The DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Strategic Extremism: Why Republicans and Democrats Divide on Religious Values
Abstract
Party platforms differ sharply from one another, especially on issues with religious content, such as abortion or gay marriage. Given the high return to attracting the median voter, why do vote-maximizing politicians take extreme positions? In this paper we find that strategic extremism depends on an intensive margin where politicians want to induce their core constituents to vote (or make donations) and the ability to target political messages toward those core constituents. Our model predicts that the political relevance of religious issues is highest when around one-half of the voting population attends church regularly. Using data from across the world and within the United States, we indeed find a nonmonotonic relationship between religious extremism and religious attendance.
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“Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shapiro (2005) formalizes this intuition in a model where politicians deploy strategic extremism (e.g., inflaming wedge issues) to amplify cultural identification and thereby raise turnout among core supporters.”
From Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure (2020) · cites this paper as Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shapiro 2005
Citations
Cites
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Misinformation and Its Correction: Continued Influence and Successful Debiasing
Lewandowsky, S., Ecker, U. K. H., Seifert, C. M., Schwarz, N., & Cook, J. (2012) · Psychological Science in the Public Interest · doi:10.1177/1529100612451018 · Cited by 2,920
Beyond misinformation: Understanding and coping with the “post-truth” era.
Lewandowsky, S., Ecker, U. K. H., & Cook, J. (2017) · Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.jarmac.2017.07.008 · Cited by 1,985
Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure
Autor, D., Dorn, D., Hanson, G., & Majlesi, K. (2020) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20170011 · Cited by 1,063
Gentzkow, M., & Shapiro, J. M. (2006) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/499414 · Cited by 1,274
Self-citationCosta, D. L., & Kahn, M. E. (2013) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/jeea.12011 · Cited by 657
Metadata
- Authors
- Glaeser, E. L., Ponzetto, G. A. M., & Shapiro, J. M.
- Affiliations
- National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
- Harvard University (US)
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2005-11-01
- Volume
- 120
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1283-1330
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2159251310
- Cited by
- 234
- References
- 38
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 10 · 2024: 14 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 17 · 2020: 13 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 10 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 16 · 2013: 15 · 2012: 9
- FWCI
- 80.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Religion and Society Interactions
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › American Constitutional Law and Politics
- Keywords
- party platforms, religious values, religious service attendance, median voter, message targeting, abortion, same-sex marriage
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