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Cited by 48Income, Poverty, and InequalitySocial Policy and Reform StudiesSocial Issues and Policies

Failure to Respond to Rising Income Inequality: Processes That Legitimize Growing Disparities

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Hing, Leanne S. Son, Wilson, Anne E., Gourevitch, Peter, English, Jaslyn, Sin, Parco·2019·Daedalus
DOI 10.1162/daed_a_01752
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Abstract

Why is there not more public outcry in the face of rising income inequality? Although public choice models predict that rising inequality will spur public demand for redistribution, evidence often fails to support this view. We explain this lack of outcry by considering social-psychological processes contextualized within the spatial, institutional, and political context that combine to dampen dissent. We contend that rising inequality can activate the very psychological processes that stifle outcry, causing people to be blind to the true extent of inequality, to legitimize rising disparities, and to reject redistribution as an effective solution. As a result, these psychological processes reproduce and exacerbate inequality and legitimize the institutions that produce it. Finally, we explore ways to disrupt the processes perpetuating this cycle.

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  • The decline in Republican support for governmental regulation of the economy reflects economic system justification, that is, the conservative defence of increasing inequality as fair and legitimate under the neoliberal regime.

    “Presumably, this reflects economic system justification, that is, the conservative defence of increasing inequality as fair and legitimate under the neoliberal regime101,107,176–181.”

    From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [180]

    The Rising Income section says conservatives may favor income inequality because they more strongly endorse system-justifying ideologies that legitimize it. The System justification theory section describes rationalizing inequality as fair. Neither passage establishes a decline in Republican support for economic regulation or ties that decline to system justification under a neoliberal regime; page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.86)

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Authors
Hing, L. S. S., Wilson, A. E., Gourevitch, P., English, J., & Sin, P.
Affiliations
University of California San Diego (US)
ORCID
Venue
Daedalus
Publisher
MIT Press - Journals
Published
2019-07
Volume
148
Issue
3
Pages
105-135
ISSN
  • 0011-5266 (ISSN-L)
  • 1548-6192
DOI
10.1162/daed_a_01752
OpenAlex
W2954603946
Cited by
48
References
2
Citations by year
2026: 10 · 2025: 13 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 2
FWCI
10.57
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
Daedalus (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Income, Poverty, and Inequality
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Social Policy and Reform Studies
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Social Issues and Policies
Keywords
income inequality, redistribution, legitimation of inequality, political dissent, public choice theory

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