Cited by 25Social and Intergroup PsychologyElectoral Systems and Political ParticipationDecision-Making and Behavioral Economics

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 115 of the 115 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Partisan Bias in Political Judgment

Open access

Abstract

This article reviews empirical data demonstrating robust ingroup favoritism in political judgment. Partisans display systematic tendencies to seek out, believe, and remember information that supports their political beliefs and affinities. However, the psychological drivers of partisan favoritism have been vigorously debated, as has its consistency with rational inference. We characterize decades-long debates over whether such tendencies violate normative standards of rationality, focusing on the phenomenon of motivated reasoning. In light of evidence that both motivational and cognitive factors contribute to partisan bias, we advocate for a descriptive approach to partisan bias research. Rather than adjudicating the (ir)rationality of partisan favoritism, future research should prioritize the identification and measurement of its predictors and clarify the cognitive mechanisms underlying motivated political reasoning. Ultimately, we argue that political judgment is best evaluated by a standard of ecological rationality based on its practical implications for individual well-being and functional democratic governance.

Overview

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Crossref · 10.1146/annurev-psych-030424-122723

Cites

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Citations

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Research works printed but not linked: 10

  1. 1957, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance
  2. 1958, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations
  3. 1995, Varieties of confirmation bias, 32, 385
  4. 2014, Choice and Preference in Media Use: Advances in Selective Exposure Theory and Research
  5. 1980, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment
  6. 2020, Metacognitive experiences as information: processing fluency in consumer judgment and decision making. Consum, Psychol. Rev., 4, 4
  7. 1984, Ordinary Vices
  8. 2021, The Bias That Divides Us: The Science and Politics of Myside Thinking
  9. 2023, Megastudy identifying effective interventions to strengthen Americans’ democratic attitudes, OSF Preprints
  10. 1946 (1917), Science as a vocation, 129

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Metadata

Authors
Ditto, P. H., Celniker, J. B., Siddiqi, S. S., Güngör, M., & Relihan, D. P.
Affiliations
  • University of California, Irvine (US)
  • Arizona State University (US)
Venue
Annual Review of Psychology
Published
2025-01-17
Volume
76
Issue
1
Pages
717-740
ISSN
  • 0066-4308 (ISSN-L)
  • 1545-2085
OpenAlex
W4402265865
Cited by
25
References
113
Citations by year
2026: 13 · 2025: 9
FWCI
3.19
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Annual Review of Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
Keywords
partisan bias, political judgment, motivated reasoning, in-group favoritism, confirmation bias, rational inference, ecological rationality, cognitive mechanisms, democratic governance
MeSH terms
Humans, Judgment, Motivation, Politics

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