Cited by 17Privacy-Preserving Technologies in DataAdversarial Robustness in Machine LearningSecurity and Verification in Computing

BapFL: You can Backdoor Personalized Federated Learning

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Ye, Tiandi, Chen, Cen, Wang, Yinggui, Li, Xiang, Gao, Ming·2024·ACM Transactions on Knowledge Discovery from Data

Abstract

In federated learning (FL), malicious clients could manipulate the predictions of the trained model through backdoor attacks, posing a significant threat to the security of FL systems. Existing research primarily focuses on backdoor attacks and defenses within the generic federated learning scenario, where all clients collaborate to train a single global model. A recent study conducted by Qin et al. [ 24 ] marks the initial exploration of backdoor attacks within the personalized federated learning (pFL) scenario, where each client constructs a personalized model based on its local data. Notably, the study demonstrates that pFL methods with parameter decoupling can significantly enhance robustness against backdoor attacks. However, in this article, we whistleblow that pFL methods with parameter decoupling are still vulnerable to backdoor attacks. The resistance of pFL methods with parameter decoupling is attributed to the heterogeneous classifiers between malicious clients and benign counterparts. We analyze two direct causes of the heterogeneous classifiers: (1) data heterogeneity inherently exists among clients and (2) poisoning by malicious clients further exacerbates the data heterogeneity. To address these issues, we propose a two-pronged attack method, BapFL, which comprises two simple yet effective strategies: (1) poisoning only the feature encoder while keeping the classifier fixed and (2) diversifying the classifier through noise introduction to simulate that of the benign clients. Extensive experiments on three benchmark datasets under varying conditions demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed attack. Additionally, we evaluate the effectiveness of six widely used defense methods and find that BapFL still poses a significant threat even in the presence of the best defense, Multi-Krum. We hope to inspire further research on attack and defense strategies in pFL scenarios. The code is available at: https://github.com/BapFL/code

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  1. [2]2. Eugene Bagdasaryan, Andreas Veit, Yiqing Hua, Deborah Estrin, and Vitaly Shmatikov. 2020. How to backdoor federated learning. In International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics. PMLR, 2938-2948.
  2. [5]5. C-L Chen, Leana Golubchik, and Marco Paolieri. 2020. Backdoor Attacks on Federated Meta-Learning. In 34th Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems.
  3. [7]7. Liam Collins, Hamed Hassani, Aryan Mokhtari, and Sanjay Shakkottai. 2021. Exploiting shared representations for personalized federated learning. In International Conference on Machine Learning. PMLR, 2089-2099.
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Authors
Ye, T., Chen, C., Wang, Y., Li, X., & Gao, M.
Affiliations
  • East China Normal University (CN)
  • Ant Group (China) (CN)
Venue
ACM Transactions on Knowledge Discovery from Data
Published
2024-06-19
Volume
18
Issue
7
Pages
1-17
ISSN
  • 1556-4681 (ISSN-L)
  • 1556-472X
OpenAlex
W4392121135
Cited by
17
References
25
Citations by year
2026: 9 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 2
FWCI
2.52
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • ACM Transactions on Knowledge Discovery from Data (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Funders
  • National Natural Science Foundation of China (62202170, 62377012)
  • Open Research Fund of KLATASDS-MOE
  • ECNU
  • CCF-AFSG Research Fund
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
Keywords
backdoor attacks, personalized federated learning, parameter decoupling, data heterogeneity, classifier diversity, malicious clients, federated learning security

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