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Regulation and Distrust*

Aghion, Philippe, Algan, Yann, Cahuc, Pierre, Shleifer, Andrei·2010·Quarterly Journal of Economics

Abstract

We document that, in a cross section of countries, government regulation is strongly negatively correlated with measures of trust. In a simple model explaining this correlation, distrust creates public demand for regulation, whereas regulation in turn discourages formation of trust, leading to multiple equilibria. A key implication of the model is that individuals in low-trust countries want more government intervention even though they know the government is corrupt. We test this and other implications of the model using country- and individual-level data on trust and beliefs about the role of government, as well as on changes in beliefs during the transition from socialism.

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Metadata

Authors
Aghion, P., Algan, Y., Cahuc, P., & Shleifer, A.
Venue
Quarterly Journal of Economics
Published
2010-08
Volume
125
Issue
3
Pages
1015-1049
ISSN
  • 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
  • 1531-4650
OpenAlex
W4290805490
Cited by
715
References
0
FWCI
102.25
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Regulation and Distrust*. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1162/qjec.2010.125.3.1015
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Aghion, P., Algan, Y., Cahuc, P., & Shleifer, A. (2010). Regulation and Distrust*. Quarterly Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2010.125.3.1015

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.