The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Informal Politics of Legislation: Explaining Secluded Decision Making in the European Union
Abstract
This article investigates a widespread yet understudied trend in EU politics: the shift of legislative decision making from public inclusive to informal secluded arenas and the subsequent adoption of legislation as “early agreements.” Since its introduction in 1999, “fast-track legislation” has increased dramatically, accounting for 72% of codecision files in the Sixth European Parliament. Drawing from functionalist institutionalism, distributive bargaining theory, and sociological institutionalism, this article explains under what conditions informal decision making is likely to occur. The authors test their hypotheses on an original data set of all 797 codecision files negotiated between mid-1999 and mid-2009. Their analysis suggests that fast-track legislation is systematically related to the number of participants, legislative workload, and complexity. These findings back a functionalist argument, emphasizing the transaction costs of intraorganizational coordination and information gathering. However, redistributive and salient acts are regularly decided informally, and the Council presidency’s priorities have no significant effect on fast-track legislation. Hence, the authors cannot confirm explanations based on issue properties or actors’ privileged institutional positions. Finally, they find a strong effect for the time fast-track legislation has been used, suggesting socialization into interorganizational norms of cooperation.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
North, D. C. (1990) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808678 · Cited by 32,691
Cited by
The New Intergovernmentalism: European Integration in the Post‐Maastricht Era
Bickerton, C. J., Hodson, D., & Puetter, U. (2015) · JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies · doi:10.1111/jcms.12212 · Cited by 586
Politics matters: Regulatory events as catalysts for price formation under cap-and-trade
Koch, N., Grosjean, G., Fuss, S., & Edenhofer, O. (2016) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2016.03.004 · Cited by 135
Metadata
- Authors
- Reh, C., Héritier, A., Bressanelli, E., & Koop, C.
- Venue
- Comparative Political Studies
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2011-12-05
- Volume
- 46
- Issue
- 9
- Pages
- 1112-1142
- ISSN
- 0010-4140 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-3829
- OpenAlex
- W3123359075
- Cited by
- 200
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 66.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Informal Politics of Legislation: Explaining Secluded Decision Making in the European Union. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1177/0010414011426415
- The paper
- Reh, C., Héritier, A., Bressanelli, E., & Koop, C. (2013). The Informal Politics of Legislation: Explaining Secluded Decision Making in the European Union. Comparative Political Studies. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414011426415
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.