A polynomial-time nash equilibrium algorithm for repeated games
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
With the increasing reliance on game theory as a foundation for auctions and electronic commerce, efficient algorithms for computing equilibria in multiplayer general-sum games are of great theoretical and practical interest. The computational complexity of finding a Nash equilibrium for a one-shot bimatrix game is a well known open problem. This paper treats a closely related problem, that of finding a Nash equilibrium for an average-payoff phrepeated bimatrix game, and presents a polynomial-time algorithm. Our approach draws on the "folk theorem" from game theory and shows how finite-state equilibrium strategies can be found efficiently and expressed succinctly.
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Citations
Cites
Nash, J. (1951) · The Annals of Mathematics · doi:10.2307/1969529 · Cited by 7,002
Cited by
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Panait, L., & Luke, S. (2005) · Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems · doi:10.1007/s10458-005-2631-2 · Cited by 1,237
“Stone and Veloso [255] argue that unrestricted communication reduces a multi-agent system to something isomorphic to a single-agent system.”
BackgroundInfluentialComputing the optimal strategy to commit to
Conitzer, V., & Sandholm, T. (2006) · Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce · doi:10.1145/1134707.1134717 · Cited by 479
Mean Field Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning
Yang, Y., Luo, R., Li, M., Zhou, M. Q., Zhang, W., & Wang, J. (2018) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1802.05438 · Cited by 286
Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria
Conitzer, V., & Sandholm, T. (2002) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.cs/0205074 · Cited by 223
“Finally, the complexity of best-responding, of guaranteeing payoffs, and of finding an equilibrium in repeated and sequential games has been studied in [1, 7, 11, 18, 25].”
BackgroundBehavioural evidence for a transparency–efficiency tradeoff in human–machine cooperation
Ishowo-Oloko, F., Bonnefon, J.-F., Soroye, Z., Crandall, J., Rahwan, I., & Rahwan, T. (2019) · Nature Machine Intelligence · doi:10.1038/s42256-019-0113-5 · Cited by 178
Metadata
- Authors
- Littman, M. L., & Stone, P.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2003-06-09
- Pages
- 48-54
- OpenAlex
- W2121180068
- Cited by
- 113
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 9.21
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Littman, M. L., & Stone, P. (2003). A polynomial-time nash equilibrium algorithm for repeated games. Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce. https://doi.org/10.1145/779928.779935
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