The DOI matches its Crossref record; 173 of the 173 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
BIASES IN THE INTERPRETATION AND USE OF RESEARCH RESULTS
Abstract
▪ Abstract The latter half of this century has seen an erosion in the perceived legitimacy of science as an impartial means of finding truth. Many research topics are the subject of highly politicized dispute; indeed, the objectivity of the entire discipline of psychology has been called into question. This essay examines attempts to use science to study science: specifically, bias in the interpretation and use of empirical research findings. I examine theory and research on a range of cognitive and motivational mechanisms for bias. Interestingly, not all biases are normatively proscribed; biased interpretations are defensible under some conditions, so long as those conditions are made explicit. I consider a variety of potentially corrective mechanisms, evaluate prospects for collective rationality, and compare inquisitorial and adversarial models of science.
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Cites
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Publication and related biases.
Song, Eastwood, Gilbody, Duley, & Sutton (2000) · Health Technology Assessment · doi:10.3310/hta4100 · Cited by 427
Blind analysis: Hide results to seek the truth
MacCoun, R., & Perlmutter, S. (2015) · Nature · doi:10.1038/526187a · Cited by 218
Self-citationThe Bias That Divides Us: The Science and Politics of Myside Thinking
Stanovich, K. E. (2021) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/13367.001.0001 · Cited by 152
Disfluency disrupts the confirmation bias
Hernandez, I., & Preston, J. L. (2013) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2012.08.010 · Cited by 152
Metadata
- Authors
- MacCoun, R. J.
- Venue
- Annual Review of Psychology
- Publisher
- Annual Reviews
- Published
- 1998-02
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 259-287
- ISSN
- 0066-4308 (ISSN-L)
- 1545-2085
- OpenAlex
- W2073249039
- Cited by
- 417
- References
- 173
- FWCI
- 3.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
