The DOI matches its Crossref record; 177 of the 177 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Property rights theory, transaction costs theory, and agency theory: an organizational economics approach to strategic management
Abstract
Property rights theory has common antecedents with contractual theories of the firm such as transaction costs and agency theories, and is yet distinct from these theories. We illustrate fundamental theoretical principles derived from these three theories by analyzing the business case of oil field unitization. Theoretical principles and application of theory to oil field unitization are each summarized. From this, it is possible to see how property rights theory is well suited to explain business situations where inefficient economic outcomes persist. Additionally, property rights theory forges new theoretical connections with other branches of organizational economics, in particular, resource-based theory. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Cites
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Cited by
The Resource-Based View: A Review and Assessment of Its Critiques
Kraaijenbrink, J., Spender, J.-C., & Groen, A. J. (2010) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206309350775 · Cited by 1,632
Dalton, D. R., Hitt, M. A., Certo, S. T., & Dalton, C. M. (2007) · The Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.1080/078559806 · Cited by 843
Why resource‐based theory's model of profit appropriation must incorporate a stakeholder perspective
Barney, J. B. (2018) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2949 · Cited by 685
Agency Theory and Bounded Self-Interest
Bosse, D. A., & Phillips, R. A. (2016) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2013.0420 · Cited by 535
Dmytriyev, S. D., Freeman, R. E., & Hörisch, J. (2021) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/joms.12684 · Cited by 497
Metadata
- Authors
- Kim, J., & Mahoney, J. T.
- Venue
- Managerial and Decision Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2005
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 223-242
- ISSN
- 0143-6570 (ISSN-L)
- 1099-1468
- OpenAlex
- W2164247748
- Cited by
- 360
- References
- 177
- FWCI
- 21.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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