The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Fiscal Year Ends and Nonlinear Incentive Contracts: The Effect on Business Seasonality
Abstract
Salesperson and executive compensation contracts typically specify a nonlinear relationship between firm revenues and pay. These agents therefore have incentive to manipulate prices, influence the timing of customer purchases, and vary effort over their firms' fiscal years. This paper empirically establishes results consistent with agents' focusing on performance over the fiscal year. Most notably, in addition to varying with the calendar business cycle, manufacturing firms' sales are higher at the end of the fiscal year, and lower at the beginning, than they are in the middle. Further evidence is found in fiscal-year price movements and patterns in the industry variation of fiscal-year effects.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Newey, W. K., & West, K. D. (1987) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913610 · Cited by 16,936
A Simple, Positive Semi-Definite, Heteroskedasticity and AutocorrelationConsistent Covariance Matrix
Newey, W., & West, K. (1986) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/t0055 · Cited by 12,278
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261677 · Cited by 5,083
The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions
Healy, P. M. (1985) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(85)90029-1 · Cited by 3,283
The Information Content of Annual Earnings Announcements
Beaver, W. H. (1968) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2490070 · Cited by 2,738
The effects of bonus schemes on accounting decisions
Healy, P. M. (2011) · DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) · Cited by 2,579
(2008) · Corporate Financial Strategy · doi:10.4324/9780080942841-11 · Cited by 2,390
Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives
Chevalier, J., & Ellison, G. (1997) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/516389 · Cited by 2,290
Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives
Chevalier, J., & Ellison, G. (1995) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w5234 · Cited by 1,582
Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry
BROWN, K. C., HARLOW, W. V., & STARKS, L. T. (1996) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb05203.x · Cited by 1,485
Cited by
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Personnel Economics: The Economist's View of Human Resources
Lazear, E. P., & Shaw, K. L. (2007) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.21.4.91 · Cited by 470
Reference-Dependent Preferences: Evidence from Marathon Runners
Allen, E. J., Dechow, P. M., Pope, D. G., & Wu, G. (2017) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2015.2417 · Cited by 324
Information and Incentives Inside the Firm: Evidence from Loan Officer Rotation
HERTZBERG, A., LIBERTI, J. M., & PARAVISINI, D. (2010) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01553.x · Cited by 287
Cleaning House: The Impact of Information Technology Monitoring on Employee Theft and Productivity
Pierce, L., Snow, D. C., & McAfee, A. (2015) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2014.2103 · Cited by 251
Metadata
- Authors
- Oyer, P.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1998-02-01
- Volume
- 113
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 149-185
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2145626126
- Cited by
- 369
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 10.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Fiscal Year Ends and Nonlinear Incentive Contracts: The Effect on Business Seasonality. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1162/003355398555559
- The paper
- Oyer, P. (1998). Fiscal Year Ends and Nonlinear Incentive Contracts: The Effect on Business Seasonality. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355398555559
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.