The DOI matches its Crossref record; 45 of the 45 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
Abstract
Players in a game are “in equilibrium” if they are rational, and accurately predict other players' strategies. In many experiments, however, players are not in equilibrium. An alternative is “cognitive hierarchy” (CH) theory, where each player assumes that his strategy is the most sophisticated. The CH model has inductively defined strategic categories: step 0 players randomize; and step k thinkers best-respond, assuming that other players are distributed over step 0 through step k - 1. This model fits empirical data, and explains why equilibrium theory predicts behavior well in some games and poorly in others. An average of 1.5 steps fits data from many games.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Schelling, T. C. (1960) · Cited by 11,816
Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics
Kahneman, D. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322655392 · Cited by 5,377
Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games
McKelvey, R. D., & Palfrey, T. R. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1995.1023 · Cited by 2,545
(2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.4.i · Cited by 2,230
Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental Approach
Camerer, C., & Lovallo, D. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.1.306 · Cited by 2,226
Self-citationA General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in GamesPreprint
Harsanyi, J. C., & Selten, R. (1988) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 2,104
Information, trade and common knowledge
Milgrom, P., & Stokey, N. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90046-1 · Cited by 1,729
Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study
Nagel, R. (2007) · American Economic Review · Cited by 1,414
On Players′ Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence
Stahl, D. O., & Wilson, P. W. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1995.1031 · Cited by 1,132
Myles, G. D. (1993) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/0176-2680(93)90012-j · Cited by 875
Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study
Costa-Gomes, M., Crawford, V. P., & Broseta, B. (2001) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00239 · Cited by 813
Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failurePreprint
Huyck, J. B. V., Battalio, R. C., & Beil, R. O. (1990) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 790
Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games
McKelvey, R. D., & Palfrey, T. R. (1998) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1023/a:1009905800005 · Cited by 656
Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study
Costa-Gomes, M. A., & Crawford, V. P. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.96.5.1737 · Cited by 542
Cooper, R. (1999) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609428 · Cited by 510
Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best-Response in Experimental P-Beauty Contests
Ho, T., Weigelt, K., & Camerer, C. F. (1996) · CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) · doi:10.7907/2wqmd-n6102 · Cited by 464
Self-citationThe Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Wilson, E. B. (1917) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.46.1197.567 · Cited by 414
Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions
Crawford, V. P. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803321455197 · Cited by 391
Modeling Rational Players: Part II
Binmore, K. (1988) · Economics and Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0266267100000328 · Cited by 346
Neuroeconomics: Why Economics Needs Brains
Camerer, C. F., Loewenstein, G., & Prelec, D. (2004) · The Scandinavian Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.0347-0520.2004.00377.x · Cited by 336
Self-citationOne, Two, (Three), Infinity, … : Newspaper and Lab Beauty-Contest Experiments
Bosch-Domènech, A., Montalvo, J. G., Nagel, R., & Satorra, A. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282802762024737 · Cited by 274
Nonmetric test of the minimax theory of two-person zerosum games.
O'Neill, B. (1987) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.84.7.2106 · Cited by 266
Features of experimentally observed bounded rationality
Selten, R. (1998) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(97)00148-7 · Cited by 233
Aging and decision making: a comparison between neurologically healthy elderly and young individuals
Kovalchik, S., Camerer, C. F., Grether, D. M., Plott, C. R., & Allman, J. M. (2005) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2003.12.001 · Cited by 212
Self-citationFehr, E., & Tyran, J. (2008) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2008.00836.x · Cited by 201
Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria: An Experimental Study
Ochs, J. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1995.1030 · Cited by 200
What do you think I think you think?: Strategic reasoning in matrix games
Hedden, T., & Zhang, J. (2002) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(02)00054-9 · Cited by 195
Learning and Decision Costs in Experimental Constant Sum Games
Dilip Mookherjee, B., & Sopher, B. (1997) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1997.0540 · Cited by 165
Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental StudyPreprint
Costa‐Gomes, M. A., & Crawford, V. P. (2004) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.586281 · Cited by 131
Experimental Economics: A Psychological Perspective
Kahneman, D. J. (1988) · Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-48356-1_2 · Cited by 104
Mixed strategies in strictly competitive games: A further test of the minimax hypothesis
Rapoport, A., & Boebel, R. B. (1992) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/0899-8256(92)90019-o · Cited by 104
Rapoport, A., & Amaldoss, W. (2000) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(00)00101-3 · Cited by 98
Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets
(1988) · Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-48356-1 · Cited by 98
Gamow, G. (1947) · IACS Institutional Repository (Indian Association for the Cultivation of Science) · Cited by 97
Games and Economic BehaviorPreprint
NOUSSAIR, C. N., de Castro, L. I., & Galvao, A. F. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.5009629 · Cited by 86
Does Minimax Work? An Experimental Study
Binmore, K., Swierzbinski, J., & Proulx, C. (2001) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00645 · Cited by 81
Evidence on the Equivalence of the Strategic and Extensive Form Representation of Games
Cooper, D. J., & Huyck, J. B. V. (2001) · Cited by 80
The Allocation of Attention: Theory and EvidencePreprint
Gabaix, X., Laibson, D., Moloche, G., & Weinberg, S. (2003) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.444840 · Cited by 79
Task Complexity, Equilibrium Selection, and Learning: An Experimental Study
Ho, T., & Weigelt, K. (1996) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.42.5.659 · Cited by 70
Self-citationGames and phone numbers: Do short-term memory bounds affect strategic behavior?
Devetag, G., & Warglien, M. (2003) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0167-4870(02)00202-7 · Cited by 62
Learning a mixed strategy equilibrium in the laboratory
Bloomfield, R. J. (1994) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(94)90108-2 · Cited by 59
Interdependent decision strategies in zero-sum games: A computer-controlled study
Messick, D. M. (1967) · Systems Research and Behavioral Science · doi:10.1002/bs.3830120105 · Cited by 57
A cognitive hierarchy theory of one-shot games: Some preliminary resultsPreprint
Camerer, C. F., Ho, T., & Chong, J.-K. (2002) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 25
Self-citationA Cognitive Hierarchy Theory of One-Shot Games and Experimental AnalysisPreprint
Camerer, C. F., Ho, T., & Chong, J.-K. (2003) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.411061 · Cited by 21
Self-citationEvidence on the Equivalence of the Stratetic and Extensive Form Representation of GamesPreprint
Cooper, D. J., & Huyck, J. B. V. (2002) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 8
Cited by
Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can Inform Economics
Camerer, C., Loewenstein, G., & Prelec, D. (2005) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/0022051053737843 · Cited by 2,161
Self-citationIDENTIFYING SOCIAL NORMS USING COORDINATION GAMES: WHY DOES DICTATOR GAME SHARING VARY?
Krupka, E. L., & Weber, R. A. (2013) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/jeea.12006 · Cited by 995
When Does "Economic Man" Dominate Social Behavior?
Camerer, C. F., & Fehr, E. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1110600 · Cited by 732
Self-citationA Sparsity-Based Model of Bounded Rationality *
Gabaix, X. (2014) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qju024 · Cited by 683
A survey and critique of multiagent deep reinforcement learning
Hernandez-Leal, P., Kartal, B., & Taylor, M. E. (2019) · Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems · doi:10.1007/s10458-019-09421-1 · Cited by 671
Metadata
- Authors
- Camerer, C. F., Ho, T.-H., & Chong, J.-K.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2004-08-01
- Volume
- 119
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 861-898
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2114765979
- Cited by
- 1,556
- References
- 45
- FWCI
- 94.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.