The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
ELECTORAL RULES AND ELECTORAL COORDINATION
Abstract
▪ Abstract Electoral coordination occurs at two main levels: (a) within individual electoral districts, where competitors coordinate entry and citizens coordinate votes; and (b) across districts, as competitors from different districts ally to form regional or national parties. We know a fair amount about district-level electoral coordination for single-tier electoral systems. In particular, when political actors are primarily concerned with the current election and have good information about the relative chances of potential competitors, two different M + 1 rules apply in an M-seat district. First, the number of competitors entering a given race tends to be no more than M + 1; second, when more than M + 1 competitors do enter a race, votes tend to concentrate on at most M + 1 of them. We know much less about cross-district coordination, in which potentially separate local party systems merge to form a national party system. This essay focuses on the latter, relatively neglected topic.
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Citations
Cites
Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems
Cox, G. W. (1997) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139174954 · Cited by 2,281
Self-citationMaking votes count: strategic coordination in the world's electoral systems
(1998) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.35-2982 · Cited by 1,753
Southern Politics in State and Nation, by V. O. Key, Jr., Alexander Heard
Sydnor, C. S. (1950) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2144283 · Cited by 1,737
Economics and elections: the major western democracies
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Nested games: rational choice in comparative politics
(1990) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.28-0532 · Cited by 1,336
Multiparty government: The politics of coalition in Europe
(1991) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/0261-3794(91)90033-o · Cited by 966
Southern Politics in State and Nation
Topkis, J., & Key, V. O. (1950) · The Yale Law Journal · doi:10.2307/793003 · Cited by 848
Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude, and the Number of Parties
Ordeshook, P. C., & Shvetsova, O. V. (1994) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111337 · Cited by 762
Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of Parties
Neto, O. A., & Cox, G. W. (1997) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111712 · Cited by 666
Self-citationMultiparty government: the politics of coalition in Europe
(1991) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.28-6457 · Cited by 627
Cited by
Explaining Variation In The Success Of Extreme Right Parties In Western Europe
Golder, M. (2003) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414003251176 · Cited by 767
Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems
CUSACK, T. R., IVERSEN, T., & SOSKICE, D. (2007) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055407070384 · Cited by 330
Metadata
- Authors
- Cox, G.
- Venue
- Annual Review of Political Science
- Publisher
- Annual Reviews
- Published
- 1999-06
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 145-161
- ISSN
- 1094-2939 (ISSN-L)
- 1545-1577
- OpenAlex
- W2119471347
- Cited by
- 266
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 2.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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