The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Beware of BGP attacks
Abstract
This note attempts to raise awareness within the network research community about the security of the interdomain routing infrastructure. We identify several attack objectives and mechanisms, assuming that one or more BGP routers have been compromised. Then, we review the existing and proposed countermeasures, showing that they are either generally ineffective (route filtering), or probably too heavyweight to deploy (S-BGP). We also review several recent proposals, and conclude by arguing that a significant research effort is urgently needed in the area of routing security.
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Citations
Cites
Understanding BGP misconfiguration
Mahajan, R., Wetherall, D., & Anderson, T. (2002) · Proceedings of the 2002 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications · doi:10.1145/633025.633027 · Cited by 533
Cited by
Proceedings of Winter Simulation Conference
(1994) · Proceedings of Winter Simulation Conference WSC-94 · doi:10.1109/wsc.1994.717062 · Cited by 540
A Survey of BGP Security Issues and Solutions
Butler, K., Farley, T. R., McDaniel, P., & Rexford, J. (2010) · Proceedings of the IEEE · doi:10.1109/jproc.2009.2034031 · Cited by 350
Survivable key compromise in software update systems
Samuel, J., Mathewson, N., Cappos, J., & Dingledine, R. (2010) · Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1866307.1866315 · Cited by 120
Metadata
- Authors
- Nordström, O., & Dovrolis, C.
- Venue
- ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
- Published
- 2004-04
- Volume
- 34
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 1-8
- ISSN
- 0146-4833 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2162260997
- Cited by
- 160
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 11.78
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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