Cited by 260Access Control and TrustPeer-to-Peer Network TechnologiesSpam and Phishing Detection

SybilGuard: defending against sybil attacks via social networks

Open access
Yu, Haifeng, Kaminsky, Michael, Gibbons, Phillip B., Flaxman, Abraham·2006·Proceedings of the 2006 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications

Abstract

Peer-to-peer and other decentralized,distributed systems are known to be particularly vulnerable to sybil attacks. In a sybil attack,a malicious user obtains multiple fake identities and pretends to be multiple, distinct nodes in the system. By controlling a large fraction of the nodes in the system,the malicious user is able to "out vote" the honest users in collaborative tasks such as Byzantine failure defenses. This paper presents SybilGuard, a novel protocol for limiting the corruptive influences of sybil attacks.Our protocol is based on the "social network "among user identities, where an edge between two identities indicates a human-established trust relationship. Malicious users can create many identities but few trust relationships. Thus, there is a disproportionately-small "cut" in the graph between the sybil nodes and the honest nodes. SybilGuard exploits this property to bound the number of identities a malicious user can create.We show the effectiveness of SybilGuard both analytically and experimentally.

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  • Prior work has focused extensively on analysis and detection of sybil and/or fake accounts in online social networks by relying on tightly-knit community structures.

    “Prior work has focused quite extensively on the analysis and the detection of sybil and/or fake accounts in online social networks by relying on tightly-knit community structures [54, 15, 53, 9, 52, 5].”

    From Measuring, Characterizing, and Detecting Facebook Like Farms (2017) · cites this paper as [54]

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Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. M. Mitzenmacher and E. Upfal. Probability and Computing. Cambridge University Press, 2005.
  2. I. Stoica, R. Morris, D. Karger, F. Kaashoek, and H. Balakrishnan. Chord: A scalable peer-to-peer lookup service for internet applications. In ACM SIGCOMM, 2001.

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Authors
Yu, H., Kaminsky, M., Gibbons, P. B., & Flaxman, A.
Affiliations
  • Intel (United States) (US)
  • Carnegie Mellon University (US)
Venue
Proceedings of the 2006 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Publisher
ACM
Published
2006-08-11
Pages
267-278
OpenAlex
W4240443285
Cited by
260
References
21
Citations by year
2026: 7 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 9 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 14 · 2017: 12 · 2016: 18 · 2015: 16 · 2014: 20 · 2013: 14 · 2012: 21
FWCI
32.14
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
ACM SIGCOMM Conference (SIGCOMM) (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Access Control and Trust
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Peer-to-Peer Network Technologies
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Spam and Phishing Detection
Keywords
Sybil attack, peer-to-peer networks, decentralized systems, trust relationships, social networks, graph cuts, Byzantine fault tolerance, identity spoofing, malicious node detection

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