The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
E-ZTAX: Tax Salience and Tax Rates*
Abstract
This paper examines whether the salience of a tax system affects equilibrium tax rates. I analyze how tolls change after toll facilities adopt electronic toll collection (ETC); drivers are substantially less aware of tolls paid electronically. I estimate that, in steady state, tolls are 20 to 40 percent higher than they would have been without ETC. Consistent with a salience-based explanation for this toll increase, I find that under ETC, driving becomes less elastic with respect to the toll and toll setting becomes less sensitive to the electoral calendar. Alternative explanations appear unlikely to be able to explain the findings.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
(2001) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 27,577
An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
Mirrlees, J. A. (1971) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2296779 · Cited by 4,510
Nordhaus, W. D. (1975) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2296528 · Cited by 3,905
Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy
Bucovetsky, S., Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2002) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1061733 · Cited by 3,748
Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (2008) · 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_7 · Cited by 3,302
Thaler, R. H. (1999) · Journal of Behavioral Decision Making · doi:10.1002/(sici)1099-0771(199909)12:3<183::aid-bdm318>3.0.co;2-f · Cited by 3,166
A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation
Ramsey, F. P. (1927) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2222721 · Cited by 2,891
Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence
Chetty, R., Looney, A., & Kroft, K. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.4.1145 · Cited by 2,742
A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model
Barro, R., & Gordon, D. (1981) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w0807 · Cited by 2,177
Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
Baron, D. P., & Myerson, R. B. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912769 · Cited by 1,721
The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution
Ballentine, J. G., Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. M. (1981) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1057953 · Cited by 1,720
Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition
Lindbeck, A., & Weibull, J. W. (1987) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00116710 · Cited by 1,611
The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution.
Prest, A. R., Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. M. (1981) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2553704 · Cited by 1,324
Effects of Payment Mechanism on Spending Behavior: The Role of Rehearsal and Immediacy of Payments
Soman, D. (2001) · Journal of Consumer Research · doi:10.1086/319621 · Cited by 419
Public finance in democratic process
Buchanan, J. M. (1967) · Cited by 390
Thaler, R. H. (2000) · Choices, Values, and Frames · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511803475.015 · Cited by 318
Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence
Chetty, R., Looney, A., & Kroft, K. (2008) · Finance and Economics Discussion Series · doi:10.17016/feds.2009.11 · Cited by 288
Pricing in Public and Private Enterprises: Electric Utilities in the United States
Peltzman, S. (1971) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466705 · Cited by 222
THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF FISCAL ILLUSION
Dollery, B. E., & Worthington, A. C. (1996) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6419.1996.tb00014.x · Cited by 210
Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government
Becker, G. S., & Mulligan, C. B. (2003) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/377114 · Cited by 209
Incentives for Anticompetitive Behavior by Public Enterprises
Sappington, D. E. M., & Sidak, J. G. (2003) · Review of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1023/a:1023607223501 · Cited by 86
The Economic Winners and Losers of Legalized Gambling
Kearney, M. S. (2005) · National Tax Journal · doi:10.17310/ntj.2005.2.08 · Cited by 76
Do Governments Grow When They Become More Efficient? Evidence from Tax Withholding
Dušek, L. (2003) · Cited by 8
Cited by
Unobservable Selection and Coefficient Stability: Theory and Evidence
Oster, E. (2019) · Journal of Business & Economic Statistics · doi:10.1080/07350015.2016.1227711 · Cited by 5,367
Social norms and energy conservation
Allcott, H. (2011) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.03.003 · Cited by 2,802
Do Consumers Respond to Marginal or Average Price? Evidence from Nonlinear Electricity Pricing
Ito, K. (2014) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.104.2.537 · Cited by 820
Giving green to get green? Incentives and consumer adoption of hybrid vehicle technology
Gallagher, K. S., & Muehlegger, E. (2011) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2010.05.004 · Cited by 762
Bhargava, S., & Manoli, D. (2015) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20121493 · Cited by 640
“…(e.g., Chetty and Saez 2013; Liebman and Luttmer 2015; Karlan et al. 2015), as well as its salience (e.g., Chetty, Looney, and Kroft 2009; Finkelstein 2009) and complexity (Hastings and Weinstein 2008; Bettinger et al. 2012; Kling et al. 2012; Bhargava, Loewenstein, and Sydnor 2015)…”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Finkelstein, A.
- Venue
- Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2009-08
- Volume
- 124
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 969-1010
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2101597149
- Cited by
- 530
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 57.69
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.