The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Understanding the Advice of Commissions-Motivated Agents: Evidence from the Indian Life Insurance Market
Open accessAbstract
We conduct a series of field experiments to evaluate the quality of advice provided by life insurance agents in India. Agents overwhelmingly recommend unsuitable, strictly dominated products that provide high commissions to the agent. Agents cater to the beliefs of uninformed consumers, even when those beliefs are wrong. We also find that agents appear to focus on maximizing the amount of premiums (and therefore their commissions) that customers pay, as opposed to focusing on how much insurance coverage customers need. A natural experiment requiring disclosure of commissions for a specific product results in agents recommending alternative products with high commissions but no disclosure requirement. A follow-up agent survey sheds light on the extent to which poor advice reflects both the commission incentives and agents’ limited product knowledge.
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Tying Odysseus to the Mast: Evidence From a Commitment Savings Product in the Philippines
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Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets
Gabaix, X., & Laibson, D. (2006) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2006.121.2.505 · Cited by 1,426
The Hyperbolic Consumption Model: Calibration, Simulation, and Empirical Evaluation
Angeletos, G.-M., Laibson, D., Repetto, A., Tobacman, J., & Weinberg, S. (2001) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.15.3.47 · Cited by 1,000
Exponential Growth Bias and Household Finance
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Cited by
An Introduction to Audit Studies in the Social Sciences
Gaddis, S. M. (2018) · Audit Studies: Behind the Scenes with Theory, Method, and Nuance · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-71153-9_1 · Cited by 157
Metadata
- Authors
- Anagol, S., Cole, S., & Sarkar, S.
- Venue
- Review of Economics and Statistics
- Publisher
- MIT Press
- Published
- 2017-03
- Volume
- 99
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-15
- ISSN
- 0034-6535 (ISSN-L)
- 1530-9142
- OpenAlex
- W3122652718
- Cited by
- 258
- References
- 31
- FWCI
- 73.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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