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A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
Abstract
Players in a game are “in equilibrium” if they are rational, and accurately predict other players' strategies. In many experiments, however, players are not in equilibrium. An alternative is “cognitive hierarchy” (CH) theory, where each player assumes that his strategy is the most sophisticated. The CH model has inductively defined strategic categories: step 0 players randomize; and step k thinkers best-respond, assuming that other players are distributed over step 0 through step k - 1. This model fits empirical data, and explains why equilibrium theory predicts behavior well in some games and poorly in others. An average of 1.5 steps fits data from many games.
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Cites
Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics
Kahneman, D. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322655392 · Cited by 5,377
Myles, G. D. (1993) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/0176-2680(93)90012-j · Cited by 875
Cited by
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Goodman, N. D., & Frank, M. C. (2016) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2016.08.005 · Cited by 594
Hirshleifer, D. (2015) · Annual Review of Financial Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-financial-092214-043752 · Cited by 497
Autonomous agents modelling other agents: A comprehensive survey and open problems
Albrecht, S. V., & Stone, P. (2018) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/j.artint.2018.01.002 · Cited by 417
Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions
Crawford, V. P. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803321455197 · Cited by 391
Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
Cai, H., & Wang, J. T.-Y. (2006) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2005.04.001 · Cited by 370
Metadata
- Authors
- Camerer, C. F., Ho, T.-H., & Chong, J.-K.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2004-08-01
- Volume
- 119
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 861-898
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2114765979
- Cited by
- 1,556
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 94.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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