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Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right after All?
Open accessAbstract
The classical doctrine of the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR), elaborated by Bagehot (1873), asserts that the central bank should lend to “illiquid but solvent” banks under certain conditions. Several authors have argued that this view is now obsolete: in modern interbank markets, a solvent bank cannot be illiquid. This paper provides a possible theoretical foundation for rescuing Bagehot's view. Our theory does not rely on the multiplicity of equilibria that arises in classical models of bank runs. We built a model of banks' liquidity crises that possesses a unique Bayesian equilibrium. In this equilibrium, there is a positive probability that a solvent bank cannot find liquidity assistance in the market. We derive policy implications about banking regulation (solvency and liquidity ratios) and interventions of the Lender of Last Resort. Furthermore, we find that public (bailout) and private (bail-in) involvement are complementary in implementing the incentive efficient solution and that Bagehot's Lender of Last Resort facility must work together with institutions providing prompt corrective action and orderly failure resolution. Finally, we derive similar implications for an International Lender of Last Resort (ILOLR).
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Cited by
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Metadata
- Authors
- Rochet, J.-C., & Vives, X.
- Venue
- Journal of the European Economic Association
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2004-12-01
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1116-1147
- ISSN
- 1542-4766 (ISSN-L)
- 1542-4774
- OpenAlex
- W2142889277
- Cited by
- 815
- References
- 43
- FWCI
- 38.89
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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