The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Hop-count filtering: an effective defense against spoofed DDoS traffic
Abstract
IP spoofing has been exploited by Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks to (1) conceal flooding sources and localities in flooding traffic, and (2) coax legitimate hosts into becoming reflectors, redirecting and amplifying flooding traffic. Thus, the ability to filter spoofed IP packets near victims is essential to their own protection as well as to their avoidance of becoming involuntary DoS reflectors. Although an attacker can forge any field in the IP header, he or she cannot falsify the number of hops an IP packet takes to reach its destination. This hop-count information can be inferred from the Time-to-Live (TTL) value in the IP header. Using a mapping between IP addresses and their hop-counts to an Internet server, the server can distinguish spoofed IP packets from legitimate ones. Base on this observation, we present a novel filtering technique that is immediately deployable to weed out spoofed IP packets. Through analysis using network measurement data, we show that Hop-Count Filtering (HCF) can identify close to 90% of spoofed IP packets, and then discard them with little collateral damage. We implement and evaluate HCF in the Linux kernel, demonstrating its benefits using experimental measurements.
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Citations
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PREVIR: Fortifying Vehicular Networks Against Denial of Service Attacks
Verma, A., Saha, R., Kumar, G., Conti, M., & Kim, T.-H. (2024) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2024.3382992 · Cited by 11
Metadata
- Authors
- Jin, C., Wang, H., & Shin, K. G.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2003-10-27
- Pages
- 30-41
- ISSN
- 1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2001968297
- Cited by
- 468
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 16.44
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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