CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 454Culture, Economy, and Development StudiesEconomic Growth and ProductivityExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Trust, growth, and well-being: New evidence and policy implications

Open access
Algan, Yann, Cahuc, Pierre·2014·Handbook of Economic Growth
DOI 10.1016/b978-0-444-53538-2.00002-2
Open this paper in CoChat — free accountOpen PDF

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/b978-0-444-53538-2.00002-2

Cites

5 of 5 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Trust in institutions and other people is a key factor in social and economic progress as well as democratic stability.

    “Numerous studies have identified trust -both trust in institutions and trust in other people-as a key factor in social and economic progress as well as democratic stability”

    From Transparency and Trust in Government. Evidence from a Survey Experiment (2021) · cites this paper as Algan & Cahuc, 2014

    The 'Future avenues: Trust and Well-Being' section says trust affects economic development and interacts with institutions, while 'Co-evolution of trust and institutions' links social capital to political accountability. These passages support much of the broad claim, but they do not establish that trust in institutions, specifically, is a key driver of democratic stability. Page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Cites

Part of this paper’s reference list could not be split into single entries.

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 100

  1. Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J., Johnson, S., 2001, The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation, American Economic Review, 91: 1369-1401.
  2. Aghion, P., Algan, Y., Cahuc, P., 2011, Can Policy affect culture? Minimum Wage and the Quality of Labor relations, Journal of the European Economic Association, vol 9(1): 3-42.
  3. Aghion, P., Algan, Y., Cahuc, P., Shleifer, A., 2010, Regulation and Distrust, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(3): 1015-1049.
  4. Aghion, P., Tirole, J., 1997, Formal and Real Authority in Organizations, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 105(1): 1-29.
  5. Alesina A., Baqir, R., Easterley, W., 1999, Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 114(4), pp. 1243-1284.
  6. Alesina, A., La Ferrara, E., 2000, Participation in Heterogeneous Communities, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 115(3), pp. 847-904.
  7. Alesina, A., La Ferrara, E., 2002, Who trust others?, Journal of Public Economics, vol (85)2, pp. 207-234.
  8. Algan, Y., Cahuc, P., 2009, Civic Virtue and Labor Market Institutions, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 1(1): 111-145.
  9. Algan, Y., Cahuc, P., 2010, Inherited Trust and Growth, American Economic Review, 100: 2060-2092.
  10. Algan, Y., Cahuc, P., Shleifer, A., 2012, Teaching Practices and Social Capital, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, forthcoming.
  11. Almond, G., Verba, S., 1989, 1st ed. 1963. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. London: Sage Publications.
  12. Ashraf, Q and O Galor. 2013. The 'Out-of-Africa' Hypothesis, Human Genetic Diver- sity, and Comparative Economic Development." American Economic Review.
  13. Banfield, E., 1958, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. New York: Free Press.
  14. Barr, A., Serneels, P., 2009, Reciprocity in the workplace. Experimental Economics, 12(1), pp.99-112.
  15. Belows, J., Miguel, E., 2009, War and Local Collective Action in Sierra Leone, Journal of Public Economics, 93(11-12): 1144-1157.
  16. Benabou, R., Tirole, J., 2006, Incentives and Prosocial Behavior, American Economic Review, 96(5), pp. 1652-1678.
  17. Bertrand M., Schoar A., 2006, The Role of Family in Family Firms, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 20(2): 73-96.
  18. Black, S., Lynch, L., 2001, How to compete : the Impact of Workplace practices and Information Technology on Productivity, Review of Economics and Statistics, 83(3), pp. 434- 445.
  19. Bidner, C., Francois, P., 2011, Cultivating Trust: Norms, Institutions and the Implications of Scale. Economic Journal, 121(5): 1097-1129.
  20. Bisin, A., Verdier, T., 2001, The Economics of Cultural Transmission and the Dynamics of Preferences, Journal of Economic Theory, 97, 298-319.
  21. Bardhan, P., 2000, Irrigation and Cooperation: An Empirical Analysis of 48 Irrigation Communities in South India, Economic Development and cultural change, 48(4): 847-65.
  22. Black, S., Lynch, L., 2001, How to Compete: The Impact of Workplace Practices and Information Technology on Productivity, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 83(3), p. 434- 445.
  23. Bloom N., Sadun, R., Van Reenen, J., 2010, Recent Advances in the Empirics of organizational Economics, Annual Review of Economics, vol. 2(1), pp. 105-137
  24. Bohnet, I., Zeckhauser, R., 2004, Trust, Risk and Betrayal, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, v. 55, 467-484.
  25. Bowles, S., Ginthis, H., 2007, Cooperation, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, eds L. Blume and S.Durlauf. Bowles, S., Polania-Reyes, S., 2012, Economic incentives and Social Preferences: Substitutes or Complements?, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 50(2), pp. 368-425.
  26. Carlin, B. I., Dorobantu F., Viswanathan S., 2009, Public trust, the law, and financial investment, Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 92(3), pp. 321-341.
  27. Castillo, M., Carter, M., 2011, Behavioral, Responses to Natural Disasters, Working Paper, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Cavalli-Sforza, L.L., Feldman, M., 1981, Cultural Transmission and Evolution: A Quantitative Approach, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
  28. Cole, S., Gine, X., Tobacman, J., Townsend, R., Vickery, J., 2012, Barriers to Household Risk Management: Evidence from India, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, forthcoming.
  29. Coleman, J., 1990, Foundations of Social Theory, Harvard University Press.
  30. Cox, J., 2004, How to identify trust and reciprocity, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 46, pp. 260-81.
  31. Dal Bo, P., Forster, A., Putterman, L., 2010, Institutions and Behavior, Experimental evidence on the effects of democracy, American Economic Reveiw, vol 100(5), pp. 2205-2229.
  32. Dinesen, P.T., Hooghe, M., 2010, When in Rome, Do as the Romans Do: The Acculturation of Generalized Trust among Immigrants in Western Europe, International Migration Review, 44(3), pp. 697-727.
  33. Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Huffman, D., Sunde, U., 2012, The Intergenerational Transmission of Risk and Trust Attitudes, Review of Economic Studies, 79(2): 645-677.
  34. Durlauf, S., 2002, On the empirics of social capital, Economic Journal, vol. 112(438), pp. 459-479.
  35. Philippe Aghion and Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, vol. 1, chapter 26, pp. 1639-1699.
  36. Ellison G., 1994, Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching, The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 61( 3), pp. 567-588.
  37. Ermisch, J., Gambetta, D., 2010, Do strong family ties inhibit trust?, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organisations.
  38. Ermisch, J., Gambetta, D., Heather, L., Siedler, T., Uhrig, N., 2009. Measuring people's trust, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 172(4), pages 749-769.
  39. Falk, A., Kosfeld, M., 2006, The Hidden Costs of Control, American Economic Review, vol. 96(5), pp. 1611-1630.
  40. Fehr, E., Schimdt, K., 1999, A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 114(3) , pp. 817-868.
  41. Fehr, E., Camerer, C.F., 2004. Measuring Social Norms and Preferences Using Experimental Games: A Guide for Social Scientists. Foundations of Human Sociality, 1(9), pp.55-96.
  42. Fehr, E., 2009, On the Economics and Biology of Trust, Presidential address at the 2008 meeting of the European Economic Association, Journal of the European Economic Association, v. 7 (2-3), 235-266, 04-05.
  43. Fisman, R., Miguel, E., 2007, Culture of corruption: evidence from diplomatic parking ticket," Journal of Political Economy, 115(6), 2007, pp. 1020-1048.
  44. Francois, P., Zabojnik, J., 2005. Trust, Social Capital, and Economic Development, Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(1): 51-94, 03.
  45. Frey, B., 1998, Institutions and Morale: The Crowding-out Effect, in Economics, Values, and Organization, ed. Avner Ben-Ner and Louis Putterman, pp. 437-460, New York: Cambridge University Press.
  46. Fukuyama, F., 1995, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, New York: Free Press.
  47. Gambetta, D., 1993, The Sicilian Mafia. The Business of Private Protection, Harvard University Press
  48. Gennaioli, N., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 2012, Human Capital and Regional Development, Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming 2013.
  49. Gintis, H., Bowles, S., Boyd, R., Fehr, E., 2005, Moral Sentiments and. Material Interests: Origins, Evidence, and. Consequences. chapter 1, in Moral Sentiments and. Material Interests, MIT Press.
  50. Glaeser, E., Laibson, D., Scheinkman, J., Soutter, C., 2000, Measuring trust, Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, pp. 811-846.
  51. Glaeser, E., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 2004, Do Institutions Cause Growth?, Journal of Economic Growth, 9 , 271-303.
  52. Greif, A., 1993, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition. American Economic Review, 83 525-48.
  53. Greif, A., 1994, Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies, Journal of Political Economy. 102: 912-50.
  54. Greif, A., Tabellini, G., 2010. Cultural and Institutional Bifurcation: China and Europe compared, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, vol. 100(2), pp. 1-10.
  55. Guiso, L., Jappelli, T., 2005, Awarness and Stock Market Participation, Review of Finance, 9(4), 537-567.
  56. Guiso L., Parigi, G., 1999, Investment And Demand Uncertainty, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 114(1), pp. 185-227.
  57. Guiso L., Sapienza, P., Zingales, L., 2004, The Role of Social Capital in Financial Development, American Economic Review, vol. 94, n. 3, pp. 526-56.
  58. Guiso L., Sapienza, P., Zingales, L., 2006, Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 20(2), pp. 23-48.
  59. Guiso L., Sapienza, P., Zingales, L., 2008a, Trusting the Stock Market, Journal of Finance, 63(6), pages 2557-2600.
  60. Guiso L., Sapienza, P., Zingales, L., 2008c, Alfred Marshall Lecture: Social Capital as Good Culture. Journal of the European Economic Association, 6(2-3): 295-320.
  61. Guiso L., Sapienza, P., Zingales, L., 2009, Cultural Biases in Economic Exchange, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(3).
  62. Guiso L., Sapienza, P., Zingales, L., 2011, Civic Capital as the Missing Link, Handbook of Social Economics, Volume 1A, Jess Benhabib, Alberto Bisin, and Matthew O. Jackson, eds. Hall, R., Jones, C., 1999, Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker Than Others, Quarterly Journal of Economics, v. 114 (1), 83-116.
  63. Hauk, E., Saez-Marti, M., 2002, On the cultural transmission of corruption. Journal of Economic Theory, 107 (2), 311-335.
  64. Helliwell, J., Putnam, R., 2007, Education and Social Capital, Eastern Economics Journal, 33(1): 1-19.
  65. Helliwell J., Wang, S., 2010, Trust and Well-Being, International Journal of Well-Being, 1(2): 42-78
  66. Heckman, J.J, Malofeeva, L., Pinto, R., Savelyev, P., 2012, Understanding the Mechanisms Through Which an Influential Early Childhood Program Boosted Adult Outcomes, American Economic Review, forthcoming.
  67. Hirshman, A., 1970, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Harvard University Press.
  68. Hoff, K., Kshetramade, M. and E. Fehr, 2011, Caste and Punishment: the legacy of caste culture in norm enforcement, Economic Journal, 121, 449-475.
  69. Holm, H., Danielson, A., 2005, Tropic trust versus Nordic trust: Experimental evidence from Tanzania and Sweden, The Economic Journal 115: 505-532.
  70. Ichino, A., Maggi, G., 2000, Work Environment and Individual Background: Explaining Regional Shirking Differentials in a Large Italian Firm. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(3): 1057-1090.
  71. Kandori, M., 1992, Social Norms and Community Enforcement, Review of Economic Studies, 59, 63-80.
  72. Karlan, D., 2005, Using Experimental Economics to Measure Social Capital and Predict Financial Decisions, American Economic Review, 95(5), pp. 1688-1699.
  73. Kahneman, D., Tversky, A., 2000, Choices, Values and Frames, Cambridge University Press.
  74. Knack, S., Keefer, P., 1997, Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross- Country Investigation, Quarterly Journal of Economics, v. 112 (4), 1252-88.
  75. Knack, S., Zak, P., 1999, Trust and Growth, Economic Journal, v. 111 (470), 295-321.
  76. Kranton, R. 1996, Reciprocal Exchange, A Self-Sustaining System, American Economic Review, 830-851.
  77. La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny. R., 1997, Trust in Large Organizations. American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 87 (2): 333-8.
  78. La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 2008, The Economics Consequences of Legal Origins, Journal of Economic Literature, June.
  79. Laury, S. K., Taylor, L.O., 2008. Altruism spillovers: Are behaviors in context-free experiments predictive of altruism toward a naturally occurring public good? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 65(1), pp.9-29.
  80. Lazzarini, S., Artes, R., Madalozzo, R., Siqueira, J., 2005, Measuring trust: An experiment in Brazil, Brazilian Journal of Applied Economics 9(2) : 153-69.
  81. Miguel, E., M. K. Gugerty, 2005, Ethnic Diversity, Social Sanctions, and Public Goods in Kenya, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 89(11), pp. 2325-2368
  82. Miguel, E., Saiegh, S., Satyanath, S., 2011, Civil War Exposure and Violence, Economics and Politics, vol. 23, pp 59-73.
  83. Nannicini, T., Stella, A., Tabellini, G., Troiano, U., 2013, Social Capital and Political Accountability, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, forthcoming.
  84. Nunn, N., 2008, The Long Term Effects of Africa's Slave Trades, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(1), pp. 139-176.
  85. Nunn, N., Wantchekon, L., 2011, The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa, American Economic Review, Vol. 101, No. 7, , 3221-3252.
  86. Nunn, N., 2009, The Importance of History for Economic Development, Annual Review of Economics, vol. 1, 65-92.
  87. Olson, M., 1971 [1965], The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Revised edition ed.). Harvard University Press.
  88. Ostrom, E., 1990, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  89. Putnam, R., Leonardi, R., and Nanetti, RY., 1993, Making Democracy Work. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  90. Rohner D., Thoenig M., Zilibotti F., 2013, War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust and Conflict, Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming.
  91. Rothstein, B., 2011, The Quality of Government, Social Trust and Inequality in International Perspective, University of Chicago Press.
  92. Sanfey, A.G, Rilling, J.K., Aronson, J.A., Nystrom, L.E et Cohen, J.D., 2002, The neural basis of economic decision-making in the ultimatum game, Science, 300, pp. 1755-1758, 2003.
  93. Smith, A. 1997[1766]), Lecture on the influence of commerce on manners. Reprinted in (D. B. Klein,ed.) Reputation:Studies in the Voluntary Elicitation of Good Conduct,University of Michigan Press.
  94. Spolaore, E., Wacziarg, R., How deep are the roots of economic development, Journal of Economic Literature, 2013.
  95. Tabellini, G., 2008a, The Scope of Cooperation: Values and Incentives, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 123(3): 905-950.
  96. Tabellini, G., 2008b, Institutions and Culture, Journal of the European Economic Association, Papers and Proceedings, vol. 6(2-3).
  97. Tabellini, G., 2010, Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Europe, Journal of the European Economic Association, 8(4), pp. 677-716.
  98. Uslaner, E.M., 2008. Corruption, Inequality and Trust, in Handbook on Social Capital, Gert T. Svendsen and Gunnar L. Svendsen, ed., Edward Elgar. Uslaner 2012, Segregatin and Mistrust: Diversity, Isolation and Social Cohesion, Cambridge University Press.
  99. Valent, P., 2000, Disaster syndrome, in Encyclopedia of Stress. Ed. George Fink. New York: Academic Press.
  100. Wallace, A., 1956, Tornado in Worcester: An Exploratory Study of Individual and Community Behavior in an Extreme Situation. Publication 392, National Academy of Sciences- National Research Council, Washington, D.C. Zak, P., Kursban R., Matzner, W., 2004, The Neurobiology of Trust, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, pp. 224-227.

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Algan, Y., & Cahuc, P.
Affiliations
  • Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (FR)
  • École Polytechnique (FR)
ORCID
Venue
Handbook of Economic Growth
Publisher
Elsevier
Published
2014
Pages
49-120
ISSN
1574-0684
DOI
10.1016/b978-0-444-53538-2.00002-2
OpenAlex
W3124666028
Cited by
454
References
5
Citations by year
2026: 22 · 2025: 16 · 2024: 23 · 2023: 35 · 2022: 34 · 2021: 137 · 2020: 47 · 2019: 24 · 2018: 12 · 2017: 26 · 2016: 48 · 2015: 15 · 2014: 11 · 2013: 3
FWCI
159.24
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Elsevier eBooks (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Econstor (Econstor) (submittedVersion)
Funders
FP7 Ideas: European Research Council (240923)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Demography › Culture, Economy, and Development Studies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Growth and Productivity
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Keywords
trust, economic development, institutions, well-being, trust measurement, innovation, business organization, labor market, product markets

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review