The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Parties as Political Intermediaries
Abstract
This paper argues that parties regulate competition among Hke-minded factions so as to enhance reputation building by, and voter trust in, the politicians standing for a given cause. While intra- and interparty competition contributes to keeping politicians on their toes, unbridled competition may encourage politicians to challenge good platforms and to wage competition along socially suboptimal dimensions (for example, by privileging form over content). The paper builds a simple model of intraparty competition and studies whether various hierarchical or democratic party institutions constitute an efficient form of party governance. The paper shows that intraparty disagreements, when they occur, hurt the party's position in the general election, but that their possibility enhances party image; and that parties must be able to avoid behind-the-scene allocations of portfolios and spoils in order to be credible. Last, it analyzes the impact of political polarization and interparty competition on the choice of party governance.
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Cites
Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 · Cited by 6,046
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00083 · Cited by 3,172
Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems
Cox, G. W. (1997) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139174954 · Cited by 2,281
Cited by
The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government
Maskin, E., & Tirole, J. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828042002606 · Cited by 904
Self-citationKitschelt, H., Hawkins, K. A., Luna, J. P., Rosas, G., & Zechmeister, E. J. (2010) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511750311 · Cited by 559
Gender Quotas and the Crisis of the Mediocre Man: Theory and Evidence from Sweden
Besley, T., Folke, O., Persson, T., & Rickne, J. (2017) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20160080 · Cited by 480
Kitschelt, H. (2007) · West European Politics · doi:10.1080/01402380701617563 · Cited by 363
Levy, G. (2004) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00254-0 · Cited by 276
Metadata
- Authors
- Caillaud, B., & Tirole, J.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2002-11-01
- Volume
- 117
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1453-1489
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2036965329
- Cited by
- 181
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 24.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Caillaud, B., & Tirole, J. (2002). Parties as Political Intermediaries. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355302320935070
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.