Cited by 0Diverse Legal and Medical StudiesMisinformation and Its ImpactsCybercrime and Law Enforcement Studies

Accountability Gaps in the Fake Follower Market

Open access
Kalameyets, Maksim, Owens, Rebecca, Hammouchi, Hicham, Sergeeva, Anastasia, Hoehn, Sviatlana, Jalilzade, Eldar, Wang, Jindi, Patel, Suchitha +4 more·2026·Proceedings of the 2026 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency

Abstract

Purchased likes, followers, views, comments, and reviews constitute a professionalised “fake-engagement-as-a-service” market that distorts social proof, skews consumer choice, undermines legitimate advertising, and exposes users to fraud and privacy risks. Despite these effects, the market remains difficult to observe at scale, and responsibility is fragmented across platforms, search engines, intermediaries, and regulators. This paper introduces an empirical mixed-methods framework that renders the fake social activity market observable and auditable. Drawing on 15 expert interviews and forensic analysis of EU-based FAS, we first identify the principal risks and harms associated with this market. We then develop an automated monitoring pipeline that measures (i) discoverability - the prominence of FAS in search engine results across jurisdictions; (ii) market structure - the services offered, pricing strategies, and operational features; and (iii) the cross-border ecosystem - the degree of provider overlap across countries as an indicator of market integration. Finally, we assess how the Digital Services Act (DSA) can be operationalised to address these risks. Across two scans of 24 countries covering 30,000 search results, we identify more than 2,000 FAS and show that fake engagement services remain readily accessible via major search engines, with marked regional variation. We observe substantial price dispersion, extensive reliance on mainstream payment processors, and cross-border clustering shaped by linguistic and cultural similarity. While many downstream harms fall within existing regulatory frameworks, legal obligations remain unclear, producing an accountability gap that the DSA has the capacity but not yet the guidance to address.

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Crossref · 10.1145/3805689.3806758

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44 of 44 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 12

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Authors
Kalameyets, M., Owens, R., Hammouchi, H., Sergeeva, A., Hoehn, S., Jalilzade, E., Wang, J., Patel, S., Aidinlis, S., Farrand, B., Lenzini, G., & Shi, L.
Affiliations
  • Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom
  • Durham University (GB)
  • University of Luxembourg (LU)
  • University of Luxembourg, Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg
  • Newcastle University (GB)
Venue
Proceedings of the 2026 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency
Publisher
ACM
Published
2026-06-25
Pages
5864-5885
OpenAlex
W7165667083
Cited by
0
References
35
FWCI
0.00
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Durham Research Online (Durham University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
European Media and Information Fund (FAMOUS project)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Diverse Legal and Medical Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Cybercrime and Law Enforcement Studies
Keywords
social media followers, online fraud, Digital Services Act, platform accountability, social validation, consumer choice, price dispersion, payment processors, privacy risks

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