The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Reputation in Online Auctions: The Market for Trust
Abstract
Online markets have dramatically altered the retail landscape. By eliminating barriers associated with geography as well as the physical costs of maintaining a storefront, online markets have created a democracy of buyers and sellers. However, the fluidity of this marketplace and the relative anonymity of transactions has made the of maintaining critically important. Solving the trust problem represents a key competitive advantage for many of the successful players in the online space. For instance, much of the remarkable success of eBay has stemmed from its ability to create valuable and informative reputations for its users through its system. The lock-in associated with a user's reputation on eBay helped it to stave off challenges by Amazon and Yahoo. This article describes how eBay's solution to the ''trust problem, has led to the creation of a for feedback whose sole purpose is the manufacture of reputation for eBay users. It presents a case study and a statistical analysis of this market in order to show that its maintenance represents a crucial challenge to eBay's future competitive advantage and, more generally, to solving the trust problem in other online markets.
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In the citing paper
“Brown & Morgan (2006) show some examples of this practice on eBay's marketplace.”
From Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets (2016) · cites this paper as Brown & Morgan (2006)
Citations
Cites
Ba, S., & Pavlou, P. A. (2002) · Cited by 2,256
The Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices, and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions
Bajari, P., Hortaçsu, A., & Hortacsu, A. (2003) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1593721 · Cited by 1,024
Does a Seller's eCommerce Reputation Matter? Evidence from eBay Auctions
Alm, J. R., & Melnik, M. I. (2002) · Issue Lab (Candid) · Cited by 557
PRICE DISPERSION IN THE SMALL AND IN THE LARGE: EVIDENCE FROM AN INTERNET PRICE COMPARISON SITE
Baye, M. R., Morgan, J., & Scholten, P. (2004) · The Journal of Industrial Economics · doi:10.1111/j.0022-1821.2004.00236.x · Cited by 468
Self-citationBa, S., & Pavlou, P. A. (2002) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.2307/4132332 · Cited by 312 · cited 1×
“16 They also find that the positive effect is more pronounced for high-value items, such as servers and digital camcorders.”
BackgroundReputation Mechanism Design in Online Trading Environments with Pure Moral Hazard
Dellarocas, C. (2005) · Information Systems Research · doi:10.1287/isre.1050.0054 · Cited by 281
How Valuable Is a Good Reputation? A Sample Selection Model of Internet Auctions
Livingston, J. A. (2005) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/0034653054638391 · Cited by 271 · cited 1×
“14 He finds that bidders are more likely to bid, and bid higher, when a seller has positive feedback reports.”
BackgroundDewally, M., & Ederington, L. (2006) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/499169 · Cited by 187
Cited by
The Impact of New Media on Customer Relationships
Hennig-Thurau, T., Malthouse, E. C., Friege, C., Gensler, S., Lobschat, L., Rangaswamy, A., & Skiera, B. (2010) · Journal of Service Research · doi:10.1177/1094670510375460 · Cited by 1,406
“Brown and Morgan (2006) argue that trust and reputation of sellers are crucial for their success on eBay, and that the feedback system installed by the platform Hennig-Thurau et al. 323 323 at Johann Wolfgang Goethe Univ on August 12, 2010jsr.sagepub.comDownloaded from has been essential for its…”
BackgroundReputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets
Tadelis, S. (2016) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015325 · Cited by 524
“Brown and Morgan (2006) show some cases in which this practice happened on eBay’s marketplace.”
BackgroundEngineering Trust: Reciprocity in the Production of Reputation Information
Bolton, G., Greiner, B., & Ockenfels, A. (2013) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1120.1609 · Cited by 429
Internet Exchanges for Used Goods: An Empirical Analysis of Trade Patterns and Adverse Selection1
Ghose, A. (2009) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.2307/20650292 · Cited by 211
An Introduction to Search Engines and Web Navigation
Levene, M. (2010) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9780470874233 · Cited by 197
Metadata
- Authors
- Brown, J., & Morgan, J.
- ORCID
- Brown, Jennifer
- Venue
- California Management Review
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2006-10
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 61-81
- ISSN
- 0008-1256 (ISSN-L)
- 2162-8564
- OpenAlex
- W2093547363
- Cited by
- 113
- References
- 7
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 3 · 2012: 18
- FWCI
- 22.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- journals.sagepub.com/page/policies/text-and-data-mining-license (tdm)
- Locations
- California Management Review (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Access Control and Trust
- Keywords
- online auctions, reputation, trust, eBay, user feedback, digital markets, competitive advantage, lock-in, online retail
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- Brown, J., & Morgan, J. (2006). Reputation in Online Auctions: The Market for Trust. California Management Review. https://doi.org/10.2307/41166371
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.