Cited by 3,300Electoral Systems and Political ParticipationGame Theory and Voting SystemsPolitical Theory and Democracy

An economic theory of political action in a democracy

Downs, Anthony·1957·Journal of Political Economy

Integrity signals

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Crossref · 10.1086/257897

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Claims the paper makes

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Claims other papers make about this one

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  • Most people tend to remain ignorant and do not pursue information, but they react rationally once they receive information about the workings of government.

    “Therefore, most people tend to remain ignorant and do not pursue information, but they react rationally once they receive information about the workings of government”
  • The conscious choice of an individual to ignore a certain piece of information is based on a cost-benefit calculation, especially those where the informative effort (costs) are considered disproportionate to the perceived potential benefits.

    “As such, the conscious choice of an individual to ignore a certain piece of information is again based on a cost-benefit calculation, especially those where the informative effort (costs) are considered disproportionate to the perceived potential benefits (Rational Ignorance Theory; Downs, 1957).”

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Authors
Downs, A.
Affiliations
Budapest University of Technology and Economics (HU)
Corresponding author
Downs, Anthony
Venue
Journal of Political Economy
Published
1957-04
Volume
65
Issue
2
Pages
135-150
ISSN
  • 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-534X
OpenAlex
W2081553388
Cited by
3,300
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 158 · 2025: 179 · 2024: 281 · 2023: 235 · 2022: 193 · 2021: 223 · 2020: 281 · 2019: 296 · 2018: 208 · 2017: 159 · 2016: 147 · 2015: 100 · 2014: 94 · 2013: 113 · 2012: 114
FWCI
18.46
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Journal of Political Economy (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Theory and Democracy
Keywords
political action, democracy, economic theory of politics, political participation, voting behavior

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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

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