The DOI matches its Crossref record; 58 of the 58 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origins and Growth of Firms
Abstract
In the formative stages of their businesses, entrepreneurs have to provide incentives for employees to protect, rather than steal, the source of organizational rents. We study how the entrepreneur's response to this problem determines the organization's internal structure, growth, and its eventual size. Large, steep hierarchies will predominate in physical-capital-intensive industries, and will have seniority-based promotion policies. By contrast, flat hierarchies will prevail in human-capital-intensive industries and will have up-or-out promotion systems. Furthermore, flat hierarchies will have more distinctive technologies or cultures than steep hierarchies. The model points to some essential differences between organized hierarchies and markets.
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Cites
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Does the stock market fully value intangibles? Employee satisfaction and equity prices
Edmans, A. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.021 · Cited by 2,511
Berger, A. N., Miller, N. H., Petersen, M. A., Rajan, R. G., & Stein, J. C. (2005) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.06.003 · Cited by 1,888
Self-citationDoes flattening government improve economic performance? Evidence from China
Li, P., Lu, Y., & Wang, J. (2016) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2016.07.002 · Cited by 1,417
Berger, A. N., Miller, N. H., Petersen, M. A., Rajan, R. G., & Stein, J. C. (2001) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.294660 · Cited by 576
Self-citationTies that Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm Investment
Garmaise, M. J. (2011) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/ewp033 · Cited by 542
Metadata
- Authors
- Rajan, R. G., & Zingales, L.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2001-08-01
- Volume
- 116
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 805-851
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W3121507500
- Cited by
- 526
- References
- 58
- FWCI
- 49.22
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.