The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Controlling high bandwidth aggregates in the network
Open accessAbstract
The current Internet infrastructure has very few built-in protection mechanisms, and is therefore vulnerable to attacks and failures. In particular, recent events have illustrated the Internet's vulnerability to both denial of service (DoS) attacks and flash crowds in which one or more links in the network (or servers at the edge of the network) become severely congested. In both DoS attacks and flash crowds the congestion is due neither to a single flow, nor to a general increase in traffic, but to a well-defined subset of the traffic --- an aggregate . This paper proposes mechanisms for detecting and controlling such high bandwidth aggregates. Our design involves both a local mechanism for detecting and controlling an aggregate at a single router, and a cooperative pushback mechanism in which a router can ask upstream routers to control an aggregate. While certainly not a panacea, these mechanisms could provide some needed relief from flash crowds and flooding-style DoS attacks. The presentation in this paper is a first step towards a more rigorous evaluation of these mechanisms.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Mahajan, R., Bellovin, S. M., Floyd, S., Ioannidis, J., Paxson, V., & Shenker, S.
- Venue
- ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
- Published
- 2002-07
- Volume
- 32
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 62-73
- ISSN
- 0146-4833 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2154178154
- Cited by
- 742
- References
- 31
- FWCI
- 72.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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