An economic theory of political action in a democracy
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Most people tend to remain ignorant and do not pursue information, but they react rationally once they receive information about the workings of government.
“Therefore, most people tend to remain ignorant and do not pursue information, but they react rationally once they receive information about the workings of government”
From Transparency and Trust in Government. Evidence from a Survey Experiment (2021) · cites this paper as Downs, 1957
The conscious choice of an individual to ignore a certain piece of information is based on a cost-benefit calculation, especially those where the informative effort (costs) are considered disproportionate to the perceived potential benefits.
“As such, the conscious choice of an individual to ignore a certain piece of information is again based on a cost-benefit calculation, especially those where the informative effort (costs) are considered disproportionate to the perceived potential benefits (Rational Ignorance Theory; Downs, 1957).”
From The privacy paradox – investigating discrepancies between expressed privacy concerns and actual online behavior – a systematic literature review (2017) · cites this paper as Downs, 1957
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“As such, the conscious choice of an individual to ignore a certain piece of information is again based on a cost-benefit calculation, especially those where the informative effort (costs) are considered disproportionate to the perceived potential benefits (Rational Ignorance Theory; Downs, 1957).”
BackgroundGet Real! Individuals Prefer More Sustainable Investments
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- Authors
- Downs, A.
- Affiliations
- Budapest University of Technology and Economics (HU)
- Corresponding author
- Downs, Anthony
- ORCID
- Downs, Anthony
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1957-04
- Volume
- 65
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 135-150
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2081553388
- Cited by
- 3,300
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 158 · 2025: 179 · 2024: 281 · 2023: 235 · 2022: 193 · 2021: 223 · 2020: 281 · 2019: 296 · 2018: 208 · 2017: 159 · 2016: 147 · 2015: 100 · 2014: 94 · 2013: 113 · 2012: 114
- FWCI
- 18.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Political Economy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Theory and Democracy
- Keywords
- political action, democracy, economic theory of politics, political participation, voting behavior
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
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