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Cited by 497Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationEconomic Theory and InstitutionsExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 154 of the 156 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The Evolution of Social Norms

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Young, H. Peyton·2015·Annual Review of Economics
DOI 10.1146/annurev-economics-080614-115322
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Abstract

Social norms are patterns of behavior that are self-enforcing within a group: Everyone conforms, everyone is expected to conform, and everyone wants to conform when they expect everyone else to conform. Social norms are often sustained by multiple mechanisms, including a desire to coordinate, fear of being sanctioned, signaling membership in a group, or simply following the lead of others. This article shows how stochastic evolutionary game theory can be used to study the resulting dynamics. I illustrate with a variety of examples drawn from economics, sociology, demography, and political science. These include bargaining norms, norms governing the terms of contracts, norms of retirement, dueling, foot binding, medical treatment, and the use of contraceptives. These cases highlight the challenges of applying the theory to empirical cases. They also show that the modern theory of norm dynamics yields insights and predictions that go beyond conventional equilibrium analysis.

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Research works printed but not linked: 13

  1. Axtell R, 1999, Behavioral Dimensions of Retirement Economics, 161
  2. Bolton P, 2005, Contract Theory
  3. Brown LM. 2013. The diffusion of innovations: empirical and experimental evidence. PhD Diss., Univ. Oxford
  4. Durlauf SN, 1997, The Economy as a Complex Evolving System, 2, 81
  5. Hechter M, 2001, Social Norms
  6. Homans GC, 1950, The Human Group
  7. Jindani S. 2014. A game-theoretic approach to dueling and other social norms. MPhilos. Thesis, Dep. Econ., Oxford Univ.
  8. Kanazawa S, Still MC. 2001. The emergence of marriage norms: an evolutionary psychological perspective. See Hechter & Opp 2001, pp. 274–304
  9. Mallaby S, 2010, More Money Than God
  10. Posner EA, 2000, Law and Social Norms
  11. Schelling TC, 1960, The Strategy of Conflict
  12. Sugden R, 1986, The Economics of Rights, Cooperation and Welfare
  13. Wennberg J, 1982, Sci. Am., 182, 1102

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Metadata

Authors
Young, H. P.
Affiliations
University of Oxford (GB)
Corresponding author
Young, H. Peyton
ORCID
Young, H. Peyton
Venue
Annual Review of Economics
Publisher
Annual Reviews
Published
2015-08-01
Volume
7
Issue
1
Pages
359-387
ISSN
  • 1941-1383 (ISSN-L)
  • 1941-1391
DOI
10.1146/annurev-economics-080614-115322
OpenAlex
W2112082685
Cited by
497
References
156
Citations by year
2026: 47 · 2025: 71 · 2024: 73 · 2023: 67 · 2022: 49 · 2021: 56 · 2020: 43 · 2019: 27 · 2018: 30 · 2017: 22 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 4
FWCI
8.54
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Annual Review of Economics (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Keywords
social norms, norm dynamics, evolutionary game theory, coordination, sanctioning, signaling, conformity, contract terms, dueling, foot binding, medical treatment, contraceptive use

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