113,114,117,118].”
  • Hybrid operational-consistency frameworks combine rule-based consistency checks with supervised learners (e.g., decision trees, XGBoost, CNN-LSTM, DNNs), using operational rules either as a first-stage filter or as additional features to improve the robustness of data-driven classifiers.

    “On the other side, hybrid frameworks combine these rule-based consistency checks with supervised learners such as decision trees, XGBoost, CNN-LSTM, and DNNs, using operational rules either as a first-stage filter or as additional features to improve the robustness of data-driven classifiers [112-114,117,118].”
  • By checking whether actuator commands, sensor responses, and event sequences are physically feasible and logically consistent, operational-consistency-based methods can detect cyber-physical attacks and stealthy manipulations that only slightly perturb statistical patterns but induce clear inconsistencies with process and control laws (e.g., false data injection, command and control tampering, re

    “By checking whether actuator commands, sensor responses, and event sequences are physically feasible and logically consistent. they can detect cyber-physical attacks and stealthy manipulations that only slightly perturb statistical patterns but induce clear inconsistencies with process and control laws-such as false data injection, command and control tampering, replay, ramp-style stealth attacks,”
  • The dataset distribution for operational-consistency-oriented methods shows evaluation across a relatively diverse set of CPS domains, including water-treatment testbeds (SWaT, WADI), vehicle OBD-II datasets, and power-system simulations.

    “Finally, the dataset distribution shows that operational-consistency-oriented methods are evaluated across a relatively diverse set of CPS domains, including water-treatment testbeds (SWaT, WADI), vehicle OBD-II datasets, and power-system simulations [111-118].”
  • Rule-centric operational-consistency approaches (e.g., Bayesian-network/FSM models, PLC-command validation tools, process-monitoring modules with explicit sensor/actuator rules) leverage hand-crafted or automatically extracted constraints to reject logically impossible operations and abnormal event sequences.

    “On one side, Bayesian-network/FSM models, PLC-command validation tools, and process-monitoring modules with explicit sensor/actuator rules leverage hand-crafted or automatically extracted constraints to reject logically impossible operations and abnormal event sequences [111-113,117].”

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Authors
Kumar, A., Das, T. K., & Pandey, R. K.
Affiliations
National Institute of Technology Raipur (IN)
Venue
Proceedings of the 10th ACM Cyber-Physical System Security Workshop
Publisher
ACM
Published
2024-07
Pages
24-35
OpenAlex
W4398133954
Cited by
4
References
43
Citations by year
2025: 3 · 2024: 1
FWCI
1.18
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical System Security (CPSS) (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Biomedical Engineering › Artificial Immune Systems Applications
Keywords
adversarial learning, zero-day attacks, intrusion detection systems, adversarial training, adversarial examples, cyber-physical systems, neural network robustness, anomaly detection

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