Moving Beyond Deterrence: The Effectiveness of Raising the Expected Utility of Abstaining from Terrorism in Israel
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Rational choice approaches to reducing terrorist violence would suggest raising the costs of terrorism through punishment, thereby reducing the overall expected utility of terrorism. In this article, we argue that states should also consider raising the expected utility of abstaining from terrorism through rewards. We test effects of repressive (or punishing) and conciliatory (or rewarding) actions on terrorist behavior using the newly developed GATE-Israel dataset, which identifies events by Israeli state actors toward Palestinian targets on a full range of counterterrorism tactics and policies from 1987 to 2004. Results show that repressive actions are either unrelated to terror or related to subsequent increases in terror, and conciliatory actions are generally related to decreases in terror, depending on the tactical period. Findings also reveal the importance of understanding the role of terrorists’ constituencies for reducing violence.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach
Becker, G. S. (1968) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259394 · Cited by 13,999
Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation
Tyler, T. R. (2006) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.57.102904.190038 · Cited by 2,381
Defiance, Deterrence, and Irrelevance: A Theory of the Criminal Sanction
SHERMAN, L. W. (1993) · Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency · doi:10.1177/0022427893030004006 · Cited by 1,133
How “Free” is Free Riding in Civil Wars?: Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem
Kalyvas, S. N., & Kocher, M. A. (2007) · World Politics · doi:10.1353/wp.2007.0023 · Cited by 616
Fully committed: suicide bombers’ motivation and the quest for personal significance.
Kruglanski, A. W., Chen, X., Dechesne, M., Fishman, S., & Orehek, E. (2009) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2009.00698.x · Cited by 525
Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks?: Evidence from Chechnya
Lyall, J. (2009) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002708330881 · Cited by 499
Deterring Delinquents: A Rational Choice Model of Theft and Violence
Matsueda, R. L., Kreager, D. A., & Huizinga, D. (2006) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.1177/000312240607100105 · Cited by 467
Schwartz, R. D., & Skolnick, J. H. (1962) · Social Problems · doi:10.1525/sp.1962.10.2.03a00030 · Cited by 305
TARGETED ENFORCEMENT AND ADVERSE SYSTEM SIDE EFFECTS: THE GENERATION OF FUGITIVES IN PHILADELPHIA*
GOLDKAMP, J. S., & VÎLCICÃ, E. R. (2008) · Criminology · doi:10.1111/j.1745-9125.2008.00113.x · Cited by 41
Metadata
- Authors
- Dugan, L., & Chenoweth, E.
- Venue
- American Sociological Review
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2012-07-31
- Volume
- 77
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 597-624
- ISSN
- 0003-1224 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-8271
- OpenAlex
- W2153765806
- Cited by
- 199
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 38.07
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Moving Beyond Deterrence: The Effectiveness of Raising the Expected Utility of Abstaining from Terrorism in Israel. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1177/0003122412450573
- The paper
- Dugan, L., & Chenoweth, E. (2012). Moving Beyond Deterrence: The Effectiveness of Raising the Expected Utility of Abstaining from Terrorism in Israel. American Sociological Review. https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122412450573
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.