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Incentive Strength and Teacher Productivity: Evidence from a Group-Based Teacher Incentive Pay System

Imberman, Scott A., Lovenheim, Michael F. · 2015 · Review of Economics and Statistics
Cited by 79

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

We estimate the impact of incentive strength on achievement under a group-based teacher incentive pay program. The system provides variation in the share of students in a subject-grade that a teacher instructs, which proxies for incentive strength. We find that achievement on incentivized exams, but not nonincentivized exams, improves when incentives strengthen. For the incentivized exams, we find that effects fade out monotonically as a teacher's portion of the group increases to between 20 and 30 percentage and are larger for teachers with low-achieving students. Calculations based off these estimates show modest positive effects of the program overall.

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Metadata

Authors
Imberman, S. A., & Lovenheim, M. F.
Venue
Review of Economics and Statistics
Published
2015-05
Volume
97
Issue
2
Pages
364-386
ISSN
  • 0034-6535 (ISSN-L)
  • 1530-9142
OpenAlex
W2078910562
Cited by
79
References
5
FWCI
32.46
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Incentive Strength and Teacher Productivity: Evidence from a Group-Based Teacher Incentive Pay System. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1162/rest_a_00486
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Imberman, S. A., & Lovenheim, M. F. (2015). Incentive Strength and Teacher Productivity: Evidence from a Group-Based Teacher Incentive Pay System. Review of Economics and Statistics. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00486

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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