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In View of Ratification: Governmental Preferences and Domestic Constraints at the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference
Open accessAbstract
The bargaining product of the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference—the Amsterdam Treaty—dwindled down the draft proposal to a consensus set of all fifteen member states of the European Union (EU). Using the two-level concept of international bargains, we provide a thorough analysis of how this consensus set was reached by issue subtraction with respect to domestic ratification constraints. Drawing on data sets covering the positions of all negotiating actors and ratifying national political parties, we first highlight the differences in the Amsterdam ratification procedures in the fifteen member states of the EU. This analysis allows us to compare the varying ratification difficulties in each country. Second, our empirical analysis of the treaty negotiations shows that member states excluded half of the Amsterdam bargaining issues to secure a smooth ratification. Because member states with higher domestic ratification constraints performed better in eliminating uncomfortable issues at the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference, issue subtraction can be explained by the extent to which the negotiators were constrained by domestic interests.
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Cited by
On Acting and Knowing: How Pragmatism Can Advance International Relations Research and Methodology
Friedrichs, J., & Kratochwil, F. (2009) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818309990142 · Cited by 473
De Vries, C. E., Hobolt, S. B., & Walter, S. (2021) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818320000491 · Cited by 338
Achieving Methodological Alignment When Combining QCA and Process Tracing in Practice
Beach, D. (2018) · Sociological Methods & Research · doi:10.1177/0049124117701475 · Cited by 90
Metadata
- Authors
- Hug, S., & König, T.
- Venue
- International Organization
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2002
- Volume
- 56
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 447-476
- ISSN
- 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-5088
- OpenAlex
- W2151036724
- Cited by
- 283
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 68.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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