How Valuable Is a Good Reputation? A Sample Selection Model of Internet Auctions
Abstract
On the online auction site eBay, by convention, sellers do not ship goods to winning bidders until after they have received payment, so there is an opportunity for sellers to take advantage of bidders' trust. Realizing this, the designers of eBay created a system that relies on self-enforcement using reputation. Several recent studies have found that bidders give little or no reward to sellers who have better reputations. I show that in fact, sellers are strongly rewarded for the first few reports that they have behaved honestly, but marginal returns to additional reports are severely decreasing.
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Livingston (2005) finds a positive effect of reputation on the probabilities of receiving a bid and of a sale happening, as well as on the sale price, especially for the first positive reviews.
“he finds a positive effect of reputation on the probabilities of receiving a bid and of a sale happening, as well as on the sale price, especially for the first positive reviews.”
From Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets (2016) · cites this paper as Livingston (2005)
Despite Livingston's more meaningful economic magnitudes, endogeneity due to lack of random assignment remains a concern.
“Note, however, that despite offering results that have more meaningful economic magnitudes, the problem of endogeneity due to a lack of random assignment is still of some concern.”
From Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets (2016) · cites this paper as Livingston (2005)
Livingston (2005) presents a theoretical model predicting positive, yet decreasing returns to reputation.
“Livingston presents a theoretical model that predicts positive, yet decreasing returns to reputation.”
From Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets (2016) · cites this paper as Livingston (2005)
In Livingston's data, the first 1-25 reviews increase payment by $20.42 on average, approximately 5% of an average price of $409.96.
“His results suggest that, on average, the first 1-25 reviews increase payment by $20.42 (approximately 5% of an average price of $409.96).”
From Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets (2016) · cites this paper as Livingston (2005)
Ratings do not affect the price paid for the card, consistent with Livingston (2005) regarding the reputation premium.
“however, ratings do not affect the price paid for the card, consistent with Livingston (2005) regarding the reputation premium.”
From Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets (2016) · cites this paper as Livingston (2005)
Moving from any two subsequent quartiles of reputation has no significant effect on sale price, consistent with Livingston's theoretical prediction.
“In comparison, moving from any two subsequent quartiles has no significant effect on sale price, consistent with the article's theoretical prediction.”
From Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets (2016) · cites this paper as Livingston (2005)
Cites
Shadow Prices, Market Wages, and Labor Supply
Heckman, J. (1974) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913937 · Cited by 1,852 · see citing works
The value of reputation on eBay: A controlled experiment
Resnick, P., Zeckhauser, R., Swanson, J., & Lockwood, K. (2006) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-006-4309-2 · Cited by 1,118 · see citing works
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Goldfarb, A., & Tucker, C. (2019) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20171452 · Cited by 2,744 · see citing works
Pavlou, P. A., & Dimoka, A. (2006) · Information Systems Research · doi:10.1287/isre.1060.0106 · Cited by 930 · see citing works
Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets
Tadelis, S. (2016) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015325 · Cited by 524 · see citing works
THE DYNAMICS OF SELLER REPUTATION: EVIDENCE FROM EBAY<sup>*</sup>
CABRAL, L., & HORTAÇSU, A. (2010) · The Journal of Industrial Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6451.2010.00405.x · Cited by 505 · see citing works
Reputation in Online Auctions: The Market for Trust
Brown, J., & Morgan, J. (2006) · California Management Review · doi:10.2307/41166371 · Cited by 113 · see citing works
- Authors
- Livingston, J. A.
- Affiliations
- Bentley University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Livingston, Jeffrey A.
- Venue
- Review of Economics and Statistics
- Publisher
- MIT Press - Journals
- Published
- 2005-08
- Volume
- 87
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 453-465
- ISSN
- 0034-6535 (ISSN-L)
- 1530-9142
- OpenAlex
- W2025505967
- Cited by
- 271
- References
- 2
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 9 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 11 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 12 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 13 · 2014: 14 · 2013: 18 · 2012: 30
- FWCI
- 23.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Review of Economics and Statistics (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
- Keywords
- online auctions, seller reputation, eBay, trust, self-enforcing agreements, honest reporting, sample selection model
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