Cited by 16Software System Performance and ReliabilityCloud Computing and Resource ManagementDistributed systems and fault tolerance

LLexus: an AI agent system for incident management

Open access
Las-Casas, Pedro, Kumbhare, Alok Gautum, Fonseca, Rodrigo, Agarwal, Sharad·2024·ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review

Abstract

When operating a software service on a cloud, the complexity of keeping multiple distributed components responsive is a significant challenge for engineering teams. Engineers frequently rely on Troubleshooting Guides (TSGs) to navigate how to mitigate performance or outage incidents. However, the effectiveness of TSGs is often hindered by their length, implicit reliance on tribal knowledge, and the variable quality of their content. This paper introduces LLexus, an agent-based AI system to automate the execution of TSGs.

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1145/3689051.3689056

Cites

21 of 21 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Defences against telemetry manipulation include cross-checking telemetry, validating formats, tracking provenance, and refusing action when evidence is too weak.

    “Defences include cross-checking telemetry, validating formats, tracking provenance, and refusing action when evidence is too weak [83], [30], [31].”

    From Large language models for agentic NetOps and AIOps: Architectures, evaluation, and safety (2027) · cites this paper as [83]

    Section 4.3 (page unavailable) describes validating tool choices and checking that plan inputs can be sourced from previous steps, the incident, or predefined values. Section 4 also describes flagging invalid responses and limiting retries. These are safeguards for generated troubleshooting plans, not stated defences against telemetry manipulation; the paper does not establish cross-checking telemetry, validating telemetry formats, or refusing action specifically because telemetry evidence is weak. (LLM, conf=0.76)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Risks from tool misuse, prompt injection through operational artefacts, drift between verified and realised state, and rollback failure become more serious once the agent is allowed to propose or execute actions.

    “Hallucination or story-mode reasoning can affect every rung, but tool misuse, prompt injection through operational artefacts, drift between verified and realised state, and rollback failure become more serious once the agent is allowed to propose or execute actions [81], [95], [83], [65], [102].”

    From Large language models for agentic NetOps and AIOps: Architectures, evaluation, and safety (2027) · cites this paper as [83]

    The Overview of LLexus (section 3) warns that generic tools such as SSH would give the system unrestricted access to production systems, and Multi-Step Plan Generation (section 4) validates tool selection to avoid hallucination-related errors. These passages support concern about tool use when actions are executed, but the paper does not address prompt injection through operational artefacts, drift between verified and realised state, or rollback failure. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • In AIOps, the more common failure is accelerating a bad mitigation, or delaying a correct mitigation through repeated refusal or mis-triage.

    “In AIOps, the more common failure is accelerating a bad mitigation, or delaying a correct mitigation through repeated refusal or mis-triage [83], [94].”

    From Large language models for agentic NetOps and AIOps: Architectures, evaluation, and safety (2027) · cites this paper as [83]

    Section 3.2.1 says nondeterministic incident investigation can take unexpected paths and produce incorrect answers. Section 6.2 gives an example of a generated plan that incorrectly escalated an issue. The paper does not establish that these are the more common AIOps failures, or describe accelerating a bad mitigation or delaying a correct one through repeated refusal. (LLM, conf=0.76)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • An agent may still act wrongly, even when it is grounded, if the evidence on which it relies is false or incomplete.

    “An agent may still act wrongly, even when it is grounded, if the evidence on which it relies is false or incomplete [83].”
  • In adversarial settings, compromised devices may inject misleading logs, counters, or protocol events.

    “In adversarial settings, compromised devices may inject misleading logs, counters, or protocol events [83], [80].”

    From Large language models for agentic NetOps and AIOps: Architectures, evaluation, and safety (2027) · cites this paper as [83]

    The Network Link case study describes engineers examining metrics and logs to diagnose unexpected behavior, but does not discuss compromised devices or deliberately misleading data. Searches for adversarial settings, falsified telemetry, counters, and protocol events found no passage addressing the claim. (LLM, conf=0.72)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

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Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 8

  1. Kaikai An, Fangkai Yang, Liqun Li, Zhixing Ren, Hao Huang, Lu Wang, Pu Zhao, Yu Kang, Hua Ding, Qingwei Lin, Saravan Rajmohan, and Qi Zhang. Nissist: An incident mitigation copilot based on trou- bleshooting guides. arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.17531, 2024. · arXiv
  2. Chetan Bansal, Sundararajan Renganathan, Ashima Asudani, Olivier Midy, and Mathru Janakiraman. Decaf: Diagnosing and triaging per- formance issues in large-scale cloud services. In Proceedings of the ACM/IEEE 42nd International Conference on Software Engineering: Soft- ware Engineering in Practice, pages 201-210, 2020.
  3. Sébastien Bubeck, Varun Chandrasekaran, Ronen Eldan, Johannes Gehrke, Eric Horvitz, Ece Kamar, Peter Lee, Yin Tat Lee, Yuanzhi Li, Scott Lundberg, Harsha Nori, Hamid Palangi, Marco Tulio Ribeiro, and Yi Zhang. Sparks of artificial general intelligence: Early exper- iments with gpt-4. arXiv preprint arXiv:2303.12712, 2023. · arXiv
  4. Suriya Gunasekar, Yi Zhang, Jyoti Aneja, Caio César Teodoro Mendes, Allie Del Giorno, Sivakanth Gopi, Mojan Javaheripi, Piero Kauff- mann, Gustavo de Rosa, Olli Saarikivi, Adil Salim, Shital Shah, Harki- rat Singh Behl, Xin Wang, Sébastien Bubeck, Ronen Eldan, Adam Tau- man Kalai, Yin Tat Lee, and Yuanzhi Li. Textbooks are all you need. arXiv preprint arXiv:2306.11644, 2023. · arXiv
  5. Jiajun Jiang, Weihai Lu, Junjie Chen, Qingwei Lin, Pu Zhao, Yu Kang, Hongyu Zhang, Yingfei Xiong, Feng Gao, Zhangwei Xu, Yingnong Dang, and Dongmei Zhang. How to mitigate the incident? an effective troubleshooting guide recommendation technique for online service systems. In Proceedings of the 28th ACM Joint Meeting on European Software Engineering Conference and Symposium on the Foundations of Software Engineering, ESEC/FSE 2020, page 14101420, New York, NY, USA, 2020. Association for Computing Machinery.
  6. Shinji Kikuchi. Prediction of workloads in incident management based on incident ticket updating history. In Proceedings of the 8th In- ternational Conference on Utility and Cloud Computing, UCC '15, page 333340. IEEE Press, 2015.
  7. Noah Shinn, Federico Cassano, Edward Berman, Ashwin Gopinath, Karthik Narasimhan, and Shunyu Yao. Reflexion: Language agents with verbal reinforcement learning. arXiv preprint arXiv:2303.11366, 2023. · arXiv
  8. Karthik Valmeekam, Matthew Marquez, and Subbarao Kambhampati. Can large language models really improve by self-critiquing their own plans? arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.08118, 2023. · arXiv

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Las-Casas, P., Kumbhare, A. G., Fonseca, R., & Agarwal, S.
Affiliations
  • Microsoft (United States) (US)
  • Microsoft
Venue
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Published
2024-08-14
Volume
58
Issue
1
Pages
23-36
ISSN
0163-5980 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4401560363
Cited by
14
References
19
Citations by year
2026: 6 · 2025: 8
FWCI
2.34
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Software System Performance and Reliability
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Cloud Computing and Resource Management
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Distributed systems and fault tolerance
Keywords
incident management, troubleshooting guide, AI agents, distributed systems

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