Cited by 52Network Security and Intrusion DetectionInformation and Cyber SecurityAdversarial Robustness in Machine Learning

AI-Augmented SOC: A Survey of LLMs and Agents for Security Automation

Open access
Srinivas, Siddhant, Kirk, Brandon, Zendejas, Julissa, Espino, Michael, Boskovich, Matthew, Bari, Abdul, Dajani, Khalil, Alzahrani, Nabeel·2025·Journal of Cybersecurity and Privacy

Abstract

The increasing volume, velocity, and sophistication of cyber threats have placed immense pressure on modern Security Operations Centers (SOCs). Traditional rule-based and manual processes are proving insufficient, leading to alert fatigue, delayed responses, high false-positive rates, analyst dependency, and escalating operational costs. Recent advancements in Artificial Intelligence (AI) offer new opportunities to transform SOC workflows through automation and augmentation. Large Language Models (LLMs) and autonomous AI agents have shown strong potential in enhancing capabilities such as log summarization, alert triage, threat intelligence, incident response, report generation, asset discovery, and vulnerability management. This paper reviews recent developments in the application of LLMs and AI agents across these SOC functions, introducing a taxonomy that organizes their roles and capabilities within operational pipelines. While these technologies improve detection accuracy, response time, and analyst support, challenges persist, including model interpretability, adversarial robustness, integration with legacy systems, and the risk of hallucinations or data leakage. A detailed capability-maturity model outlines the levels of integration with SOC tasks. This survey synthesizes trends, identifies persistent limitations, and outlines future directions for trustworthy, explainable, and safe AI integration in SOC environments.

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Crossref · 10.3390/jcp5040095

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  • SOAR and threat-hunting surveys [27,28] focus on workflow automation rather than autonomous reasoning.

    “SOAR and threathunting surveys [27,28] focus on workflow automation rather than autonomous reasoning.”

    From Agentic AI and Large Language Models for Autonomous IoT Cybersecurity: A Systematic Survey, Taxonomy, and Research Roadmap (2026) · cites this paper as [27]

    The Introduction (page unavailable) describes this paper as a survey of LLM and AI-agent applications across SOC functions, not specifically a SOAR or threat-hunting survey. Its Capability Maturity Model section explicitly examines progression from manual to fully autonomous operations, including independent complex analysis. That contradicts the characterization that it focuses on workflow automation rather than autonomous reasoning. (LLM, conf=0.87)

    Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • CyberAlly is reported to have cut MTTR from 8 h to 90 min (vendor case-study figures, not an independent benchmark) in simulated SOC environments.

    “CyberAlly [27] is reported to have cut MTTR from 8 h to 90 min (vendor case-study figures, not an independent benchmark) in simulated SOC environments.”

    From Agentic AI and Large Language Models for Autonomous IoT Cybersecurity: A Systematic Survey, Taxonomy, and Research Roadmap (2026) · cites this paper as [27]

    Section 3.2, Alert Triage (page not specified), reports that CyberAlly was tested in simulated SOC environments and reduced Mean Time To Respond from 8 h to 90 min. The paper does not identify those figures as a vendor case study or establish whether they came from an independent benchmark; Section 7, Threats to Validity, gives only a general caution about simulated evaluations. (LLM, conf=0.87)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Gen-2 strength comes in joining natural language and the real data, but they are vulnerable to error drift and ripple-level logic failures that only their persistent monitoring can alleviate.

    “Their strength comes in joining natural language and the real data, but they are vulnerable to error drift and ripple-level logic failures that only their persistent monitoring can alleviate [23], [29].”

    From The Evolution of Agentic AI in Cybersecurity: From Single LLM Reasoners to Multi-Agent Systems and Autonomous Pipelines (2026) · cites this paper as [23]

    The Log Summarization section describes LLMs turning collected log data into human-readable insights, while the Interpretability table warns of cascading errors from hallucinations. Section 5.3 (Model-Related Challenges) calls for continuous self-verification and human oversight. The paper does not establish these points specifically for “Gen-2,” describe error drift, or say that persistent monitoring is the only way to alleviate the failures. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Gen-1 provides a valuable but limited base: a strong linguistic intelligence coupled with structural weaknesses that stop reliable automation.

    “Ultimately, Gen-1 provides a valuable but limited base: a strong linguistic intelligence coupled with structural weaknesses that stop reliable automation [23], [25].”

    From The Evolution of Agentic AI in Cybersecurity: From Single LLM Reasoners to Multi-Agent Systems and Autonomous Pipelines (2026) · cites this paper as [23]

    Section 5.3, “Model-Related Challenges” (page unavailable), describes LLM reliability weaknesses, including hallucinations and susceptibility to attacks, and says security operations often require human verification. The paper supports the contrast between useful language capabilities and reliability limits, but does not identify a “Gen-1” category or say those weaknesses stop reliable automation altogether. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • While models work in probability space and do not use external verification mechanisms, if the prompt is ambiguous or data is found missing, it hallucinates or misses crucial details.

    “While models work in probability space and do not use external verification mechanisms, if the prompt is ambiguous or data is found missing, it hallucinates or misses crucial details [23], [25].”

    From The Evolution of Agentic AI in Cybersecurity: From Single LLM Reasoners to Multi-Agent Systems and Autonomous Pipelines (2026) · cites this paper as [23]

    The Interpretability table describes probabilistic output variability, and §5.5 says poor or inconsistent data can amplify hallucinations. Section 3.5 reports that autonomous LLMs often omit or hallucinate details. The paper does not establish that ambiguous prompts cause these errors or that models categorically lack external verification mechanisms; §5.3 instead discusses verification and oversight as ways to improve accuracy. (LLM, conf=0.85)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

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Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

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Sorted by citations

Authors
Srinivas, S., Kirk, B., Zendejas, J., Espino, M., Boskovich, M., Bari, A., Dajani, K., & Alzahrani, N.
Affiliations
California State University, San Bernardino (US)
Corresponding author
Srinivas, Siddhant
Venue
Journal of Cybersecurity and Privacy
Publisher
MDPI AG
Published
2025-11-05
Volume
5
Issue
4
Pages
95
ISSN
2624-800X (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4415932290
Cited by
39
References
58
Citations by year
2026: 38 · 2025: 1
FWCI
16.30
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of Cybersecurity and Privacy (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Funders
California State University, San Bernardino, School of Computer Science and Engineering
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
Keywords
security operations center, large language models, AI agents, security automation, alert triage, incident response, threat intelligence, vulnerability management, asset discovery, false positives, hallucinations, model interpretability, capability maturity model, explainable AI, cyber threat detection

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