The DOI matches its Crossref record; 66 of the 66 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?
Abstract
Scholars and policymakers generally assume that multilateral cooperation is a necessary condition for economic sanctions to be of any use. However, previous statistical tests of this assumption have shown that sanctions are more successful with lower levels of cooperation. This puzzle calls into question established theories of economic statecraft as well as theories of international cooperation. In this article I test possible explanations for the ineffectiveness of multilateral cooperation on sanctions events using James Fearon's (1998) breakdown of cooperation into bargaining and enforcement phases as a framework for discussion The empirical results show that when multilateral economic sanctions fail, their failure is due to enforcement, not bargaining problems Without the support of an international organization, cooperating states backslide from promises of cooperation Backsliding occurs because of domestic political pressures and uncertainty about the intentions of the other sanctioning countries; backsliding causes an initial burst of cooperative behavior to decay over time. Without institutional support, cooperation is worse than useless—it is counterproductive. This result suggests that international cooperation is a more fragile equilibrium than previously thought but undercuts realist arguments that international organizations are unimportant.
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Cited by
Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?
Marinov, N. (2005) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00142.x · Cited by 444
Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice
Drezner, D. W. (2011) · International Studies Review · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2486.2010.01001.x · Cited by 411
Self-citationAsset Revaluation and the Existential Politics of Climate Change
Colgan, J. D., Green, J. F., & Hale, T. N. (2021) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818320000296 · Cited by 362
Multistakeholderism: anatomy of an inchoate global institution
Raymond, M., & DeNardis, L. (2015) · International Theory · doi:10.1017/s1752971915000081 · Cited by 351
“A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation”: Economic Sanctions and State Repression, 1976-2001
Wood, R. M. (2008) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.00512.x · Cited by 314
Metadata
- Authors
- Drezner, D. W.
- Venue
- International Organization
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2000
- Volume
- 54
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 73-102
- ISSN
- 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-5088
- OpenAlex
- W2156712803
- Cited by
- 296
- References
- 66
- FWCI
- 9.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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