The DOI matches its Crossref record; 72 of the 72 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Contracts as Reference Points*
Abstract
We argue that a contract provides a reference point for a trading relationship: more precisely, for parties' feelings of entitlement. A party's ex post performance depends on whether he gets what he is entitled to relative to outcomes permitted by the contract. A party who is shortchanged shades on performance. A flexible contract allows parties to adjust their outcomes to uncertainty but causes inefficient shading. Our analysis provides a basis for long-term contracts in the absence of noncontractible investments and elucidates why “employment” contracts, which fix wages in advance and allow the employer to choose the task, can be optimal.
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Citations
Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1988) · Decision, Probability and Utility · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609220.014 · Cited by 32,474
Coase, R. H. (1937) · Economica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x · Cited by 23,972
Filders, R. (1992) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/0169-2070(92)90130-2 · Cited by 16,165
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O'Brien, D. P., & Williamson, O. E. (1976) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2230812 · Cited by 13,381
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556151 · Cited by 11,264
Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization
Alchian, A. A., & Demsetz, H. (1996) · Firms, Organizations and Contracts · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198774358.003.0005 · Cited by 9,565
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261404 · Cited by 9,352
Self-citationWilliamson, O. E. (1975) · Cited by 6,810
(2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.7.i · Cited by 6,810
Cited by
Interdependent Preferences and Reciprocity
Sobel, J. (2005) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/0022051054661530 · Cited by 899
Corporate culture: Evidence from the field
Graham, J. R., Grennan, J., Harvey, C. R., & Rajgopal, S. (2022) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2022.07.008 · Cited by 428
The Importance of Trust for Investment: Evidence from Venture Capital
Bottazzi, L., Da Rin, M., & Hellmann, T. (2016) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhw023 · Cited by 423
The effect of reference point prices on mergers and acquisitions
Baker, M., Pan, X., & Wurgler, J. (2012) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.04.010 · Cited by 412
Investor attention, psychological anchors, and stock return predictability
Li, J., & Yu, J. (2012) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.04.003 · Cited by 378
Metadata
- Authors
- Hart, O., & Moore, J.
- Venue
- Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2008-02
- Volume
- 123
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-48
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W3121238280
- Cited by
- 670
- References
- 72
- FWCI
- 64.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.