Cited by 2,281Electoral Systems and Political ParticipationGame Theory and Voting SystemsPolitical Theory and Democracy

Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems

Cox, Gary W.·1997·Cambridge University Press eBooks

Abstract

Popular elections are at the heart of representative democracy. Thus, understanding the laws and practices that govern such elections is essential to understanding modern democracy. In this book, Cox views electoral laws as posing a variety of coordination problems that political forces must solve. Coordination problems - and with them the necessity of negotiating withdrawals, strategic voting, and other species of strategic coordination - arise in all electoral systems. This book employs a unified game-theoretic model to study strategic coordination worldwide and that relies primarily on constituency-level rather than national aggregate data in testing theoretical propositions about the effects of electoral laws. This book also considers not just what happens when political forces succeed in solving the coordination problems inherent in the electoral system they face but also what happens when they fail.

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Crossref · 10.1017/cbo9781139174954

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  • Partisan alignment focuses on the dimensionality of the political space.

    “Second, mass polarization in terms of partisan alignment (Fig. 1b) focuses on the dimensionality of the political space.”
  • The number of candidates is a key aspect in the logic of strategic coordination at the electoral level.

    “Por tanto, el número de candidatos es un aspecto clave en la lógica de la coordinación estratégica en el plano electoral (Cox 1997).”
  • Cuando la presidencia es un "gran premio", esto puede incentivar la conformación de pocos partidos legislativos que se organicen en torno a la disputa presidencial.

    “Por una parte, cuando la presidencia es un “gran premio”, esto puede incentivar la conformación de pocos partidos legislativos que se organicen en torno a la disputa presidencial (Shugart y Carey 1992;Jones 1995;Cox 1997;Mainwaring y Shugart 1997;Golder 2006).”

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Authors
Cox, G. W.
Affiliations
University of California San Diego (US)
Corresponding author
Cox, Gary W.
Venue
Cambridge University Press eBooks
Published
1997-03-28
OpenAlex
W4251366449
Cited by
2,281
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 87 · 2025: 119 · 2024: 74 · 2023: 56 · 2022: 68 · 2021: 78 · 2020: 116 · 2019: 125 · 2018: 102 · 2017: 96 · 2016: 105 · 2015: 93 · 2014: 82 · 2013: 93 · 2012: 62
FWCI
75.68
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Theory and Democracy
Keywords
electoral systems, electoral law, strategic voting, coordination problems, strategic coordination, game-theoretic model, voting behavior, representative democracy

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