The Effect of Nonlinear Incentives on Performance: Evidence from “Econ 101”
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper analyzes both theoretically and empirically how an absolute grading standard that allows only a small number of distinct grades affects student course performance outcomes. The clearest prediction of the model is that course performance of “grade-motivated” students will tend to be clustered slightly above the boundaries that separate grades, as long as the variance of the random component of performance is not too large. A more tenuous prediction is that the proximity of a grade-motivated student to a grade boundary going into the final exam should influence final exam performance, after controlling for prefinal exam performance. An empirical investigation of the course performance of university students who were enrolled in introductory economics classes that used an absolute grading standard finds evidence in favor of both of these predictions. The results suggest that student effort decisions respond to the incentives created by the grading system.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“However, these studies found only minimal (Oettinger, 2002) or no (Grant and Green, 2013) evidence that grades motivated students to perform better on final exams under these conditions.”
From Teaching More by Grading Less (or Differently) (2014) · cites this paper as Oettinger, 2002
Citations
Cites
(2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.2.i · Cited by 13,709
Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 · Cited by 6,046
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1987) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913238 · Cited by 2,859
Performance Pay and Productivity
Lazear, E. P. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.5.1346 · Cited by 2,487
Berry, D. A., & DeGroot, M. (1978) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2286553 · Cited by 625
Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects?
Ehrenberg, R. G., & Bognanno, M. L. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261736 · Cited by 495 · cited 1×
“And, although empirical analysis has lagged behind the theory, several recent studies (Ehrenberg & Bognanno, 1990; Lazear, 2000) provide evidence that effort choices do respond significantly to performance incentives.”
BackgroundChanges in College Skills and the Rise in the College Wage Premium
Grogger, J., & Eide, E. (1995) · The Journal of Human Resources · doi:10.2307/146120 · Cited by 430
Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects?
Ehrenberg, R., & Bognanno, M. (1988) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w2638 · Cited by 381
Fiscal Year Ends and Nonlinear Incentive Contracts: The Effect on Business Seasonality
Oyer, P. (1998) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355398555559 · Cited by 369
Academic Achievement and Job Performance
Wise, D. A. (2016) · American Economic Review · Cited by 229
A Simple Model of Educational Standards
Costrell, R. M. (1994) · American Economic Review · Cited by 225
The Impact of Educational Standards on the Level and Distribution of Earnings
Betts, J. R. (1998) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 163
Do high grading standards affect student performance?
Figlio, D., & Lucas, M. E. (2003) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(03)00039-2 · Cited by 154
Do Incentives Matter? The Case of Navy Recruiters
Asch, B. J. (1990) · ILR Review · doi:10.1177/001979399004300306 · Cited by 147
The learning effect of assessment and evaluation in high school
Becker, W. E., & Rosen, S. (1992) · Economics of Education Review · doi:10.1016/0272-7757(92)90002-k · Cited by 108
Do Grading Standards Affect the Incentive to Learn?Preprint
Betts, J. R. (1998) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.76459 · Cited by 33
Betts, J. R., & Grogger, J. (2000) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w7875 · Cited by 33
Research works printed but not linked: 4
- Betts Julian, 1997, UCSD Department of Economics discussion paper, 22
- Betts Julian, 1998, American Economic Review, 88, 266
- Costrell Robert, 1994, American Economic Review, 84, 956
- Wise David, 1975, American Economic Review, 65, 350
Cited by
Teaching More by Grading Less (or Differently)
Schinske, J., & Tanner, K. (2014) · CBE—Life Sciences Education · doi:10.1187/cbe.cbe-14-03-0054 · Cited by 326
“However, these studies found only minimal (Oettinger, 2002) or no (Grant and Green, 2013) evidence that grades motivated students to perform better on final exams under these conditions.”
Social image concerns and prosocial behavior: Field evidence from a nonlinear incentive scheme
Lacetera, N., & Macis, M. (2010) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2010.08.007 · Cited by 316
“Including the time to reach the donation site, the waiting time before the donation and the resting time at the hospital after the donation (which is higher for whole blood donation), on average a donor should expect a commitment of about two hours.”
Main, J. B., & Ost, B. (2014) · The Journal of Economic Education · doi:10.1080/00220485.2014.859953 · Cited by 69
“Oettinger (2002) showed that nonlinear grading distributions can encourage students to strategically allocate effort.”
BackgroundA General Test for Distortions in Performance Measures
Courty, P., & Marschke, G. (2008) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest.90.3.428 · Cited by 48
“Jacob and Levitt, 2002; Oettinger, 2002; Burgess et al., 2002; and Courty and Marschke, 2004).”
Zahran, S., Brody, S. D., Highfield, W. E., & Vedlitz, A. (2010) · Journal of Environmental Planning and Management · doi:10.1080/09640560903529410 · Cited by 44
“In fact, when a performance target is defined as unreachable, a discrete incentive may do more harm than good, inducing a stall or even a ‘freeze of effort’ (Oettinger 2002, McEwan and Santibanez 2005).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Oettinger, G. S.
- Corresponding author
- Oettinger, Gerald S.
- Venue
- Review of Economics and Statistics
- Publisher
- MIT Press - Journals
- Published
- 2002-08
- Volume
- 84
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 509-517
- ISSN
- 0034-6535 (ISSN-L)
- 1530-9142
- OpenAlex
- W2125999105
- Cited by
- 49
- References
- 18
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 3 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 1 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 1 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 2.02
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Review of Economics and Statistics (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Education › Educational Outcomes and Influences
- Social Sciences › Education › Evaluation of Teaching Practices
- Social Sciences › Education › School Choice and Performance
- Keywords
- grade boundaries, student effort, course performance, final exam performance, introductory economics courses
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.