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Hold-Up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points*
Open accessAbstract
We study two parties who desire a smooth trading relationship under conditions of value and cost uncertainty. A contract fixing price works well in normal times because there is nothing to argue about. However, when value or cost is unusually high or low, one party will deviate from the contract and hold up the other party, causing deadweight losses as parties withhold cooperation. We show that allocating asset ownership and indexing contracts can reduce the incentives to engage in hold-up. In contrast to much of the literature, the driving force in our model is payoff uncertainty, rather than noncontractible investments.
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Citations
Cited by
Kőszegi, B. (2014) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.52.4.1075 · Cited by 317
Accounting Information in Financial Contracting: The Incomplete Contract Theory Perspective
CHRISTENSEN, H. B., NIKOLAEV, V. V., & WITTENBERG‐MOERMAN, R. (2016) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12108 · Cited by 301
Formal and Informal Contracting: Theory and Evidence
Gil, R., & Zanarone, G. (2017) · Annual Review of Law and Social Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-110316-113413 · Cited by 56
Metadata
- Authors
- Hart, O.
- Venue
- Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2009-02
- Volume
- 124
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 267-300
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2112662901
- Cited by
- 169
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 27.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Hart, O. (2009). Hold-Up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points*. Quarterly Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2009.124.1.267
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.