The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Boondoggles, Rent-Seeking, and Political Checks and Balances: Public Investment under Unaccountable Governments
Abstract
We show that public investment is dramatically higher in countries with low-quality governance and limited political checks and balances or no competitive elections. This result is robust to a number of specifications. The most plausible interpretation of these results is that these governments use public investment as a vehicle to increase their rent-seeking. This evidence suggests that efforts to increase public investment in countries with weak governance, or to measure the growth effects of productive public investment using only observed measures of public investment, should be undertaken with caution.
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Cites
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Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries
Barro, R. (1989) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w3120 · Cited by 8,385
Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?
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The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Reply
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INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: CROSS‐COUNTRY TESTS USING ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES
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Self-citationThe Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded Set of International Comparisons, 1950-1988
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Infrastructure and Economic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa
Calderon, C., & Serven, L. (2010) · Journal of African Economies · doi:10.1093/jae/ejp022 · Cited by 479
Is infrastructure capital productive? A dynamic heterogeneous approach
Calderón, C., Moral-Benito, E., & Servén, L. (2015) · Journal of Applied Econometrics · doi:10.1002/jae.2373 · Cited by 365
Investing in public investment: an index of public investment efficiency
Dabla-Norris, E., Brumby, J., Kyobe, A., Mills, Z., & Papageorgiou, C. (2012) · Journal of Economic Growth · doi:10.1007/s10887-012-9078-5 · Cited by 346
Oil rents, corruption, and state stability: Evidence from panel data regressions
Arezki, R., & Brückner, M. (2011) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.03.004 · Cited by 272
Metadata
- Authors
- Keefer, P., & Knack, S.
- Venue
- Review of Economics and Statistics
- Publisher
- MIT Press - Journals
- Published
- 2007-08
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 566-572
- ISSN
- 0034-6535 (ISSN-L)
- 1530-9142
- OpenAlex
- W2169734393
- Cited by
- 273
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 36.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Keefer, P., & Knack, S. (2007). Boondoggles, Rent-Seeking, and Political Checks and Balances: Public Investment under Unaccountable Governments. Review of Economics and Statistics. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest.89.3.566
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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