The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Extent of the Market and the Supply of Regulation
Abstract
We present a model in which setting up and running a regulatory institution takes a fixed cost. As a consequence, the supply of regulation is limited by the extent of the market. We test three implications of this model. First, jurisdictions with larger populations affected by a given regulation are more likely to have it. Second, jurisdictions with lower incremental fixed costs of introducing and administering new regulations should regulate more. This implies that regulation spreads from higher to lower population jurisdictions, and that jurisdictions that build up transferable regulatory capabilities should regulate more intensely. Consistent with the model, we find that higher population U. S. states have more pages of legislation and adopt particular laws earlier in their history than do smaller states. We also find that the regulation of entry, the regulation of labor, and the military draft are more extensive in countries with larger populations, as well as in civil law countries, where we argue that the incremental fixed costs are lower.
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Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302753399436 · Cited by 3,956
Self-citationZipf Distribution of U.S. Firm Sizes
Axtell, R. L. (2001) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1062081 · Cited by 1,839
Cited by
The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins
Porta, R. L., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2008) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.46.2.285 · Cited by 3,220
Self-citationPrivate credit in 129 countries☆
DJANKOV, S., MCLIESH, C., & SHLEIFER, A. (2007) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.03.004 · Cited by 2,795
Self-citationThe Economic Consequences of Legal Origins
Porta, R. L., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2007) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w13608 · Cited by 892
Self-citationAghion, P., Algan, Y., Cahuc, P., & Shleifer, A. (2010) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2010.125.3.1015 · Cited by 715
Self-citationThe Importance of History for Economic Development
Nunn, N. (2009) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev.economics.050708.143336 · Cited by 698
Metadata
- Authors
- Mulligan, C. B., & Shleifer, A.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2005-11-01
- Volume
- 120
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1445-1473
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W1977256403
- Cited by
- 219
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 21.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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