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Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Insurance: Can Dynamic Data Help to Distinguish?
Open accessAbstract
A standard problem of applied contracts theory is to empirically distinguish between adverse selection and moral hazard. We show that dynamic insurance data allow to distinguish moral hazard from dynamic selection on unobservables. In the presence of moral hazard, experience rating implies negative occurrence dependence: individual claim intensities decrease with the number of past claims. We discuss econometric tests for the various types of data that are typically available. Finally, we argue that dynamic data also allow to test for adverse selection, even if it is based on asymmetric learning.
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Citations
Cites
Asymmetric Information in Health Insurance: Evidence from the National Medical Expenditure Survey
Cardon, J. H., & Hendel, I. (2001) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2696362 · Cited by 411
Automobile insurance ratemaking in the presence of asymmetrical information
Dionne, G., & Vanasse, C. (1992) · Journal of Applied Econometrics · doi:10.1002/jae.3950070204 · Cited by 173
Cited by
Sources of Advantageous Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance Market
Fang, H., Keane, M. P., & Silverman, D. (2008) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/587623 · Cited by 493
Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets
Cohen, A., & Siegelman, P. (2010) · Journal of Risk and Insurance · doi:10.1111/j.1539-6975.2009.01337.x · Cited by 418
The Nature of Risk Preferences: Evidence from Insurance Choices
Barseghyan, L., Molinari, F., O'Donoghue, T., & Teitelbaum, J. C. (2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.6.2499 · Cited by 348
Dynamic Moral Hazard: A Longitudinal Examination of Automobile Insurance in Canada
Shi, P., Zhang, W., & Boucher, J. (2018) · Journal of Risk and Insurance · doi:10.1111/jori.12172 · Cited by 8
Metadata
- Authors
- Abbring, J. H., Heckman, J. J., Chiappori, P.-A., & Pinquet, J.
- Venue
- Journal of the European Economic Association
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2003-05-01
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 2-3
- Pages
- 512-521
- ISSN
- 1542-4766 (ISSN-L)
- 1542-4774
- OpenAlex
- W2149867011
- Cited by
- 173
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 11.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Abbring, J. H., Heckman, J. J., Chiappori, P.-A., & Pinquet, J. (2003). Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Insurance: Can Dynamic Data Help to Distinguish? Journal of the European Economic Association. https://doi.org/10.1162/154247603322391152
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