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Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm
Open accessAbstract
This paper studies the Grossman-Hart-Moore (GHM) "property rights" approach to the theory of the firm under alternating-owners bargaining. When managers can pursue other occupations whilst negotiating over the division of the gains from cooperation, the GHM results obtain. If taking the best alternative job terminates bargaining, outcomes are very different. Sometimes an agent with an important investment decision should not own the asset she works with; sometimes independent assets should be owned together; sometimes strictly complementary assets should be owned separately.
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Citations
Cited by
Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
Baker, G., Gibbons, R., & Murphy, K. J. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302753399445 · Cited by 1,730
Rajan, R. G., & Zingales, L. (1998) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355398555630 · Cited by 1,123
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/15.1.74 · Cited by 555
Kim, J., & Mahoney, J. T. (2005) · Managerial and Decision Economics · doi:10.1002/mde.1218 · Cited by 360
Chapter 21 Not-for-profit ownership and hospital behavior
Sloan, F. A. (2000) · Handbook of Health Economics · doi:10.1016/s1574-0064(00)80034-7 · Cited by 264
Metadata
- Authors
- de Meza, D., & Lockwood, B.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1998-05-01
- Volume
- 113
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 361-386
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2032761389
- Cited by
- 230
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 22.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1162/003355398555621
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- de Meza, D., & Lockwood, B. (1998). Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355398555621
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.