Cited by 271Auction Theory and ApplicationsDigital Platforms and EconomicsLaw, Economics, and Judicial Systems

How Valuable Is a Good Reputation? A Sample Selection Model of Internet Auctions

Livingston, Jeffrey A.·2005·Review of Economics and Statistics

Abstract

On the online auction site eBay, by convention, sellers do not ship goods to winning bidders until after they have received payment, so there is an opportunity for sellers to take advantage of bidders' trust. Realizing this, the designers of eBay created a system that relies on self-enforcement using reputation. Several recent studies have found that bidders give little or no reward to sellers who have better reputations. I show that in fact, sellers are strongly rewarded for the first few reports that they have behaved honestly, but marginal returns to additional reports are severely decreasing.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1162/0034653054638391

Cites

2 of 2 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Livingston (2005) finds a positive effect of reputation on the probabilities of receiving a bid and of a sale happening, as well as on the sale price, especially for the first positive reviews.

    “he finds a positive effect of reputation on the probabilities of receiving a bid and of a sale happening, as well as on the sale price, especially for the first positive reviews.”

    From Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets (2016) · cites this paper as Livingston (2005)

  • Despite Livingston's more meaningful economic magnitudes, endogeneity due to lack of random assignment remains a concern.

    “Note, however, that despite offering results that have more meaningful economic magnitudes, the problem of endogeneity due to a lack of random assignment is still of some concern.”

    From Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets (2016) · cites this paper as Livingston (2005)

  • Livingston (2005) presents a theoretical model predicting positive, yet decreasing returns to reputation.

    “Livingston presents a theoretical model that predicts positive, yet decreasing returns to reputation.”

    From Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets (2016) · cites this paper as Livingston (2005)

  • In Livingston's data, the first 1-25 reviews increase payment by $20.42 on average, approximately 5% of an average price of $409.96.

    “His results suggest that, on average, the first 1-25 reviews increase payment by $20.42 (approximately 5% of an average price of $409.96).”

    From Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets (2016) · cites this paper as Livingston (2005)

  • Ratings do not affect the price paid for the card, consistent with Livingston (2005) regarding the reputation premium.

    “however, ratings do not affect the price paid for the card, consistent with Livingston (2005) regarding the reputation premium.”

    From Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets (2016) · cites this paper as Livingston (2005)

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Authors
Livingston, J. A.
Affiliations
Bentley University (US)
Corresponding author
Livingston, Jeffrey A.
Venue
Review of Economics and Statistics
Published
2005-08
Volume
87
Issue
3
Pages
453-465
ISSN
  • 0034-6535 (ISSN-L)
  • 1530-9142
OpenAlex
W2025505967
Cited by
271
References
2
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 9 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 11 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 12 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 13 · 2014: 14 · 2013: 18 · 2012: 30
FWCI
23.46
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • The Review of Economics and Statistics (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
Keywords
online auctions, seller reputation, eBay, trust, self-enforcing agreements, honest reporting, sample selection model

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