The DOI matches its Crossref record.
A Theory of Misgovernance
Abstract
This paper tries to explain why government bureaucracies are often associated with red tape, corruption, and lack of incentives. The paper identifies two specific ingredients that together can provide an explanation: the fact that governments often act precisely in situations where markets fail and the presence of agency problems within the government. We show that these problems are exacerbated at low levels of development and in bureaucracies dealing with poor people. We also argue that we need to posit the existence of a welfare-oriented constituency within the government in order to explain red tape and corruption.
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Claims the paper makes
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It may be impossible for a benevolent government to screen bad entrants without facilitating corruption.
“On the second version of the unintended consequences argument, it may be impossible for the benevolent government to screen bad entrants without facilitating corruption (Banerjee 1997, Acemoglu and Verdier 2000).”
From The Regulation of Entry (2002) · cites this paper as Banerjee 1997
Citations
Cites
No references could be resolved yet.
Research works printed but not linked: 19
- Aghion, Philippe, and Robin Burgess, "Financing Development in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union," in A. Giovannini, ed., Finance and Development: Issues and Experience (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993). · DOI
- 10.1086/467507 · DOI
- Bolton Patrick, 1992, Economic Policy, 276
- 10.1016/0047-2727(87)90075-2 · DOI
- Clague Christopher, 1993, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 393
- Dixit, Avinash, The Making of Economic Policy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996). · DOI
- Holmstrom Bengt, 1991, Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations, 24, 10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 · DOI · Paper page
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and Jean Tirole, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993).
- Leff, Nathaniel H. "Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption," in Monday Ekpo, ed., Bureaucratic Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1979).
- 10.2307/2946696 · DOI · Paper page
- Murphy Kevin M, 1993, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 409
- Nye, Joseph S. "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis," in Monday Ekpo, ed., Bureaucratic Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1979).
- Olson Mancur, 1993, American Political Science Review, 567, 10.2307/2938736 · DOI
- 10.1086/261800 · DOI
- 10.2307/2118402 · DOI
- Tirole, Jean, "Collusion and the Theory of Organisations," in Advances in Economic Theory: Proceedings of the 6th World Congress of the Econometric Society, Jean-Jacques Laffont, ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
- 1996, Review of Economic Studies, 1
- Waterbury, John S. "Endemic and Planned Corruption in a Monarchical Regime," in Monday Ekpo, ed., Bureaucratic Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1979).
- 10.2307/3003300 · DOI
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302753399436 · Cited by 3,956
Metadata
- Authors
- Banerjee, A. V.
- Affiliations
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US)
- Corresponding author
- Banerjee, A. V.
- ORCID
- Banerjee, A. V.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1997-11-01
- Volume
- 112
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1289-1332
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2059794602
- Cited by
- 587
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 15 · 2025: 12 · 2024: 21 · 2023: 16 · 2022: 28 · 2021: 22 · 2020: 28 · 2019: 31 · 2018: 13 · 2017: 24 · 2016: 23 · 2015: 25 · 2014: 27 · 2013: 29 · 2012: 25
- FWCI
- 36.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- HighWire Press Open Archive (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Public Administration and Governance
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Taxation and Compliance Studies
- Keywords
- misgovernance, state bureaucracy, red tape, corruption, principal-agent problem, market failure, poor people
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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