The DOI matches its Crossref record; 72 of the 72 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Contracts as Reference Points*
Abstract
We argue that a contract provides a reference point for a trading relationship: more precisely, for parties' feelings of entitlement. A party's ex post performance depends on whether he gets what he is entitled to relative to outcomes permitted by the contract. A party who is shortchanged shades on performance. A flexible contract allows parties to adjust their outcomes to uncertainty but causes inefficient shading. Our analysis provides a basis for long-term contracts in the absence of noncontractible investments and elucidates why “employment” contracts, which fix wages in advance and allow the employer to choose the task, can be optimal.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Hart, O., & Moore, J.
- Venue
- Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2008-02
- Volume
- 123
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-48
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W3121238280
- Cited by
- 670
- References
- 72
- FWCI
- 64.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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