Attacks against process control systems: risk assessment, detection, and response
Open accessAbstract
In the last years there has been an increasing interest in the security of process control and SCADA systems. Furthermore, recent computer attacks such as the Stuxnet worm, have shown there are parties with the motivation and resources to effectively attack control systems.
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Out of twenty-four papers examined a software prototype or tool supporting the method is discussed only in seven papers.
“Out of twenty-four papers examined a software prototype or tool supporting the method is discussed only in seven papers, namely Baiardi et al. (2009); Cardenas et al. (2011); Kriaa et al. (2012); LeMay et al. (2011); Patel and Zaveri (2010); Roy et al. (2010); Ten et al. (2010).”
From A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems (2016) · cites this paper as Cardenas et al. (2011)
Cites
Cyber security risk assessment for SCADA and DCS networks
Ralston, P. A. S., Graham, J. H., & Hieb, J. L. (2007) · ISA Transactions · doi:10.1016/j.isatra.2007.04.003 · Cited by 267 · see citing works
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Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey
Humayed, A., Lin, J., Li, F., & Luo, B. (2017) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2017.2703172 · Cited by 1,185 · see citing works
A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems
Cherdantseva, Y., Burnap, P., Blyth, A., Eden, P., Jones, K., Soulsby, H., & Stoddart, K. (2016) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2015.09.009 · Cited by 606 · see citing works
“In Cardenas et al. (2011), the standard formula for calculating risk as an average loss is accepted and interpreted in the context of a sensor network: where p i is the probability of an attacker compromising sensor i and is accepted to be the same for all sensors and L i is a loss resulting from…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialA survey of physics-based attack detection in cyber-physical systems
Giraldo, J., Urbina, D., Cardenas, A., Valente, J., Faisal, M., Ruths, J., Tippenhauer, N. O., Sandberg, H., & Candell, R. (2019) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3203245 · Cited by 535 · see citing works
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A survey of cyber security management in industrial control systems
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Detection and Differentiation of Replay Attack and Equipment Faults in SCADA Systems
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A cyber-security methodology for a cyber-physical industrial control system testbed
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Experimental assessment of network design approaches for protecting industrial control systems
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Physical process resilience-aware network design for SCADA systems
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- Authors
- Cárdenas, A. A., Amin, S., Lin, Z.-S., Huang, Y.-L., Huang, C.-Y., & Sastry, S.
- Affiliations
- Fujitsu Laboratories of America
- University of California, Berkeley (US)
- National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University (TW)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2011-03-22
- Pages
- 355-366
- OpenAlex
- W2056451850
- Cited by
- 699
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 15 · 2025: 19 · 2024: 20 · 2023: 36 · 2022: 42 · 2021: 63 · 2020: 82 · 2019: 76 · 2018: 73 · 2017: 67 · 2016: 59 · 2015: 47 · 2014: 44 · 2013: 34 · 2012: 17
- FWCI
- 53.50
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS) (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- Funders
- Division of Computer and Network Systems (0720882 (CSR-EHS: PRET)0931843 (ActionWebs))
- Army Research Office (W911NF-07-2-0019)
- Air Force Office of Scientific Research (FA9550-06-0312)
- National Science Foundation (0720882 (CSR-EHS: PRET)0931843 (ActionWebs))
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Industrial Automation and Control Systems
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Keywords
- process control systems, SCADA systems, cyberattacks, industrial cybersecurity, Stuxnet, computer worms
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